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1. Introduction 
1.1. Scope  
 
The main purposes of this study is to compare transaction costs of tradable 
permit systems with other types of policy instruments and based on this 
comparison, to infer relevant policy options and implications for the use of 
tradable permits. This requires that tradable permits are first placed within a 
broader theoretical framework. Several elements of this framework, 
including different theories on market failures and the internalization of 
externalities, are discussed in section 1.2. Subsequently, the central research 
questions and methodology, which can be embedded in this theoretical 
frame, are described in section 1.3. This section also gives an outline of the 
study. 
 
1.2. Theoretical framework 
1.2.1. Market failures 
The market mechanism can be thought of as a process by which the 
decisions taken by different agents in the economy are all co-ordinated 
through adjustments in prices. The case for the market as the mechanism for 
the optimal allocation of social resources is well known. The idea is to 
achieve a Pareto-efficient allocation of social resources; this means that no 
single economic agent can be made better off without at the same time 
harming another agent. Following Inman (1987, p. 649), markets fail in 
those cases in which they cannot prevent individuals from cheating against a 
mutually co-operative outcome (Paulus, 1995, p. 1). It occurs when the 
following conditions exist: 
1. There is no adequate competition. This is the case when mergers 
are all too common, the result will be an increase in larger and 
fewer firms in many industries. In extreme cases, this results in a 
monopoly. The greatest threat of a monopoly is that it denies 
consumers the benefit of choice and competition. In the end, it 
will create artificial shortages and higher prices. Inadequate 
competition may also enable a firm to influence politics by 
means of economic strength.  
2. Buyers and sellers have no complete information. The 
competitive market process as a mechanism for achieving a 
first-best, Pareto-optimal allocation of resources requires that 
each consumer is fully informed about all attributes of the 
commodity being purchased. If this is not the case, particularly 
if the seller knows more about the commodity than the buyer, 
market transactions will be characterized by asymmetric 
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information (Inman, 1987, p. 659). This leads to mistakes and 
thus, market failure.  
3. Resource immobility exists. The efficient allocation of resources 
requires that land, labour, entrepreneurs, and capital are free to 
move to markets where the returns are the highest. The 
consequence of a move is a reason that may hamper the 
corporation from taking its business elsewhere.1 Resource 
mobility is considered ideal in the competitive market economy, 
but it is actually much more difficult to accomplish. When 
resources are immobile, markets do not function as they should.  
4. Inefficiency in a market economy also occurs because of the 
existence of public goods, i.e. goods that are non-rivalrous and 
non-excludable. Examples are highways, schools, national 
defence and the police. In the absence of government 
intervention, the market provides a lower than optimal amount 
of public goods because of the free rider2 problem. Clearly, the 
market process with self-seeking consumers will fail to achieve 
a Pareto-efficient allocation of these goods and services.  
5. Finally, in case of externalities, markets will fail. Externalities 
arise whenever consumption or production by one person or 
firm directly affects utility of another person or firm. Like public 
goods, externalities create a conflict between self-seeking 
maximizing behaviour and the attainment of a Pareto-efficient 
allocation of social resources. If a Pareto-efficient allocation is 
to result when an activity creates benefits or harm for 
individuals other than those performing the activity, then we 
require the performing agent to be rewarded or penalized 
according to the marginal benefits or costs created. According to 
Inman (1987, p. 656-657), unless all consumers have identical 
demands for the externality and the externality can be denied to 
non-payers, a market process will not achieve a Pareto-efficient 
allocation.  
 
Besides these five important reasons of market failure, two other reasons 
often mentioned are distributional or equity considerations and (de)merit 
good arguments when the government encourages or discourages the 
consumption of a certain good because it thinks this consumption is good or 
bad per se (Verhoef, 1999, p. 199).  
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1 There are times when a business that is located in a certain community decides to leave 
the region, leaving hundreds of people unemployed. Therefore, it is very difficult for a 
business to take those drastic decisions.  
2 The free rider problem exists because individuals do not need to reveal their preferences 
concerning which public goods should be provided, since they know that even without 
revealing their preferences they benefit from the services.  
11
According to Inman (1987, p. 653), where markets fail to achieve 
efficiency, governments may succeed. As an allocator of social resources, 
the task of the government is to find and enforce a cooperative, Pareto-
improving allocation. In that sense, governments play the role of economic 
institutions. Generally, this role has to be compared to the role of markets in 
order to determine under what circumstances governments are preferred 
over markets for the allocation of resources (Paulus, 1995, p. 1). However, 
although government intervention can often improve on market outcomes, it 
does not always do so. First, there often exists asymmetric information 
between government and private agents about various parameters that affect 
optimal economic decisions. Second, politicians and civil servants have 
their own objectives, monetary or non-monetary, and these objectives are 
not necessarily aimed at minimising economic inefficiencies or achieving a 
more desirable distribution of income when designing and implementing 
economic policies. Third, transaction costs can be high with government 
intervention and, finally, government involvement creates opportunities for 
rent-seeking activities and lobbying by interest groups.  
 
Traditionally, the role of the government in relation to the market has been 
to distribute resources and to define and enforce property rights. 
Theoretically, if the government were to define property rights in such a 
way that would allow for correct pricing of environmental resources, their 
actual scarcity and cost would be reflected. This suggests a role for 
governments in implementing e.g. environmental protection. Different 
options are available to the government for this purpose: educate consumers, 
place quotas on the use of certain resources or ban producers from using 
them, or create market-based incentives to induce both producers and 
consumers to adjust their behaviour.  
1.2.2. Public goods 
The theory of public goods was first developed and debated by the 
continental public finance economists, notably Ugo Mazzola, Knut 
Wicksell, Erik Landahl, Emil Sax and others (Musgrave and Peacock, 
1958). However, the public goods theory stayed in its infancy until the 
1950s. Modern public goods theory can be attributed to Paul A. Samuelson. 
Following Samuelson, other important contributions to the public goods 
theory were by Musgrave (1958) and Buchanan (1968). Their contributions 
were the cornerstones of the modern public goods theory. Samuelson’s 
(1955) definition gives two characteristics of public goods: indivisibility3 
and joint consumption4. The result of those two characteristics is that once a 
public good is produced, any given unit of the good can be made equally 
available to all. As Samuelson (1955) so succinctly states, public goods 
 12 
                                                 
3 To express indivisibility, he uses the term “can not be parcelled out among different 
individuals”. 
4 To express joint consumption, he states “all enjoy in common”. 
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have the property that “one man’s consumption does not reduce some other 
man’s consumption”. According to the definition of Samuelson, extension 
of the supply to one individual facilitates its extension to all. In other words, 
supply of a given unit to one individual, and supply of the same unit to other 
individuals are clearly joint products. This contrasts sharply with private 
goods which, once consumed or utilized as an input, can no longer be of 
service to others (Oakland, 1987, p. 485). 
 
In general, goods can be classified into two groups: pure goods and impure 
goods. Pure goods consist of pure public goods and pure private goods. A 
pure public good, what Samuelson calls “collective consumption good” has 
the two characteristics as already described: non-rivalry and non-exclusion. 
However, pure public goods have also some other characteristics that pure 
private goods usually have not, namely externalities, the free rider and the 
forced rider5 problem. 
 
Impure goods are divided into club, common-pool and merit/demerit goods. 
A club good is an impure public good whose benefits are excludable, but 
partially non-rival. Club goods consist of quasi-collective goods and toll 
goods. A quasi-collective good is related the pure private good in the sense 
that it has both rivalry and exclusion features. However, a quasi-collective 
good generates either positive or negative external economies6. Toll goods7 
are partially indivisible (non-rival) goods whose benefits are shared by club 
members. Exclusion mechanism could be installed in return for a free or a 
user charge, which is a “toll”. This type of goods are mostly said to be 
natural monopolies, which is to say that as the number of users increases, 
the cost per user decreases. Common-pool goods8 are divisible but 
exclusion is difficult or sometimes expensive to implement. Normally, there 
is no need of payment to obtain or to use this type of goods and they can be 
consumed to the point of exhaustion, as long as the cost of collecting, 
harvesting or extracting does not exceed the value of the goods to the 
consumer. Finally, the concept of merit goods was first introduced by 
Musgrave (1959). Merit goods are beneficial for the entire society and, 
therefore, are expected to encourage production and/or consumption. For 
example, the construction of low cost housing for poor, rehabilitation 
 13 
                                                 
5 The term of forced rider explains that the supply and the demand for some particular 
public goods may be obligatory. An example is elementary education. Individuals may be 
forced to demand or consume a public good, whereas an individual is totally free to demand 
for goods and services in the marketplace. 
6 Externalities are the distinguished feature of quasi-collective goods. Examples are: 
education and health. 
7 Toll goods are also referred to as exclusive club goods. Examples are cable television, 
communication networks and utilities such as electric power and water supply. However, in 
the recent developments, the existence of toll goods is slowly diminishing.  
8 Examples of common-pool goods are fishing in the see, hunting in wild mountains and 
extracting minerals from nature. 
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centres for elderly and mentally deficient people may be encouraged by 
government via several methods. Demerit goods are harmful and it is 
thereby expected that their consumption and/or production will be 
penalized. For example, the government can penalize the production as well 
as the consumption of demerit goods such as alcohol, tobacco products, 
drug use etc.  
1.2.3. Internalization of externalities 
External effects have been studied by economists ever since the days of 
Marshall and Pigou. Along with the development of the field of 
environmental economics, the theory of externalities has remained of great 
and growing importance in economic science (Verhoef, 1999, p. 197). As 
already pointed out, the existence of externalities leads to a deviation from 
the social optimum (Pareto efficiency). In the presence of externalities, 
market prices do not reflect full social costs (or benefits), and, for instance, 
regulatory taxes (or subsidies) are called for to restore the efficient workings 
of the market mechanism. Verhoef (1999, p. 200) describes externalities as 
follows: “an external effect exists when an actor’s (the receptor’s) utility (or 
production) function contains a real variable whose actual value depends on 
the behaviour of another actor (the supplier), who does not take this effect 
of his behaviour into account in his decision-making process”. According to 
Mishan (1971), “the essential feature of an external effect is that the effect 
produced is not a deliberate creation but an unintended or incidental by-
product of some otherwise legitimate activity”. Externalities thus refer to 
situations where effects (harmful or beneficial) of production or 
consumption are imposed on others but cannot be traced or charged back to 
the originator. Harmful side effects that affect an uninvolved third party are 
called negative externalities whereas beneficial side effects are called 
positive externalities. The main characteristic of an externality is the 
separation between the affected individual and the source of the effects. 
Because of this, it is difficult to get the perpetrator to pay for the costs of the 
harmful effects or the beneficiaries to reimburse those who create benefits to 
society9.  
 
Baumol and Oates (1975, p. 17) give their own definition of externalities. 
They distinguish two conditions that need to be fulfilled when speaking of 
an externality. Firstly, an externality is present whenever some individual’s 
(person A) utility or production relationships include real (non-monetary) 
variables, whose values are chosen by others without particular attention to 
the effects on A’s welfare. This definition rules out the case, in which, 
someone deliberately does something to affect A’s welfare. Secondly, the 
decision maker, whose activity affects others’ utility levels or enters their 
 14 
                                                 
9 An example of a negative externality would be pollution. A positive externality exists if 
the economic action benefits a third party. The construction on a road may cause traffic 
jams but local business may benefit from the traffic, which is now detoured by their shops.  
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production functions, does not receive compensation for his activity, an 
amount equal to the resulting (marginal) benefits or costs to others.  
 
Tietenberg (2000, p. 68) describes two types of externalities: namely 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary externalities. When the external effect is 
transmitted through higher prices, pecuniary externalities arise. For 
example, suppose that when a firm moves into a residential area and causes 
nuisance for the neighbours, housing prices decrease. This decrease creates 
a negative effect on all those selling a house, and, therefore, is an external 
diseconomy10. However, resulting higher rents are reflecting the scarcity of 
land. Therefore, because the land market provides a mechanism by which 
the parties can bid for land, the prices that result reflect the value of the land 
in its various uses (Tietenberg, 2000, p. 68)11. A non-pecuniary externality12 
exists when the effect is not transmitted through prices. For example, the 
scarcity of clean air is not signalled to the polluting firm. An essential 
feedback mechanism via prices that is present for the pecuniary externalities 
is not present in the non-pecuniary externalities. Blauwens (1988, p. 73) 
claims that pecuniary externalities are not really external effects because 
they do not violate the correct functioning of the market economy. On the 
contrary, the market mechanism will move the prices of goods and factors 
and this will slow down certain consumptions or productions.  
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Baumol and Oates (1975, p. 15-23) elaborate on non-pecuniary externalities 
and distinguish two types, namely public and private goods externalities. 
Most of the externalities take the character of public goods13. For example, 
when the air in a city is polluted, this is for every resident and not just for 
one individual. Therefore, air pollution is a clear example of a public ‘bad’. 
It is common knowledge now that, when a public good is involved, the price 
system will just not do. Baumol and Oates emphasize on one specific 
character of the public goods, namely, the fact that an increase in the 
consumption of the good by one individual does not reduce its availability 
to others. On the contrary, depletable externalities will usually be permitted 
to persist only if the cost of collecting a price for it exceeds the potential 
gains. Otherwise, private enterprises will find it profitable to take the 
measures necessary to eliminate the externality. In practice, the major 
source of depletable externalities lies in institutional obstructions that 
effectively prevent the assignment of property rights permitting the 
implementation of normal market exclusion and pricing procedures. An 
example is the usage of exhaustible common-property resources, such as 
 
10 An external diseconomy refers to circumstances in which the affected party is damaged 
by the externality.  
11 This is called a pecuniary diseconomy and it does not causes a market failure. 
12 In the literature, non-pecuniary externalities are often called technological externalities.  
13 Public goods externalities are also called undepletable externalities. An undepletable 
externality in fact exhibits two types of market failure at the same time: the external effect 
itself, and a public good (or bad) character.  
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fisheries. Consider a lake to which all fishermen have free access. The 
fishing of one fisherman reduces the expected size of the catch of others, a 
clear case of a depletable externality. The result of individual maximizing 
behaviour is an excessive level of fishing. A price of admission to the lake 
could be charged and than the efficient level of fishing activity could be 
attained. This example suggests that it is preferred not to think of depletable 
externalities as externalities but as cases where institutional impediments 
make it impossible to impose the appropriate prices. 
 
Finally, Verhoef (1999, p. 201) raises the concept of congestion 
externalities, where each actor is at the same time both supplier and receptor 
of the effect. Probably the most important form of this type of externality is 
road traffic congestion. Economists like Pigou (1920, p. 194) and Knight 
(1924) already used the example of a congested highway as an illustration 
of the points they had to make on externality regulation.  
 
When discussing the internalization of externalities, Ronald Coase (1960) 
argued that, to the extent that the externality is Pareto-relevant14, exchange 
will tend to take place, hence internalizing the effect and guaranteeing an 
efficient outcome. Although much of his discussion was posed in terms of 
liability for damages, the implicit model for Coase’s analysis is one that 
assumes all property rights to be well defined and enforced and, hence, 
tradable. This basic Coasean analysis presumes that entitlements are 
protected by a property rule, insuring that, absent transaction costs, the 
operation of the market will effectively internalize a potential externality 
(Buchanan and Faith, 1981, p. 95-96). However, in cases where individuals 
acting on their own can not attain an efficient solution by bargaining, there 
are several ways in which the government can intervene and correct the 
market inefficiency. Examples are regulation, (Pigouvian) taxation and 
tradable permits. This thesis focuses on the possibility of using tradable 
permits to internalize external effects.  
 
1.3. Research questions and approach of the study 
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In this work, the concept of tradable permits in externalities is analyzed. To 
be able to assess the problems and possibilities of using tradable permits for 
 
14 A Pareto relevant externality exists where the behaviour of one affects the payoff of 
another and there exist potential arrangements for modifying behaviour so as to make all 
parties better off. This means that each person voluntary enters into trades to obtain factors 
and goods that have more utility to the individual then the original set (Pareto-better 
trades). Any opportunity of this sort that has not yet been consummated is referred to as a 
Pareto-relevant externality (Buchanan and Stubblebine, 1962). If people have knowledge of 
them, and they are not overwhelmed with transaction costs, the market will internalize all 
Pareto-relevant externalities, when it is in equilibrium. People will then have made all of 
the mutually advantageous trades that are possible.  
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ecological and/or other purposes, the concept of tradable permits is 
described in the second chapter. Tradable permits are an example of market-
based instruments. A more detailed description and analysis of the different 
policy approaches to reach certain policy goals are first given. Within the 
literature on tradable permits, there is a long history in which tradable 
permits are defined, described in detail and also used in practical cases. This 
literature survey is also given in the second chapter, along with a description 
of the different types of tradable permit programs. These programs are 
compared with each other, highlighting their own problems and 
possibilities. The theoretical foundations of tradable property rights are 
essential to understand how a system of tradable permits should be 
organised in a perfect world.  
 
In chapter 3, based on the previous idea, the construction of a tradable 
permit system is described with its design features. This will provide a more 
in-depth theoretical treatment of the instrument and also an analysis of its 
many different design possibilities. This theoretical framework is developed 
based on the transaction costs and property rights theory. This analysis will 
give an answer to the following questions: 
1. When is a cap-and-trade system best used?  
2. What are the different possibilities of initially distributing the permits? 
3. What are the advantages and disadvantages of inter-temporal trade? 
4. On which scale can the permits be distributed? 
5. Are there adverse effects on competition? 
6. Which other effects can a system of tradable permits bring about? 
7. What are the different monitoring and enforcement issues that need to 
be taken into account when implementing tradable permits? 
 
The central research question, namely to compare transaction costs of 
tradable permit systems with those of other policy instruments, is analysed 
within the context of particular case-studies, i.e. the development and use of 
tradable permits in emission rights, transportation rights and fiscal deficit 
rights. 
 
A tradable emissions system is based on the principle that the cost of 
emissions reductions varies from facility to facility. When each facility is 
set a limit on its emissions by the regulators, some facilities may be able to 
reduce emissions more than required at a fairly low cost. They may choose 
to reduce emissions levels below the required levels and sell the excess 
pollution rights to another source that is facing a higher cost of reducing its 
pollution. This theory of emission rights is described in detail in chapter 4. 
Furthermore, several nations, especially the United States, have already 
implemented systems of tradable permits to limit, for example, greenhouse 
gases. The most well-known program is the “Clean Air Amendments” of 
1990, which was the first major legislative effort to deal with a large and 
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continuing pollution problem by means of tradable emission allowances. 
This program will be discussed and also other programs, such as for 
example the RECLAIM program in California, will be described in this 
chapter. These case studies will help to understand the practical implications 
of introducing a system of tradable permits. Furthermore, this fourth chapter 
provides an overview of the most important problems and possibilities of 
using tradable permits in externalities. Tradable permits are attractive 
because of different reasons. For example, they are effective, efficient and 
give a clear incentive for technological development. Furthermore, the 
initial allocation can limit the excess burden that is typical for taxes. There 
are also a lot of problems with implementing tradable permits. Examples 
are: the existence of prohibitively high transaction costs and market power. 
All the general problems and possibilities of using tradable permits will be 
thoroughly discussed. Furthermore, a transaction costs analysis will be 
conducted by comparing all relevant transaction costs of tradable emission 
permits and environmental taxation. 
 
In chapter 5, the design of a tradable transportation permit system is 
analyzed. In addition to the problems of designing and implementing 
tradable permits systems in general as well as in emissions rights, as 
described in the previous chapters, their use in the transport sector involves 
some specific considerations. The design of a tradable permit system in the 
transport sector will take into account the following aspects: 
1. What are the objectives of the system and its basis characteristics, 
such as the physical basis of permits, the conditions under which the 
transfer of permits can take place and the legal status of the permits? 
2. What are the criteria for the initial allocation of the permits? 
3. Will temporal and spatial flexibility be introduced in the system? 
Which flexibility options (e.g. banking, borrowing) are suitable for 
this system? 
4. How will the trade be organised? 
5. What are the means of monitoring and enforcement, such as 
enforcement of penalties and fines and verification of required 
performance? 
6. What are the expected effects of this system? Will it have an impact 
on the competitiveness and market power? Is it compatible with 
existing legal and institutional frameworks, regulatory regimes, and 
other instruments such as taxes? What are the distributive aspects? Is 
the system politically and socially acceptable?  
 
For the comparative transaction cost analysis of tradable transportation 




In the sixth chapter, rights in deficit spending are studied. National fiscal 
deficits can be seen as external effects that weigh heavily on the Euro-
market and affect all members of the European Union. To deal with the 
problem, the European Union chose a set of strict norms and standards to 
which countries have to apply. This is a clear example of a traditional 
‘command-and-control’ policy. In this chapter, research is done about the 
introduction of tradable permits in deficit spending. Those countries who are 
in a need for extra deficit spending, can buy extra permits from other 
countries that do not have that need. The Stability Pact specifies ceilings for 
general government deficit, thus including deficits incurred by state, 
provincial and local governments. We note that Germany will violate the 
deficit rules for the second year. A sizable share of the federal government 
expenditure is canalized through state and local governments. Because the 
local governments and states question the constitutional status of the Pact, 
and they do not comply with the total allowed deficit spending, Germany 
exceeds the EU deficit limit. The tradable deficit permits system suggests a 
solution for this problem, if local governments are allowed to borrow and 
trade permits. After having received its initial allocation of permits, the 
federal government should distribute it among its different jurisdictions. All 
jurisdictions will then be allowed to act on the permits market, so that the 
final level of deficit spending will not exceed the limit. The design of such a 
system is described, based on the theoretical aspects from a tradable 
emission permit system. Again, transaction costs of tradable fiscal deficit 
permits will be compared with the current regulation, more specifically the 
Stability Pact. 
 
Finally, chapter 7 presents the conclusion in which the objective of this 
book is reflected upon by using the theoretical framework provided before. 
On the basis of the comparative transaction costs analysis, an assessment is 
made to find out which policy instruments can be implemented with low 
transaction costs. Finally, the chapter considers the limitations of this 
analysis and sketches some directions for further research.  
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2. Tradable permits: origin and context 
2.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the main sources of origin of the idea of using taxes and 
tradable permits for ecological purposes are described within the context of 
the economic approach to environmental problems. The chapter starts with a 
description of the different policy instruments to reach environmental goals, 
namely voluntary agreements, command-and-control policy and market-
based instruments. Although Stavins (2002, p. 2) considers four major 
categories within market-based instruments, taxes and tradable permits 
stand out since both rely on price signals to induce polluters to reduce 
pollution. Taxes and tradable permits are therefore further analyzed in the 
remaining paragraphs of this chapter. Besides the history of these two 
instruments, we will also elaborate on the different types of tradable permit 
systems. The chapter ends with discussing the controversy on a tradable 
permits approach.   
 
2.2. Policy instruments 
 
In the literature, the different policy instruments to curb pollution and reach 
environmental goals are voluntary initiatives, command-and-control policy 
and market-based instruments. These three instruments will be discussed in 
depth in the next sections. 
2.2.1. Voluntary initiatives 
Voluntary initiatives refer to measures which are used to motivate 
individuals to voluntarily change their behaviour with regard to the 
environment15. The most important characteristic is that individuals are not 
forced to change their behaviour with regard to the environment. This 
means that the (voluntary) measures are not previously mandated by 
government by legislation or intervention. The instrument has grown out of 
practice, not out of theory. The increasing pressure on the “shared 
responsibility” for environmental protection by government and the industry 
enhanced the use of voluntary initiatives. Under certain conditions, these 
initiatives can develop in a promising additional instrument in national or 
European policy.  
 
Voluntary initiatives exist in many variations which all carry elements of the 
national, cultural or economic context of their use. Different forms of 
 20 
                                                 
15 Paulus (1995, p. 22) refers to voluntary initiatives as social regulation instruments. They 
are also sometimes called persuasive instruments.  
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voluntary initiatives are: self-regulation, co-regulation, responsible care 
programs, behaviour codes, own intentions, voluntary environmental 
reporting, registrations with environmental care systems such as ISO 14000, 
environmental labelling and agreements between the government and the 
industry (Crals and Vereeck, 2004b). All these types include three main 
instruments: unilateral commitments made by for example polluters, 
negotiated agreements between industry and public authorities, and public 
voluntary schemes developed by environmental agencies (Bernheim, 2001, 
p.193). Unilateral commitments made by polluters consist of environmental 
improvement programs set up by firms and communicated to their 
stakeholders. An example would be where a firm commits itself to some 
combination of reducing its emissions by 20 per cent over five years. In the 
public voluntary schemes, the public authorities set standards to be 
followed, or targets to be attained and participating firms agree to meet 
these targets. An example is compliance with the Eco Management and 
Auditing Scheme (EMAS)16 of the European Union, which as been 
available to firms since 1993. Negotiated agreements are agreements 
between a sector or group of sectors to meet one or more overall targets. A 
common example in a number of countries in the E.U. is a commitment on 
the part of those in the packaging chain to meet an overall re-use and 
recycling target, by a pre-specified year (Higley and Lévêque, 2001, p. 5-6).  
 
There is little information about the environmental efficiency of voluntary 
initiatives. The prime reason is that a lot of voluntary initiatives are still 
running and no conclusions can be made yet. The lack of base lines and 
reference points for emissions is a serious disadvantage of voluntary 
initiatives. If those base lines would exist, the effects of voluntary initiatives 
could be compared with these points and conclusions could be made. 
Another disadvantage of voluntary initiatives is the danger of free riders. 
This means that a part of the regulated sources are not complying with the 
goals of the voluntary initiatives17. Because voluntary initiatives neither 
give a uniform incentive to reduce emissions with regard to individual 
abatement cost functions nor effectively prevent free-riding by individual 
firms or entire sectors, the choice for using them as a policy option is not 
driven by the criterion of cost-effectiveness. Finally, transaction costs of 
voluntary initiatives can be quite high for state authorities and industrial or 
other organizations. These costs include costs for collecting information on 
available technology; information on possible partners for the voluntary 
agreements, contractual costs such as lobbying and monitoring costs after an 
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16 Firms that apply for EMAS certification must have an environmental policy in place, 
conduct an environmental review of its sites, set and implement an environmental 
improvement program and environmental management systems, and have its policies and 
management system reviewed to verify that they meet the requirements.  
17 Formal sanctions are usually not part of voluntary programs which enhances the risk that 
the programs will have no effects in the firm whatsoever.  
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agreement is reached18 (Bizer, 1999, p. 154). But there are also some 
favourable qualities. On the one hand, regulated sources do not lose 
financial means such as the cost of taxes on emissions and the cost of the 
purchase of emission rights. This gives the regulated sources more means to 
invest in measures for emission reductions. Even if the emission rights are 
distributed for free, they still have to pay for additional emissions. On the 
other hand, voluntary initiatives are a proactive and participative approach 
of the industry for environmental problems. This participative approach 
gives the regulated sources the advantage that they have more influence on 
the goals of the regulations and the way to achieve those regulations 
(Bernheim, 2001, p. 197-198).   
2.2.2. Command-and-control policy 
This policy is the most familiar for reaching environmental goals. They 
influence directly the behaviour of individuals with regard to the 
environment. Examples are standards, limits on the amount of pollution 
allowed to enter the natural environment, specifying abatement technologies 
and establishing pollution reporting systems. 
 
Standards are the most known example of the command-and-control policy. 
Two types of standards will be briefly discussed, namely, ambient standards 
and emissions standards. An ambient standard defines an overall quality 
target for air or water in a region. It is often used to maintain adequate 
pollution controls. An emission standard defines specific limits on the 
volume of contaminants which can be released to the environment. They are 
applied to specific sources, for example firms, or to pieces of equipments, 
for example automobiles. They can take two forms: (1) performance 
standards specify the quantity or concentration of emissions per unit of time, 
and (2) technology standards specify particular equipment or processes that 
must be used. 
 
The command-and-control policy has the potential to be effective but it 
mostly criticized because of its inefficiency and the absence of the incentive 
to innovate. Furthermore, command-and-control regulations tend to freeze 
the development of new technologies. Standards discourage adoption of 
new technologies and there is little or no incentive for industries to exceed 
their control targets. An industry that adopts a new technology is not 
rewarded and is not given the opportunity to benefit financially from its 
investment. Regulations can also be difficult to enforce and costly to 
administer. Rising costs and budget constraints have made regulation less 
attractive than economic instruments. Each plant, or at least each industry, 
must be analyzed in detail to determine the appropriate level of emission 
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18 Such monitoring costs might accrue to individual firms or to industrial organizations. 
Enforcement costs are necessary where monitoring shows non-compliance with mandatory 
standards or agreements.   
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control. This is very costly and also a lot of errors can occur. The 
information problem is another problem of a command-and-control policy. 
The regulators are relying on correct information from the polluter, either in 
terms of emissions or in terms of costs of control. But the polluters have an 
incentive to distort the information given. In conclusion, we mention the 
inflexibility of the command-and-control policy. Those subjected to 
regulations have no choice in how they reach these environmental and social 
goals.  
2.2.3. Market-based instruments 
Stavins (2000, p.1) defines market-based instruments as: “regulations that 
encourage behaviour through market signals rather than through explicit 
directives regarding pollution control levels or methods”19. Most 
importantly, they give flexibility at actors and create an incentive to search 
for more efficient ways of reaching environmental goals.  
 
In theory, if market-based instruments are well designed and implemented, 
they allow the desired level to be reached at lowest cost by providing 
incentives for the greatest reductions in pollution by those firms that can 
achieve these reductions most cheaply. In contrast to command-and-control 
policy, market-based instruments have the potential to provide an incentive 
to industries to adopt new technologies (Downing and White, 1986). A 
further potential benefit of using market-based policies may arise where 
these raise revenues, for example emission taxes or auctioned tradable 
permits.  
 
There are also some potential disadvantages and limitations on the 
applicability of market-based instruments. One concerns the case where the 
users of natural resources have some degree of monopoly power in the 
output market. Firms may make use of their monopoly power to increase 
profits by reducing output below the competitive level. The imposition of an 
environmental tax may then have the effect of inducing further reductions in 
output, below the socially optimal level. Command-and-control policy, on 
the other hand, may not include reductions in output on the same scale, and 
therefore may not add to the existing costs of monopoly power (Bari, 2002, 
p. 10). Another problem with market-based instruments is that the 
distributional effects may be unacceptable, as in the case of taxes on fossil 
fuels to restrain the greenhouse effect or to conserve the use of energy. 
There are also further issues, such as the costs of administration, the ease 
and effectiveness of enforcement, and the likely level of public acceptance, 
about which theory only gives a certain amount of guidelines.   
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19  In the literature, market-based instruments are also referred to as incentive-based, market 
conform or economic instruments.  
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Stavins (2000, p. 2) considers four major categories within the market-based 
instruments: pollution charges, tradable permits, market barrier reductions20 
and government subsidy reductions21. However, taxes and tradable permits 
stand out as market-based policy instruments since both rely on price signals 
to induce polluters to reduce their emissions and the external costs they 
impose on society (Norregaard and Reppelin-Hill, 2000). The history on and 
description of these two instruments are further discussed in the next 
sections. 
 
2.3. History on taxes and tradable permits 
 
The economic rationale of environmental taxation is based on the work by 
Pigou (1920) who pointed at the divergence between private and social 
costs. He asserted that the unremedied prevalence of external costs would 
lead to suboptimal social outcomes. Following Pigou, levying an ecological 
tax confronts polluters with the true social (private plus external) costs of 
their activities, who, in response, will reduce their emissions. Coase (1960) 
questioned the need of government activism and pointed out that, under 
certain circumstances, voluntary negotiations would also lead to the 
internalization of external costs. In other words, a market in externalities can 
be set up. For instance, pollution rights can be distributed by an 
environmental agency up to the amount of total pollution deemed 
acceptable. Trading of such rights among polluters creates a market for 
pollution with prices signalling external costs and providing clear incentives 
to reduce emissions (Norregaard and Reppelin-Hill, 2000).  
2.3.1. (Environmental) taxes 
Following Pigou, the external costs of pollution are not reflected in prices, 
which, by consequence, lead to a suboptimal market equilibrium. The 
Pigouvian policy prescription in such case is the imposition of a tax. An 
environmental tax set equal to the external cost will, in theory, lead to the 
optimal level of production and emission reduction. This assumes, however, 
that the taxing authority has full knowledge of all relevant external costs. 
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20 Stavins (2000, p. 2) distinguishes three types of market barrier reductions. The first one, 
market creation, is a measure that facilitates the voluntary exchange of water rights and 
thus promotes more efficient allocation and use of scarce water supplies. The second type is 
information rules, such as energy-efficiency product labelling requirements. If these 
information rules are mandated, we can categories them within the traditional command-
and-control policy. If they are not, e.g. if it is just to promote the adoption of environmental 
friendly technologies, we can categories them within voluntary measures. The third type, 
liability rules, will encourage firms to consider the potential environmental damages of 
their decisions.   
21 Subsidies can be structured in several ways. If the polluter is paid a certain amount for 
every unit by which its emission falls below a base level, the subsidy functions much like a 
pollution tax.  
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More specifically, a complete internalization by means of taxation can only 
succeed if there exists a system that generates not only accurate information 
on the external costs and the activities by which they are caused, but also on 
associated utilities, damages and marginal costs (Paulus, 1995, p. 27). 
Moreover, the environmental authority has to determine which part of total 
externalities has been caused by a particular pollution generating source. 
Paulus (1995, p. 28) points out that these requirements are never met in 
practice and concludes that Pigouvian taxes are more of a theoretical 
benchmark than an effective policy device. In practice, taxes may either fall 
short of curbing pollution or create excess burdens (Harberger, 1974). This 
excess burden that is put on citizens is one of the major problems of 
environmental taxation. According to Paulus (1995, pp. 58-59), tax 
avoidance will take place in the first phase, namely the perception phase, 
when the burden of the tax payment is directly experienced or felt by those 
who are confronted with the tax and if there are possible alternative ways of 
behaviour. In the second phase, the payment phase, those confronted with 
the tax payment will try to shift the burden of this payment to others. When 
this possibility is exhausted, those confronted with the tax will, in the longer 
run, be induced to search for further alternatives, i.e. environmentally 
friendly ways of behaviour. In the third phase, the incidence phase, when 
there are neither possibilities to avoid or reduce that which is taxed nor 
possibilities to shift the payment of the tax to others, those confronted with 
the tax will, ceteris paribus, adjust their behaviour in reaction to the lower 
income resulting from payment of the tax. Consequently, taxes put an 
excess burden on citizens as their income will decrease because of the 
payment they will have to make (Crals and Vereeck, 2004). As Backhaus 
(2002, p. 63) points out, the knowledge about the burden of taxation22 is 
only available in the decentralized form of households, firms and other 
economic entities. It cannot be systematically collected by any central 
authority and for this reason the knowledge about the excess burden will be 
systematically underestimated by any conceivable attempt at measurement.  
 
Paulus (1995, p. 28) following Burrows (1979) indicates that in situations 
with imperfect or poor information on policy instruments, governments 
have two policy options. First, the quest for socially efficient solutions can 
be pursued through iterative control (improvement little by little). In this 
sense, Pigouvian taxes that are set at too high or too low a level can be re-
adjusted until an optimal tax rate is found. Important disadvantages of this 
procedure, however, are the uncertainty and the costs that are associated 
with trial-and-error re-adjustments. Instead of such a trial and error 
procedure, governments can also opt for the use of particular control 
policies to move the system towards pollution limits that do not claim to be 
socially efficient23. In this respect, given the fact that the Pigouvian tax 
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22 This includes both the tax itself and the excess burden.  
23 These limits or standards, can, for instance, be set by politicians.  
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cannot serve as a practical policy device itself, second best approximates 
have been suggested of which the most familiar include the regulatory 
charge and the standard and charges approach24.   
 
Despite this fundamental flaw, environmental taxation has been put into 
effect in many countries under different forms. McMorran and Nellor 
(1994) distinguish between pure Pigouvian taxes levied on units of 
emission, indirect taxes on resources and consumption goods whose use 
cause ecological damage, and environmental provisions in other tax types 
like personal and corporate income taxes, general sales taxes or value added 
taxes25. The OECD (1996) uses five different categories:  
− emission taxes26, 
− product charges when direct measurement of emissions is not 
possible, 
− indirect (sales or value added) tax rate differentiation according to 
environmental friendliness,  
− user charges27, and 
− income tax deductibles for environmentally friendly behavior by 
consumers or businesses.  
 
Taxes typically carry both an incentive and financial effect. Although the 
purpose of Pigouvian taxation is to bring about a change in activity and 
pollution levels, environmental taxes can be easily conceived as just an 
alternative source of revenue for the government. Assuming a low treasury 
preference, public support may have to be won by an environmental tax 
reform that balances environmental tax revenues with tax cuts elsewhere or 
provides tax incentives for pollution reduction. However, this does not solve 
the systemic information problem. When environmental taxes are set too 
low, suboptimal emission reductions will result. Alternatively, high taxes 
will cause unwarranted deadweight losses. Moreover, it has been recognized 
that the mere existence of an externality does not in itself merit corrective 
state action. As mentioned, Coase (1960) convincingly argued that, under 
certain circumstances, the reduction of spill-over effects can be achieved via 
private negotiations. This insight has led to the development of a new policy 
instrument. 
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24 These options are more in detail discussed by Paulus (1995).  
25 For example, lower VAT rates are applied in some countries to environmentally friendly 
products (e.g. recycled paper) or pollution reducing devices (e.g. solar energy equipment). 
26 Emissions taxes are usually only suitable for stationary sources because of their high 
monitoring and administrative costs.  
27 User charges are considered environmental tax instruments since they seek to reduce the 
use of natural resources such as water and land.  
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2.3.2. Tradable (emission) permits 
Both in theory as in practice, tradable permits are a relatively new 
instrument. After Coase had showed that negotiations over externalities 
could lead to optimal outcomes if transaction costs are low and property 
rights, irrespective of the initial distribution,28 well established, his insight 
soon found an application in emission permit trading. Crocker (1966) was 
the first to show that the Coase theorem could be applied to air pollution. He 
also correctly pointed out that, whereas effective Pigouvian taxation 
assumes perfect information about marginal external damages, a permit 
system requires no knowledge at all about damage or cost functions. The 
market will reveal marginal costs while the environmental authority only 
has to determine the total amount of pollution acceptable. Consequently, 
this approach fundamentally changes the information requirements imposed 
on the bureaucracy29. It remained for this key insight to become imbedded 
in a practical program for controlling pollution. While Crocker (1966) 
pointed out its applicability for air, Dales (1968) did the same for water. 
Furthermore, Dales (1968) claimed that transferable property rights could 
promote environmental protection at lower aggregate costs then 
conventional standards, for which Montgomery (1972) provided formal 
proof30. Locating externalities in the Arrow-Debreu model, Laffont (1988, 
p. 27) has argued that “in a regime of pure and perfect competition, 
externalities will be internalized naturally” because free entry to markets 
induces agents to acquire information on the externality. Hence, Laffont’s 
formal analysis reflects the Coasean principle quite precisely.  
 
Although transaction costs were not negligible, the concept of tradable 
emission rights was readily put into practice. Already in the seventies, the 
US Environment Protection Agency (EPA) started experimenting with 
various forms of permit trading as an instrument to control air emissions. 
The main issue was to find ways of avoiding a potential barrier on further 
industrial development in areas, chiefly in California, which were failing to 
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28 The initial distribution of property rights is not a decisive factor in the Coasean world 
since trading of rights will assure that they are put to their optimal use. 
29 Crocker (1966, p. 81) stated that: “Although the atmospheric pollution control authority’s 
responsibilities will continue to be a good deal broader than the basic governmental 
function of providing legal and tenure certainty in property rights, its necessary work will 
not have to include the guesswork involved in attempting to estimate individual emitter and 
receptor preference functions”. 
30 Baumol and Oates (1971) already tried to prove the existence of a cost-effective permit 
market equilibrium but their results only apply in a special case, namely when all emissions 
from all emitters have to have the same impact on the environmental target. When the 
target involves meeting an ambient concentration standard, this case has become known as 
the ‘uniformly mixed’ case. The Baumol-Oates theorem is also valid when the 
environmental target is defined in terms of aggregate emissions. In many other cases, 
however, the location of the emissions does matter. Montgomery solved this problem by 
proving the existence of a different cost-effective permit market equilibrium in this more 
complicated case.  
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achieve the federal government’s air quality targets because of the density 
and rising number of polluting activities31 that accompanied strong 
economic growth. The idea that emerged was to continue to allow new 
industry to set up provided it made use of the most effective pollution 
control technology and could prove that the additional emissions that would 
ensue would be offset by a reduction in emissions from existing sources32. 
That gave rise to the offset system33 (OECD, 2001, p. 11). With the 
economic repercussions of the 1974 oil shock, finding solutions which 
would lower the costs to business of complying with environmental 
regulations, without jeopardizing quality targets, also became of concern for 
the authorities of the United States. That led to the bubble system, pooling 
the requirements placed on all existing sources in a given facility, industrial 
zone or small region. A bubble permits higher emissions from some existing 
sources provided that they are offset by lower emission from others (OECD, 
2001, p. 11). More recently, Title VI of the Clean Air Act Amendments set 
up the Acid Rain Program in which SO2 emission rights are traded among 
electrical utility units (Atkinson and Tietenberg, 1991). This program has 
two very important innovative features. The first was to assure the 
availability of allowances by instituting an auction market. A second 
innovation was that it allowed anyone to purchase allowances (Tietenberg, 
1999a). This program will be discussed more in detail in the fourth chapter. 
Several countries are currently in the process of planning or implementing 
trading schemes to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Woerdman, 
2004). The principle rose to its current prominence by the Kyoto Protocol34 
which calls for international emissions’ trading between 2008 en 2012 
(Article 17). The Protocol has incorporated, besides the concept of 
emissions trading35, three other provisions for cooperative implementation 
mechanisms, namely the bubble concept36, joint implementation (JI)37 and a 
 28 
                                                 
31 For both stationary and mobile sources.  
32 This was accomplished by requiring new sources to secure credits for 120% of the 
emissions they would add; the extra 20% would be retired as an improvement in air quality 
(Tietenberg, 1999a).  
33 The offset policy requires major new or expanding sources in non-attainment areas to 
secure sufficient offsetting emission reductions from existing firms that the air is cleaner 
after their entry or expansion than before (Tietenberg, 1998).  
34 The principal accomplishment of the December 1997 Conference of Parties in Kyoto, 
Japan was the establishment of fixed quantitative reductions in greenhouse gases for 38 
nations and the European Community. The reductions are expected to produce a global 
reduction of 5,2% from 1990 levels or 30% from levels that would have been expected by 
2010 (Tietenberg, 1999a). 
35 The concept of emissions trading (Article 17) means that Annex B countries are allowed 
to purchase rights to emit greenhouse gases (GHG) from other Annex B countries that are 
able to cut GHG emission below their assigned amounts.  
36 The Kyoto Protocol incorporates the bubble concept into the final text of Article 4. It 
allows a group of Annex I countries to jointly fulfil their commitments under Article 3, 
provided that their total combined aggregate GHG emissions do not exceed their assigned 
amounts.  
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clean development mechanism (CDM)38 (Tietenberg, 1999b, p. 2-3). To 
come into operation, the Kyoto Treaty needs to be ratified by at least 55 
countries whose combined volume of GHG accounts for 55 % of emissions 
by industrialized countries (COM, 2000). Irrespectively,39 the European 
Community (EC) adopted a directive that creates a trading program in GHG 
emissions rights for energy intensive industries within the EU (COM, 1995). 
Similar emissions trading schemes are already up and running in Denmark 
since 2001 and in the United Kingdom since 2002 (Woerdman, 2004).  
2.3.3. Comparing tradable permits with environmental taxes 
In principle, taxes and tradable permits exhibit a striking symmetry because 
for every tradable permit system that maximizes the value of the resource, 
an environmental tax exists that could achieve the same outcome. In 
practice, however, this symmetry disappears and striking differences can 
arise. Once a quantity limit is specified, the government has no 
responsibility for finding the right price in a tradable permit system; the 
market defines the price. With a tax system, the government must find the 
appropriate tax rate. Also with a tax system, the resource rents are normally 
channeled to the government while with tradable permits, resource users 
typically retain them. According to Tietenberg (2001a), recent work 
examining how the presence of preexisting distortions in the tax system 
affects the efficiency of the chosen instrument suggests that the ability to 
recycle the revenue (rather than give it to permit holders) can enhance the 
cost-effectiveness of the system by a large amount. Evidently, this work 
creates a bias toward taxes or auctioned permits and away from 
“grandfathered” permits40. How revenues are distributed, however, also 
affects the attractiveness of alternative approaches to environmental 
protection from the point of view of the various stakeholders. To the extent 
that stakeholders can influence policy choice, “grandfathering” may 
increase the feasibility of implementation41.   
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The two systems are also quite differently if the government decides not to 
intervene in the market. While in a tradable permit system, inflation will 
merely result in higher permit prices; with taxes the amount of 
environmental protection will decline over time in the absence of some kind 
of indexing scheme. Conversely, technical progress that lowers compliance 
costs will result in more environmental protection under taxes than tradable 
permits (Tietenberg, 2001).  
 
37 This options involves project-oriented emission reduction credited to the investing 
country (allowed between Annex I countries). 
38 Countries that fund projects through the CDM can get credit for certified emission 
reductions (CER’s) from these projects.  
39 In January 2005, 132 countries have ratified the Protocol, and their aggregate share in 
global emissions amounts to 61.6 %. 
40 The different forms of distributing permits will be discussed in the following chapter.  
41 Tietenberg (2001a) refers to Svendsen (1999).  
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Finally, the presence of uncertainty about the benefits and costs can lead to 
a preference of one instrument or the other depending upon the nature of the 
uncertainty42. For example, knowledge about the slope of the individual 
marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves is an important factor when setting 
the tax level (as already pointed out by Crocker (1966)). Figure 1 shows 
that, as market players pass on more incorrect information to the 
government about their marginal abatement cost curves, the advantage of a 
tradable permit system will increase at the expense of taxes, assuming that 
an autonomously determined environmental target needs to be fulfilled. 
Consequently, asymmetric information between the government and 
citizens or firms can lead to improper use of taxation. For example, citizens 
can declare higher marginal control costs than they really have (Johansson, 
2000). If the marginal costs of pollution are not equalized, the costs of 
pollution control will be unnecessarily high (Kolstad, 2000, p. 141).
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42 Tietenberg (2001a) bases this assumption on work done by Weitzman (1974).  
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Figure 1: Certainty about the environmental result in spite of the uncertainty about 
the slope of the individual MAC-curves 
Source: Based on Johansson (2000) 
 
Concluding, this figure shows that taxes are only cost-effective when 
regulators are completely correct in their assessment of each person’s 
control costs43 and proofs that the presence of uncertainty, in the form of 
knowledge about individual MAC curves, leads to a preference of tradable 
permits (Crals and Vereeck, 2004). 
 
2.4. Types of tradable permit systems 
 
There exist four types of tradable emission permits systems: 
− an averaging system, 
− a usage rights system, 
− a credit system, and 
− a cap-and-trade system. 
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43 However, as indicated by Ekelenkamp, Hötte and van der Vlies (2000, p. 69), it is almost 
impossible in practice for the policy makers to ensure that the marginal costs of pollution 
control are equalized among the different polluters generating the same pollution.  
In an averaging program, the environmental authority sets an average 
emissions limit for similar products in the same industry. Firms are allowed 
to exceed this legal limit for some products when offset by other products 
they produce. Compensation among firms is also allowed. An averaging 
program is mandatory since the average environmental performance of the 
products in the range must comply with the regulatory requirements. 
Participation in trading with other companies, however, is voluntary. In 
general, excess emissions rights that are created through emissions 
reduction in averaging programs are seldom sold to competitors that did not 
achieve their emissions goals. Rather, they are used to create some 
headroom and flexibility within the company. Furthermore, averaging 
programs are aimed at large players with several products within the 
specified product range. This type of program is, therefore, not suitable for 
trading among many individuals44. 
 
A usage rights program aims to regulate the use of free and commonly 
owned resources (Crals, Keppens and Vereeck, 2004, p. 721). The rights are 
defined by a public authority or even a local community. The program is 
mandatory since the usage rights are binding for all parties45.  
 
Since the averaging system fails to promote trading between competing 
firms and usage rights have only limited application, only credit and cap-
and-trade systems will be discussed. 
 
A credit program imposes an emissions constraint on each individual 
resource user. Transferable emission reduction credits (ECR) can be gained 
by polluting less than the legal limit which is derived from existing 
environmental regulation or determined by expected future emissions46. In a 
cap-and-trade system, the environmental authority first determines the total 
amount of pollution (or cap) deemed acceptable and, subsequently, 
distributes fully tradable emission rights among resource users. The sum of 
those rights adds up to the cap47.  
 
Despite their apparent similarity, Tietenberg (2001a, p. 201) has argued that 
there are substantial differences between both approaches. A cap-and-trade 
system is characterized by the following features:  
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44 An example is the CAFE (Corporate Average Fuel Economy) program that was set up to 
improve the fuel consumption efficiency of vehicles produced by US automobile 
manufacturers.  
45 There exist very few practical examples of a usage rights system. It is used in New 
Zealand for transferable fishing rights and transferable construction rights. No examples of 
usage rights in air pollution control exist.  
46 Credit trading, the approach taken in the bubble and offset policies, presumes the pre-
existence of standards and provides a more flexible means of achieving the aggregate goals 
than the source-based standards were designed to achieve (Tietenberg, 1999a).  
47 Allowance trading is used in the Acid Rain Program and RECLAIM in California.  
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− Efficacy: the cap is a physical limit on emissions determined by the 
environmental authority which, by definition, guarantees that the system 
reaches its goal. The number of permits is limited accordingly and 
individual sources can only increase their emissions if they are 
compensated by pollution reductions elsewhere (Koutstaal and Nentjes, 
1995).  
− Flexibility: the environmental authority can set the legal cap at its 
discretion. In contrast with environmental regulation, polluters actually 
have a choice of either complying (by reducing production or installing 
abatement equipment) or purchasing additional permits.  
− Dynamic efficiency: there is a clear incentive to reduce emission 
costs by investing in cleaner technology. Since excess permits can be 
sold, the system rewards participants who use cleaner technologies.  
− Static efficiency: tradability assures that the emission rights will end 
up where they yield their highest value. In other words, trade will result 
in an efficient allocation of permits equalizing marginal abatement costs 
of polluters. However, this economic efficiency of the system is 
dependent on the relative ease of transferability of rights, viz. low 
transaction costs (Noll, 1981).  
 
Since credit trading does not involve a cap, its effectiveness and efficiency 
is far less certain. First, polluters can simply comply with their legal 
environmental obligations without engaging in the trade of ECR which will 
reduce the liquidity of the market. As a result, prices for ECR may fail to 
reflect marginal external costs since they do not respond to variable 
emissions level as long as they remain below the legal standard (Dewees, 
2000). Secondly, any increase in the number of resource users will lead to 
more pollution. It follows that the level of emissions allowed in a certain 
year can only be calculated accurately ex post (Woerdman, 2004). 
Furthermore, credit trading depends upon the existence of a previously 
determined set of regulatory standards while allowance trading does not. 
The practical implication is that allowances can be used even in 
circumstances: (1) where a technological baseline ether has not been, or 
cannot be, established or (2) where the reduction is short-lived (such as 
when a standard is met early) rather than permanent (Tietenberg, 1999a). 
Therefore, Tietenberg et al. (1999, p. 33) conclude that “allowance (cap-
and-trade) trading programs have been proven superior to credit trading 
systems in terms of both economic and environmental results” (it.add.).48  
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The reason is essentially that credit trades are not of a commodity nature, 
with their higher transaction costs and with the regulatory barriers to their 
 
48 Nevertheless, many countries have relied on credit trading. Following Woerdman (2004), 
the social and political legitimacy of credit trading programs is due to their reliance on 
existing standards and the absence of any controversy on distributional justice. 
33
creation. A cap-and-trade allowance program offers a system-based solution 
in which issues such as baseline, allowable levels and allocation are dealt 
with in the initial phase of establishing the overall program. After this initial 
phase, a cap-and-trade program can further function without the need for 
revising the issues for individual trades and therefore greatly reduces the 
need for government oversight. However, as Tietenberg et al. (1999, p. 33) 
highlight, if allowances are allocated to private entities, this initial phase can 
be contentious, as valuable economic rights are being allocated.  
 
Credit trading, on the other hand, is project-based and requires all these 
issues to be analysed and verified for each trade. This means that each 
source must establish its emissions baseline, permitted level, reduction plan 
and enforcement mechanisms. Furthermore, this system requires a process 
of verification and government approval as well as continued monitoring. 
As a result, transaction costs and uncertainty are high. Tietenberg et al. 
(1999, p.33) compare allowances with a currency unit and credits with a 
specific good whose value must be determined each time through a 
regulatory process. They also conclude that one of the most important 
differences in these two types of trading programs is the level of 
government involvement in trading. Although allowance trading has very 
high quality assurance, once the program has been designed it requires no 
government involvement in approval of trades and consequently has lower 
transaction costs than credit trading which, in contrast, is project-based and 
requires one or more approvals for every trade, leading to higher transaction 
costs, uncertainty levels and risk, together with lower environmental quality 
assurance. 
 
Despite the systemic flaws of ecological taxation and the qualities of cap-
and-trade programs just described, the former is more often used. 
Opponents of tradable emission rights have unremittingly pointed at the 
prohibitively high transaction costs of the latter system allegedly as a 
consequence of its complexity.49 We believe that this argument is false and 
rests on an inaccurate definition and incomplete classification of transaction 
costs as will be shown in the following chapters. Much depends on the 
policy setting in which environmental pollution occurs. Since Coase’s 1960 
article, it is not at all obvious whether an externality should lead to 
government action. Baumol and Oates (1988) have asserted that an active 
role by the government would be necessary when a large number of victims 
are concerned. The crucial difference between the Pigouvian and Coasean 
approach is whether the large number case is appropriate and, if so, whether 
or not large numbers of people are able to organize themselves.  
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49 See e.g. Jackson (1995), Pearce (1995), Mullins and Baron (1997), Rao (2003, p. 158). 
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2.5. Controversy on tradable permits 
 
The controversy on a tradable permits approach arises from several sources, 
but, according to Tietenberg (2001a, p. 197-198) the most important 
concerns the allocation of wealth associated with these resources. While 
tradable permits typically do not privatize the resources, as conventional 
wisdom might suggest, they do privatize at least to some degree access to 
those resources. And because the access rights can be very valuable when 
the resource is managed efficiently, the owners of these rights may acquire a 
substantial amount of wealth. The ability to reclaim that wealth for 
motivating sustainable behavior is an important strength of the system. 
However, the ethical issues raised by its distribution among competing 
claimants are a significant and continuing source of controversy.  
 
Tietenberg (2001a, p. 198) distinguishes also another source of controversy, 
namely the broad class of externalities. In general, these are effects on the 
ecosystem or on other parties which are not or inadequately reflected in the 
decisions by those holding the access rights. This incomplete internalization 
of externalities could involve diverse adverse effects50.  
 
A final source of controversy that Tietenberg (2001a, p. 198) distinguishes 
is ideological. He suggests that “since capitalist property rights are the 
major source of the problem, it is inconceivable that these same rights could 
be part of the solution”. For example, Goodin (1994) compares a tradable 
permits system to the sale of indulgences in the Middle Ages. Indulgences 
were granted by church officials, for a price, to sinners. Sinners could use 
them to remit time served in purgatory (Tietenberg, 2001b). According to 
Goodin (1994), economic incentive system approaches to environmental 
protections are morally suspect because they share with medieval 
indulgences several characteristics: 
− the seller is selling something (the right to degrade the environment) 
that the seller has no right to sell; 
− ethically, it can not be sold but only given away; 
− it legitimizes and removes the stigma from acts of environmental 
degradation that are morally wrong, and 
− it plays favorites, allowing some permit holders to do what none 
ought to be doing. 
 
Tietenberg (2001b) states that the moral concerns that prevented the use of 
economic incentives policies can partially be overcome by a variety of 
measures that attempt to respond to at least some of the concerns: 
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50 For example on the spatial concentrations of emissions. 
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− The supply of pollution permits is fixed51 and is set on the basis of 
health and other physical considerations52; 
− Entitlements are defined in terms of a “limited authorization to emit” 
rather than conveying ownership of a portion of the airshed to private 
owners53; 
− In theory, a credit is a credit regardless of the circumstances of its 
creation, but in ethics some types of credit transfers are deemed more 
ethically justified than others. Emissions trading instead of credit trading 
responded to these ethical distinctions; 
− The prohibition of trades that reduce air quality in specific 
neighborhoods even if they result in aggregate emission reductions and 
air quality remains betters than required by the ambient standards.  
 
According to Tietenberg (2001b) following Roe (1998), all of these require 
an efficient penalty, but they may well increase the acceptability of the 
programs by reducing the potential for resistance. Designing programs to 
reduce resistance is apparently common in public policy.  
 
With regard to the Kyoto Protocol, Woerdman (2002) has scrutinized the 
barriers why, although permit trading is the superior alternative according to 
economic literature, politicians are not accepting permit trading as the 
leading instrument for climate policy but mainly favor sub-optimal designs. 
He pays most attention to the political barriers of the instrument. The reason 
is that, when governments have accepted and decide to use such an 
instrument, it still has to be effectively implemented. However, Stavins 
(2002, p. 14-15) writes that although “…the political world has been slow to 
embrace the use of market-based instruments for environmental protection, 
(…) market based instruments have moved center stage, and policy debates 
look very different from the time when these ideas were characterized as 
‘licenses to pollute’ or dismissed as completely impractical.” 
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51 Not subject to change in the face of higher prices.  
52 Not on the basis of willingness to pay.  
53 This addresses the concern that the airshed, which is seen as part of the common heritage, 
should not become private property.  
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3. Theory of tradable rights and transaction costs 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter it was argued that tradable permits outperform taxes 
because, whereas effective taxation assumes perfect information about 
marginal external damages, a permit system requires no knowledge al all 
about damage or cost functions. Consequently, the attention to use tradable 
permits for ecological purposes has steadily increased. However, opponents 
of tradable emission rights have unremittingly pointed at the prohibitively 
high transaction costs of the latter system allegedly as a consequence of its 
complex design.  
 
The aim of this chapter is twofold. On the one hand, the purpose is to 
describe a theoretical framework of tradable permits in which all design 
issues are discussed (paragraph 3.2.). On the other hand, the purpose is to 
offer a transaction costs classification that is thought to include all relevant 
types of transaction costs (paragraph 3.3.). This scheme will be used for 
policy evaluation of tradable permits versus other policy instruments in the 
next chapters.  
 
3.2. Theoretical framework 
 
Cap-and-trade instruments are one set of tools within the broader set of 
market-based policy instruments as already discussed in the previous 
chapter. Moreover, research has shown that allowance trading has proven to 
be superior to other trading programs as also shown in the previous chapter. 
Therefore, we will focus on cap-and-trade instruments. Colby (2000, p. 639) 
distinguishes six different groups of stakeholders in a cap-and-trade 
market54:  
− Direct resource users (interest in continued access, costs of access, 
profits and livelihood)55; 
− Environmental interests (interest in air & water quality, human and 
ecosystem health)56; 
− Policy makers (interest in balancing constituent interests, legal 
requirements and budgetary objectives)57; 
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54 The market consist of, according to Colby (2000, p. 639), the cap, the allocation of the 
rights, trading rules, monitoring and enforcement and the accountability for outcomes.  
55 For example: a fishing fleet, irrigators or electric utilities.  
56 For example: public agencies or NGO environmental advocates. 
57 Examples are state legislature, courts and administrative rule makers. 
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− Competing claimants (interest in access to resource and the costs of 
access)58; 
− Regulators (interest in effective implementation, avoiding political 
crossfire and an adequate budget), and; 
− Economically linked businesses/communities (interest in jobs, 
economic viability and community stability). 
 
Together, these disparate interests are faced with a complex and conflict-
ridden task. Prior to the establishment of a tradable permits system, 
policymakers must determine how much of the resource can be used (cap), 
and with what exceptions for unusual conditions. They must assign initial 
allowances, set the rules for transfers, and monitor and enforce the activities 
that ensue. Finally, policymakers must account to stakeholders, the public 
and (sometimes) courts for the resulting stream of gains and losses. All 
these design issues will be discussed in the following paragraphs. It is 
important to note that the cap-and-trade implementation process can be 
obstructed at many points – from initial debate over whether a proposed cap 
on resource use is scientifically justified to fine-tuning the rules for 
reporting permit trades (Colby, 2000, p. 640).  
3.2.1. Cap and trade 
Cap-and-trade refers to a policy approach in which use of the resource is 
capped, use permits are allocated, and a permit trading mechanism is 
established (Colby, 2000, p. 639). When a resource is freely available and 
no conflict arises about its use, a system of tradable permits is unnecessary. 
However, once scarcity becomes evident, conflicts arise, and allocative 
mechanisms do become necessary. The cap-and-trade is best used when the 
problem is extensive over a large area, when there are many different 
sources that are responsible for the problem, when the costs of control differ 
from source to source and when emissions can be measured in a consistent 
and correct way. In the case of fishery, e.g., the cap could be set based on 
the total amount allowed catching. For pollution, the cap is typically set 
based on the aggregate amount of emissions allowed. Consequently, the cap 
defines the aggregate level of access to the source that is authorized. A 
system of cap-and-trade gives the highest certainty that an (efficient) 
reduction is achieved, also in times of economic insecurity. For example, in 
order to emit a given quantity of pollutants, a source has to have the 
appropriate number of permits. If a source wants to increase emissions, it 
has to obtain additional permits for its emissions (Ermoliev, Michalevich 
and Nentjes, 2000, p. 39).  
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58 These are e.g. the new entrants into the market. 
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A precondition for the establishment of a market is a definition of the 
tradable right. Economists have consistently argued that these permits 
should be treated as secure property rights to protect the incentive in 
pollution control equipment. Confiscation of rights could undermine the 
entire process (Tietenberg, 1999a). Following Tietenberg, the environmental 
community has just as consistently argued that the air belongs to the people 
and it, as a matter of ethics, should not become private property. According 
to this view, the ends cannot justify the transfer of a communal right into a 
private one. For instance, the right to a reasonable level of clean air is seen 
as inalienable. The practical solution of this matter, according to the Clean 
Air Act, involves providing some security to the permit holders, while 
making it clear that it is not a property right. In practice, this means that 
policy makers are expected to recognize the security needed to protect 
control investments. However, their ability to change control requirements 
as the need arises will not be inhibited by the need to pay compensation for 
withdrawing a portion of the authorization to emit (Tietenberg, 1999a).  
3.2.2. Initial distribution of the permits 
The initial distribution of the permits is one of the most complex issues in 
the design of a cap-and-trade system. In the literature, we find 3 main 
categories of distributing permits amongst entities, namely: allocation by 
lottery, an auction or allocation by criteria. In the first case, permits are 
allocated randomly. A reliance on lotteries is usually motivated by a desire 
to provide an equal possibility of access to all potential claimants. This 
approach is used e.g. when allocating a limited number of permits to hunt 
moose in Maine (Tietenberg, 2001b). However, due to its relative lack of 
importance in pollution control, we shall not discuss this option any further.  
 
Lyon (1986) has examined the theoretical consequences of various initial 
allocation methods. In general, he discovers that, in the long run, regardless 
of whether permits are allocated by auction or by criteria, the ultimate 
allocation of control responsibility will be the same. The reason for this 
result is that allowing tradability in purely competitive markets assures that 
the permits ultimately end up with to those parties who value them the most 
regardless of the initial allocation (Tietenberg, 2001b). This is an important 
supposition which provides a lot of flexibility to policy makers. However, 
while these results demonstrate that the ultimate allocation of control 
responsibility may be insensitive to the initial allocation of permits they do 
not imply the same distribution of costs. Auctions typically involve transfers 
of resources to the government, whereas allocations by criteria do not.    
3.2.2.1. An auction 
In an auction, the fixed number of permits will be allocated to the highest 
bidder. Several possible types of auctions exist (Cramton and Kerr, 2002):  
− Sealed-bid auctions; 
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− Ascending auctions; and 
− Ascending-clock auctions.  
 
In sealed-bid auctions, the bidders simultaneously submit demand 
schedules. The auctioneer adds these demand schedules to form the 
aggregate demand curve. The point at which the aggregate demand curve 
and the supply curve cross determines the clearing price59 (Cramton and 
Kerr, 2002). Disadvantage of this system is that bidders need to know their 
personal demand curve. Furthermore, the system is subject to strategic 
bidding and bidders can not adjust their bid in function of that of others 
(Bernheim, 2001, p. 80). In an ascending auction, both price and allocation 
are determined through a process of open competition. Each bidder has 
every opportunity to improve (raise) its bids, changing losing bids into 
winning bids. In the end, those willing to pay the most win the permits. 
Finally, in an ascending-clock auction the clock indicates the current price. 
In each round, the bidders submit the quantity they are willing to buy at that 
price. If the total quantity bid exceeds the quantity available the clock is 
increased. The bidding continues until the quantity bid is less than the 
quantity available. The permits are then allocated at the prior price, and are 
rationed for those that reduced their quantity in the last round60.    
 
From an economic perspective, auctioning is optimal because permits are 
allocated to those who yield them the highest value. Consequently, permits 
are efficiently distributed. Furthermore, there is a free entrance for new 
market members. All participants are being treated equally meaning that 
both newcomers and already existing participants have to buy permits. 
Historical use of emissions, therefore, has no influence and newcomers have 
no competition disadvantage to enter the market. Auctioning off permits 
also provides a reference price and this can help to start up trade in a later 
phase. Trough this indicative value of the permits, participants can more 
easily determine their strategy and decide how much rights they need to 
cover the projected use and consequently bid for these rights on the auction. 
Revenue raising methods, such as auctioning, can also help reduce the 
tendency of existing factor-market distortions to be intensified by pollution 
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59 The two most common pricing methods are uniform pricing and pay-your-bid pricing. 
Under uniform pricing, each winner pays the clearing price for each permit. With pay-your-
bid pricing, each winner pays its bid. Of course, bidding behaviour is quite different under 
the two approaches as described by Cramton and Kerr (2002). With pay-your-bid pricing, 
the bidder attempts to guess where the clearing price is likely to fall and then bids slightly 
above it. With uniform pricing, predicting the clearing price is less important, since every 
winner pays the clearing price regardless of how high it bids.  
60 Some advantages of this system are: (1) it is easier to implement for both seller and 
buyers, since a buyer only bids a single quantity in each round; (2) there is no possibility of 
undesirable bid signalling, since only the total quantity bid is reported and (3) rapid 
convergence is guaranteed, since the price increases by one bid increment with each round 
of bidding (Cramton and Kerr, 2002).   
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control policy, providing the revenue is used for this specific purpose61 
(Tietenberg, 2001b). There are, however, also some disadvantages when 
auctioning off permits of which the most important is the large financial 
burden on sources. Furthermore, with auctioning, polluters can end up in an 
inferior competitive position compared with foreign competitors who are 
not subject to a similar system (Bernheim, 2001, p. 81). Also, since the 
financing capacities of polluters are very different, a suboptimal distribution 
of the efforts can come about. The wealthy polluters can buy more easily 
permits than others. This is an actual risk when introducing tradable permits 
because great purchasing power differences can exist between participating 
entities. Finally, the effects of an emissions trading program on a product 
market, assuming that the initial allowances are auctioned, are shown in 
figure 2. The demand and initial supply curves are noted as D and S0. The 
second supply curve, S2, reflects the costs of the auctioned permits, ignoring 
for this illustration the effects of the changed cost of producing the product 
in order to focus on the effects of auctioning62. The shift in supply due to the 
auctioned allowances result in an increase in the price of the product to 
consumers, from P0 to P2c, and reduction in the quantity produced from Q0 
to Q2. The labelled areas in the figure illustrate how auctioning allowances 
affects owners of existing facilities and the loss in consumer surplus 
(indicated by A and D). With the rise in prices and reduction in sales, the 
value of the capital assets held by facility owners is reduced, because the 
producer surplus they generate has declined by the amount illustrated in the 
figure (B and C is the lost producer equity).  
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61 Auction revenue can replace distortionary taxes which create deadweight loss by 
inserting a wedge between marginal cost and price. As described by Cramton and Kerr 
(2002), the rents in an auctioned system are collected as revenue by the government. This 
revenue could be used to cut labor, payroll, capital, or consumption taxes or to reduce the 
deficit, all of which would create efficiency gains. 
62 From this perspective, permits can be seen as another factor of production.  
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Figure 2: Product market effects of auctioned distribution 
 
Source: Harrison and Radov, 2002, p. 22 
3.2.2.2. Allocation by criteria 
The most common allocation by criteria is grandfathering the permits. 
Grandfathering refers to an approach that bases the initial allocation on 
historic use. Under grandfathering, existing sources only have to purchase 
any additional permits they may need over and above the initial allocation 
(as opposed to purchasing all permits in an auction market). Policy makers 
distributed permits for free among market players and therefore have a 
complete influence on the composition of the market. Consequently, it is 
relatively easy to prevent unwanted monopolies. The most important 
advantage of grandfathering is that the excess costs incurred by participants 
can be kept low63. The financial efforts are limited to the purchase of rights 
in excess of the free permits or the adaptation investments which are done to 
stay within the permit allocation. An important result of the economic 
theory of permit trading is that the marginal costs under grandfathering are 
identical to the marginal costs under an auction. The reason is that the freely 
assigned allowances have an opportunity cost associated with them: 
participants that receive allowances can sell them to others (Harrison and 
Radov, 2002, p. 23). Because the marginal costs are the same, economic 
theory predicts that resulting control decisions by individual facilities will 
be identical to the decisions that would be made under an allowance auction, 
                                                 
 
63 Participants receive a so-called windfall profit.  
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as already pointed out. However, when grandfathering permits existing 
participants will be more willing to accept the system because they receive 
‘free’ rights. Grandfathering is based on the principle of acquired rights of 
the polluters, just as the first owners of land, on a specific moment, have 
obtained the right of ownership (Bernheim, 2001, p. 78). Although 
politically the easiest path to sell64, grandfathering has also its 
disadvantages. Namely, it is possible to reserve some permits for new 
participants but this option is rarely exercised in practice. As a result of the 
free distribution scheme, new participants typically have to purchase all 
permits, while existing participants get an initial allocation fee. Thus, the 
free distribution based on historical use imposes a bias against new users in 
the sense that their financial burdens are greater than that of identical 
existing users (Tietenberg, 2001a, p. 206). Furthermore, the practice of 
grandfathering can actually increase pollution in the short run if sources are 
aware that larger current use results in larger future permits allocations. 
Naturally, as described by Tietenberg (2001b), this can create an incentive 
to elevate current emissions for the purpose of qualifying for a large initial 
allocation of permits. This problem can be circumvented by basing the 
initial allocation on the command-and-control authorized (as opposed to 
actual) emissions. That way, increasing actual emissions in this system does 
not increase permit allocations. As with auctioning off permits, 
grandfathering can intervene with the competitive position of specific 
participants. Free distributing permits can be seen as a subsidy, which has 
certain implications for the competitiveness of a country, sector or 
individual company. Therefore, when allocating permits, the European 
competition rules65 and those of the World Trade Organization need to be 
taken into account.   
 
Figure 3 shows the case in which allowances are grandfathered. The 
negative effects on the sector are clearly lower than under the auctioning; 
although the sector must control e.g. emissions to the same degree, under 
grandfathering producers receive allowances. In this example, the total asset 
value of owners’ facilities in the sector actually increases under 
grandfathering, by the amount represented by the area A - C66.
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64 This political acceptability arises from the fact that with a grandfathering system, existing 
sources can be no worse off than they were with the command-and-control system, but they 
might be better off. Since existing sources will have the same initial allocation under both 
systems, the choice not to trade makes the firm equally well off. On the other hand, those 
existing sources that do voluntarily trade are unambiguously better off (Tietenberg, 2001b).  
65 EG-treaty art. 92 and 93.  
66 The net producer gain (A-C) = permit allocation (A+B) – lost producer equity (B+C).  
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Figure 3: Product market effects of grandfathered distribution 
 
Source: Harrison and Radov, 2002, p. 24. 
 
Besides grandfathering, another criterion that is described in the literature is 
updating. The updating approach bases future allocations on a facility’s 
current and future activities. For example, if the updating formula is based 
on production, a facility’s allocation in 2010 may depend upon its output in 
2008. This approach clearly would provide an incentive to increase output 
in 2008 in order to receive more allowances in 2010 (Harrison and Radov, 
2002, p. 25)67. Using updating for the initial allocation of permits looses one 
of the most important features of permit trading; because participants 
receive more permits if they use more, they will be tend to increase their use 
and hence get a higher allocation. Thus, this incentive to increase production 
is directly at odds with one of the most important control options – namely 
the reduction in generation. The economy as a whole will be worse off 
under updating. Because firms are producing more output than they would 
in the non-updating cases, they are forced to implement more stringent, 
more expensive controls to maintain the cap. As a result, the demand for 
allowances rises compared to the demand under either auctioning or 
grandfathering. The net result is higher compliance costs to achieve the 
same emissions target. Concluding, the new mix of compliance choices 
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67 Updating is related in certain respects to an emissions allocation based on relative targets. 
If relative targets are used, firms are allocated emissions allowances based on an industry-
wide emission rate – often expressed in tons per unit of output. Relative targets are 
equivalent to averaging programs, rather than cap-and-trade programs.  
under updating would not minimise the overall cost of meeting the 
emissions cap, which would result in distortions in both the allowance and 
product markets. Compared to either grandfathering or an auction 
mechanism, the allowance price would be higher and economy-wide 
economic output would be lower because of the misallocation of resources 
(Harrison and Radov, 2002, p. 30).    
3.2.3. Transferability rules 
A big source of controversy is attached to the rules that govern the 
transferability of permits. Following Tietenberg (2001a), transferability not 
only assures that rights flow to their highest valued use68 and restrictions on 
that transferability only serve to reduce the efficiency of the system, but it 
also provides a user-financed form of compensation for those who 
voluntarily decide to no longer use the resource. However, according to 
critics, allowing the rights to be transferable produces a number of socially 
unacceptable outcomes including the concentration of rights, the destruction 
of community interests and the degrading of traditional relationships among 
users as well as the environment. One of the most important fears that is 
expressed in almost any discussion of tradable permits involves the degree 
of market power that can be facilitated by the tradability.  
 
The first type of market power involves the ability of participants to 
manipulate prices strategically in the permit market either as a monopolistic 
seller or a monopolistic buyer. Hahn (1984, p. 763) has examined the 
possibility of market power with transferable property rights. He states that, 
just because a firm may have a large share of the permits, this does not 
necessarily mean it can influence the outcome in the permit market. 
Furthermore, if a firm does have market power in the permit market, its 
effect on price (assuming that there is one firm with market power) varies 
with its excess demand for permits. Therefore, once the potential for market 
power has been ascertained, it is a flow – excess demand of the firm with 
market power – which determines the equilibrium. According to Hahn 
(1984), the importance of the flow has immediate implications for the 
market design. In particular, with full knowledge of demand functions, a 
central authority could effectively pick the quantity of permits it wanted the 
dominant firm to use through a suitable initial allocation. Of course, the 
more realistic situation is one in which the authority has, at most, only a 
crude estimation of the demand functions. In this case, Hahn proposes a 
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68 Trading allowances enables participants operating at high marginal abatement costs to 
purchase additional allowances from participants operating at lower marginal abatement 
costs. this provides a means of compensating participants with relatively lower marginal 
abatement costs for assuming a relatively greater share of the costs of reductions. The lower 
cost participants are expected to expand their abatement efforts until their marginal costs 
rise to meet those of higher cost firms (Burtraw and Mansur, 1999).  
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basic model69 that can be applied to assess the possibilities for exerting 
market influence. Tietenberg (2001b) has also studied market power and his 
analysis supports the notion that market power on the seller side is a more 
serious problem than market power on the buyer side. He uses transaction 
costs for the basis of this assumption. Because transaction costs associated 
with forming a cartel with a large number of small sources are significantly 
greater than those for forming one with a small number of large sources, 
proportional initial allocation rules make power on the seller side more 
likely than on the buyer side by creating a situation involving a few plants 
selling permits to a much larger number of buyers.  
 
However, strategic price behavior is not the only potential source of market 
power problems. Firms could also conceivably use market permits as a 
vehicle for driving competitors out of business. However, this problem is 
relatively rare. In most markets, permits represent a very rude instrument for 
attempting to gain a strategic advantage (Tietenberg, 2001a and 2001b).  
 
In conclusion we can say that, even when the possibility of market power 
exists, the consequences can frequently be limited by proper program 
design. A first option is an auction market which provides a continuous 
source of permits, thereby limiting the ability of one participant or group of 
participants from cornering the market. Furthermore, the government can 
also set aside some permits which they can sell should the need rise. Broer, 
Mulder and Vromans (2002, p. 29) state that there is a need for sufficient 
suppliers and buyers for the well functioning of the market and preventing 
market power. The more market players, and the more they differ in 
abatement costs, to more reason they have to trade. The existence of easy 
possibilities to enter the market will also improve competition on the permit 
market.  
3.2.4. Temporal dimension 
Standard theory suggests that a value maximizing tradable permit system 
must have temporal exchangeability, thus implying that allowances can be 
both borrowed and banked70. As argued by Rubin (1996, p. 281), perhaps 
the most important consequence of emissions banking and borrowing is the 
ability to firms to shift their emission stream through time. Banking allows a 
user to store its permits for future use. With banking, for example, a 
resource user can save unused permits from 2001 for use in 2004. Banking 
is thought to give opportunities for cost savings by affording firms 
flexibility in timing their investment for compliance. With the opportunity 
to bank unused allowances, a firm may decide to invest in a relatively grater 
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69 A critical assumption underlying the competitive model is that firms act as if they were 
price takers. In the model developed by Hahn, it is assumed that all firms except on are 
price takers. This model is in detail discussed in Hahn (1984).  
70 Tietenberg (2001a) refers to Rubin (1996) and Kling and Rubin (1997).  
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level of abatement in a first period and consequently create an allowance 
surplus that can be used to delay further investments in a later period 
(Burtraw and Mansur, 1999). When banking is not allowed, 2001 permits 
are only valid in 2001. With borrowing, a permit holder can use permits 
earlier than their stipulated date. For example, permits holders can choose to 
use 2004 permits in 2001, but that means of course that they are no longer 
available in 2004. Rubin (1996, p. 281) has shown in his paper that, because 
the society is becoming increasingly concerned with environmental quality 
and emission standards are becoming more stringent, banking of emission 
permits can lower social damages. Banking also provides cost savings to 
firms by allowing them to adjust their own internal rates of emission 
reductions to an externally set standard. According to him, banking can, 
along with averaging71 and trading72, lower the financial costs of 
compliance. Therefore, he concludes that, along with averaging and trading, 
banking should be considered by public policymakers in charge of ensuring 
the safety of the environment. Kling and Rubin (1997) have investigated, 
using a simple optimal control model, the firms’ incentives for banking or 
borrowing emission permits and compares the emission and output streams 
firms would chose within the socially optimal solution. They find that in 
many cases firms will sub-optimally choose excessive damage and output 
levels in early periods and correspondingly too few in later periods if given 
the opportunity to freely move emissions between time periods. They 
propose a modified banking scheme where firms are not allowed one-to-one 
trades of emissions between time periods; instead emissions borrowed 
against future savings are penalized by the rate of discount73 (Kling and 
Rubin, 1997, p.111).  
 
There also some disadvantages when granting temporal flexibility to 
participants (Tietenberg, 2001a). The first one involves the potential for 
creating a temporal clustering of emissions. With complete freedom on their 
temporal use, it is possible for resource users to be concentrated in time. 
Since concentrated resource use causes more degradation than dispersed 
use, regulators have chosen to put a priori restrictions on the temporal use of 
permits despite the economic penalty that imposes. The second concern has 
arisen where imposing sanctions for noncompliance is difficult. It has been 
noted that enforcing the cumulative emissions budget on a nation that has 
borrowed heavily in the earlier years would become increasingly difficult 
over time (Tietenberg et al., 1999). Borrowing also puts the environmental 
cap at risk because participants can keep on borrowing permits without ever 
reaching their limit.  
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71 For example, emission averaging between sources within a firm.  
72 He refers here to trading between firms while banking and borrowing refer to trading 
through time.  
73 This means that the firm would be required to pay back more emissions than it used.  
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The length of validity is a determining element in the possibility to make 
efficiency gains using trading. The tradability of a permit becomes more 
difficult when its length of validity is smaller. With a limited length of 
validity, efficiency is more likely to be reached by the initial distribution 
than by the trade. Furthermore, a limited length of validity increases the 
transaction costs of the government and market players because these are 
partly connected with the frequency of repeating the initial distribution of 
the permits. However, there are also disadvantages against rights with long 
lengths of validity. First of all, the insecurity about the price development 
can negatively influence the revenues of auctioning off permits74. Secondly, 
the market will function worse when the policy lines are not available or not 
known at the moment that the government determines the cap. However, 
deciding on explicit policy lines for a long period reduces the margin of the 
government. Finally, permits with a long length of validity hamper the 
possibility of adjusting the policy by the government75 (Broer, Mulder and 
Vromans, 2002, p. 25).  
3.2.5. Geographical area 
In general, a larger geographical area implies more market players and 
therefore a better tradability of the rights. Consequently, a smaller 
geographical area can imply less market players and therefore less 
efficiency gains. Furthermore, a smaller geographical can also induce 
participants to move and hence evade the system76 (Broer, Mulder and 
Vromans, 2002, p. 30). When determining the geographical area, the link 
between the area and location, where the external effects manifest, needs to 
be taken into account. For example, there exist two possibilities when 
dealing with pollution:  
− the emissions of different locations have the same effect, in other 
words, they are not location bound; 
− the emission are location bound77. 
 
Tietenberg (2001b) distinguishes three different approaches: (1) emission 
permits, (2) zonal systems, and (3) trading rules and trading ratios. These 
different approaches are discussed in detail by Tietenberg (2001b) and we 
will merely give the most important characteristics.  
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The first one, emission permits, ignores source location and controls only 
emission levels. However, to reach a concentration target is often 
 
74 Hence, the revenues can turn out to be lower than the value in cash of an annual auction.  
75 However, the government can still adjust the cap by buying rights on the market or 
deciding that each permit give right to e.g. a lower amount of emissions than in the 
preceding period.  
76 This is called leakage and occurs when companies move their production to places where 
emission trading is not used.  
77 Here it is very important to find the appropriate geographical area.  
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suboptimal; it can exact a cost penalty and can bring about hot spots78. The 
evidence on the size of the potential cost penalty when emission permit 
systems are used to control non-uniformly mixed assimilative pollutants 
from multiple sources for multiple receptor sights is mixed. Tietenberg 
(2001b) refers to the ratio of emission permit regional control costs to the 
traditional command-and-control policy. A ratio of greater than 1.0 indicates 
that the emission permit approach achieves the objective at lower cost while 
a ratio of less than 1.0 indicates that the traditional regulatory approach is 
cheaper. Since the ratios in this analysis range from a low of 0.42 to a high 
of 11.10, the cost-effectiveness of an emission permit system in this context 
is apparently quite sensitive to local conditions.  
 
Emission permits give also rise to the concern of hot spots because they are 
caused both by the amount of emissions79 and by their location and timing80. 
Emission permits may increase the threat of hot spots in two main ways. 
First, trades may create unacceptably high local concentrations near sources 
that have acquired permits as an alternative to further control. Second, 
permits may allow the long-range transport of emissions to increase, thereby 
increasing deposition problems.  
 
The second one, zonal permit systems, deal with the spatial dimension by 
dividing the control area into a grid containing a specific number of zones 
(Tietenberg, 2001b). In the most restrictive of this approach, trades would 
be allowed within zones, but not between zones. In less restrictive versions, 
trades between zones are allowed using predefined trading ratios. Zonal 
approaches have a certain appeal because they appear to provide a middle 
ground between the excessive simplicity of emissions-based policies and the 
excessive administrative complexity associated with tailoring the instrument 
design to the unique circumstances of each emitter. Whereas emissions-
based systems normally over control distant sources, the zoned system 
allows differential treatment of distant and proximate sources. Whereas an 
emission-based system is vulnerable to the creation of hot spots, the zoned 
systems appears to lower this vulnerability by targeting greater control on 
those zones containing the emitters which are the main contributors to the 
most severely affected receptors. However, the implementation of a zonal 
system places a larger burden on the control authority than the 
implementation of a pure emission permits system. With the zonal permit 
system, the control authority has to define a vector81 rather than the scalar82 
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78 Hot spots are unacceptably high concentrations of pollutions in particular locations; 
emission permits could contribute to the formation of hot spots if they allowed more 
clustering of emissions in vulnerable areas than permitted under command-and-control.  
79 The amount of emission is controlled by emission permits because a cap is determined.  
80 These are not controlled by emission permits.  
81 The vector contains the elements corresponding to the level of authorized emissions in 
each zone. 
82 The scalar is the aggregate emissions level.  
49
that is necessary to implement an emission permit system (Tietenberg, 
2001b).  
 
The final option when a tradable permit approach is used is firstly ruling out 
certain classes of trades, while allowing others and secondly allowing the 
permits to be traded at something other than a one-for-one ratio without 
imposing zonal boundaries or predetermined fixed exchange rates. Both of 
these possibilities represent a departure of the two former approaches but 
they focus on the transaction and not at the market as a whole. In practice, 
however, as indicated by Tietenberg (2001b), manipulating trading ratios 
can extract an efficiency penalty and can have ambiguous effects on trading 
activity and air quality. The alternative, allowing one-for-one trades and 
retaining the right to prohibit specific trades that represent problems, seems 
to be the most common choice of policy makers.  
3.2.6. Monitoring and enforcement 
The attainment of economic, social and environmental objectives is mostly 
dependent on the monitoring and enforcement issues. Non-compliance not 
only makes it more difficult to reach stated goals, it sometimes makes it 
more difficult to know whether the goals are being met. Tradable permit 
systems raise certain monitoring and enforcement issues especially because 
it offers the possibility of raising income levels for participants. This 
possibility will also raise the incentives for non-compliance. Therefore, in 
the absence of a strong enforcement system, illegal activity can occur 
together with a failure of meeting the cap (Tietenberg, 2001a). 
3.2.6.1. Monitoring 
As pointed out by Stranlund and Dhanda (1999, p. 267), Malik (1990) 
appears to be the first to cast doubt on the efficiency properties of 
transferable permit systems when firms may be noncompliant. In a 
comparison of a transferable permit system to uniform emissions standards 
with exogenous enforcement, Keeler (1991) finds that non-compliance (and 
hence, aggregate emissions) may be greater under a transferable permit 
system than under uniform standards. In another comparison of a 
transferable permit system to a uniform emissions standard, but this time 
when enforcement expenditures are committed to achieve a certain degree 
of compliance, Malik (1992) finds that a transferable permit system may be 
more costly to enforce, and hence, enforcement plus aggregate abatement 
costs may actually be higher for such systems than for uniform emissions 
standards. Laffont and Tirole (1996) have analysed the impact of spot and 
future markets for tradable pollution permits on the potential polluter’s 
compliance decisions. Polluters have different possibilities: they can buy 
permits, invest in pollution abatement, or stop production or source out. In 
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their analysis it is shown that stand-alone spot markets83 induce excessive 
investment. The introduction of a futures market84 reduces this incentive to 
invest, but is not the optimal way to control pollution. They propose a menu 
of options on pollution rights, possibly coupled with intertemporally 
bundled sales that will yield higher welfare.  
 
In practice, every monitoring system must identify both the information that 
is needed to monitor the operation of the tradable permit program and the 
management component that will gather, interpret, and act on this 
information. Data should also be collected on transfers so that monitoring 
and analysis of the market can take place. Therefore, effective monitoring 
systems are composed of data, data management, and verification 
components (Tietenberg, 2001a). In general, there are two different kinds of 
monitoring data required for the smooth implementation of a tradable permit 
program. Firstly, periodic data on the condition of the resource is needed to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the program. These data are also used for 
adjusting the cap. Secondly, sufficient data is needed to monitor compliance 
with the various limitations imposed by the regulatory system. Furthermore, 
for the monitoring of compliance with a tradable permit program data is 
required on the identity of permit holders, the amount of permits owned by 
each holder and permit transfers. As Tietenberg (2001a) suggests, one key 
to a smoothly implemented tradable program is ensuring that all data needed 
are input into an integrated computer system that is accessible by eligible 
users on a real-time basis. Facilitating this kind of flexibility would reduce 
the enforcement burden considerably. It also proofs that technology plays a 
very important role in tradable permit programs because it ensures 
administrative efficiency, lowers transaction costs and provides greater 
environmental accountability.   
 
Finally, monitoring of a tradable permit system can occur on different 
levels. In an upstream design, the monitoring is organised at the level of the 
producers and importers while in a downstream design, the monitoring is 
focused on the end-users. There are significant differences between the 
number and type of market actors who have to be monitored under an 
upstream and a downstream design. An upstream design will have far fewer 
and much bigger actors than a downstream design. In terms of the impact on 
administrative efficiency, fewer actors in an upstream monitoring design 
will be easier to manage while downstream monitoring has the potential to 
become impractical, with potentially a large number of actors, leading to 
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83 In a stand-alone spot market, the regulator does not observe investments but his only 
instrument is the supply of pollution rights each period. Thus, the government sets at the 
beginning of each period the number of permits for that period.  
84 In a futures market, the regulator also does not observe investments but he can offer in 
the first period pollution rights for the second period with the commitment of not changing 
the supply of pollution rights in the second period.  
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high administration costs (Crals, Keppens and Vereeck, 2004, p. 133). An 
option proposed by Haites and Mullins (2001, p. 38) is a hybrid system; for 
example upstream compliance with allocations to upstream and downstream 
entities or a downstream trading program for large sources and efficiency 
standards for smaller entities. The result of all these possibilities is an 
implicit trade-off between administrative efficiency (the number of actors to 
be monitored) and economic efficiency (the more actors, the more cost 
savings the system brings). 
3.2.6.2. Enforcement 
The literature on optimal regulatory enforcement begins with Becker 
(1968), who pointed out that because enforcement is costly, it is not socially 
optimal to identify non-compliant agents all the time but rather do so 
sporadically and raise sanctions to the maximum feasible level. Building 
upon this literature, Montero (2002, p. 436) has studied whether incomplete 
enforcement of a regulation has any impact on the choice between price 
(e.g. taxes) and quantity (e.g. tradable permits) instruments. He finds that, 
under cost and benefit uncertainty as well as incomplete enforcement, a 
quantity instrument performs relatively better than a price instrument. In 
fact, if the slopes of the marginal benefit and marginal cost curves are the 
same, the quantity instrument should be preferred. The reason is that in a 
quantity regime with incomplete enforcement, the effective (or observed) 
amount of control is no longer fixed, but rather endogenously determined by 
the actual (ex-post) cost of control (Montero, 2002, p. 452-453). Stranlund 
and Chavez (2000, p. 128) have shown in their analysis that a self-reporting 
can conserve monitoring costs, not because it allows for targeted monitoring 
as in the context of enforcing emissions standards, but because it allows the 
application of a penalty for a reporting violation that serves as an additional 
deterrent to non-compliance. In addition, they have also shown (p. 126) that 
targeted monitoring, i.e. the practice of monitoring some firms more closely 
than others, is not necessary in a competitive permit system. Finally, they 
suggest (p. 127-128) tying penalties in transferable permit systems to the 
current equilibrium price of permits. According to them, doing so would 
allow enforcement authorities to choose a monitoring strategy that is 
effective, yet independent of permit market fluctuations. Tietenberg (2001a) 
argues that a successful enforcement program requires a carefully 
constructed set of sanctions for non-compliance. Penalties should be 
commensurate with the danger posed by non-compliance. Penalties that are 
unrealistically high may be counterproductive if authorities are reluctant to 
impose them and participants are aware of this reluctance. Unrealistically 
high penalties are also likely to consume excessive enforcement resources 
as those served with penalties will seek redress through appeal processes. In 
practice, predetermined administrative fines can be imposed by the 
enforcing agency itself for “routine” non-compliance. In an ideal system, 
more serious non-compliance in terms of either the magnitude of the offence 
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or the number of offences would trigger civil penalties. Criminal penalties 
should be reserved for falsification of official reports and the most serious 
violations.  
 
3.3. Transaction costs 
3.3.1. Survey of the literature 
The concept of transaction costs was introduced by Coase (1937) to explain 
why firms exist as an alternative for organizing economic activity by means 
of exchange transactions across the market. The answer is that firms arise 
because there are substantial costs involved in using the market. Coase was 
not very explicit about what he meant by these transaction costs. He 
described them as the cost of “discovering what the relevant prices are” (p. 
390) or “negotiating and contracting costs” (p. 391).  
 
Arguably, transaction cost reasoning became most widely known by Oliver 
Williamson (1979). He defined them as “the economic equivalent of friction 
in physical systems” (1985, p. 19). Arrow has referred to transaction costs 
as “the costs of running the economic system” (1969, p. 48). Eggertson 
(1990) and Barzel (1997) associate transaction costs with the transfer, 
capture, and protection of exclusive property rights85.  
Coase himself later clarified that “to carry out a market transaction, it is 
necessary to discover who it is that one whishes to deal with, to inform 
people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations 
leading op to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection 
needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed and so 
on” (1960, p. 15). Under such broad definition, transaction costs include all 
costs associated with any allocative decision including the costs of 
uncertainty with respect to the outcome of the decision (Challen, 2000). 
Stavins (1995) has claimed that transaction costs are “ubiquitous” in market 
economies since parties must find one another to transfer, communicate and 
exchange information. At the extreme, North (1990) considers transaction 
costs as just part of production costs, thus expanding the neoclassical 
definition.  
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85 Eggertsson (1990, p. 14-15) continues: “When information is costly, various activities 
related to the exchange of property rights between individuals give rise to transaction costs. 
These activities include: (1) the search for information about the distribution of price and 
quality of commodities and labour inputs, and the search for potential buyers and sellers 
and for relevant information about their behaviour and circumstances; (2) the bargaining 
that is needed tot find the true position of buyers and sellers when prices are endogenous; 
(3) the making of a contract; (4) the monitoring of contractual partners to see whether they 
abide by the forms of the contract; (5) the enforcement of a contract and the collection of 
damages when partners fail to observe their contractual obligations; and (6) the protection 
of property rights against third-party encroachment – for example protection against pirates 
or even against the government in the case of illegitimate trade”. 
53
 
Furubotn and Richter (1997, p. 40, 43) take a neo-institutional perspective 
by defining transaction costs as “the costs of resources utilized for the 
creation, maintenance, use, change, and so on of institutions and 
organizations. […] When considered in relation to existing property rights 
and contract rights, transaction costs consist of the costs of defining and 
measuring resources or claims, plus the costs of utilizing and enforcing the 
rights specified. Applied to the transfer of existing property rights and the 
establishment or transfer of contract rights between individuals (or legal 
entities), transaction costs include the costs of information, negotiation, and 
enforcement.” 
 
Transaction costs have entered into mainstream economics being widely 
applied with slightly different meanings to organizational structures (e.g. 
vertical integration), market failures (e.g. externalities and asymmetric 
information), institutional choices (e.g. promotion of clubs) and public 
choice (e.g. administrative costs). Overall, transaction cost economics has 
contributed to our understanding of observed patterns of organization (Rao, 
2003). Transaction cost is now a generic term referring to any costs that 
come from realizing a transaction across a market. Accordingly, transaction 
costs can be interpreted as “the costs of any activity undertaken to use the 
price system” (Demsetz, 1997, p. 426) including – as we might add - 
market-based approaches of environmental policy. 
3.3.2. Classification 
Since different types of costs may be borne by different players at different 
points in the policy process, a proper classification of transaction cost 
categories is important to assure that all relevant costs are accounted for. 
When complete, a transaction cost taxonomy may also be helpful in 
improving policy design and management. 
 
According to Dahlman (1979), transaction costs include:  
− search and information costs,  
− bargaining and decision-making costs,  
− monitoring and enforcement costs. 
 
The economic rationale of institutions lies in the reduction of those costs. 
This must be interpreted carefully. However, although institutions are, in 
principle, designed to reduce transaction costs by diminishing uncertainty, 
they may not succeed so. New or changing institutions may generate, at any 
point in time, inconsistencies between competing institutions as well as 
uncertainty over future institutional changes which, in turn, are likely to lead 
to increasing transaction costs (Meyer, 2001, p. 358).  
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Milgrom and Roberts (1992) distinguish between two categories of 
transaction costs. The first type arises from information asymmetries and 
incompleteness of contracts among parties. The second type stems from 
imperfect commitments or opportunistic behavior of parties. In his treatise 
on tradable emission permits, Stavins (1995) discusses the taxonomy of 
Foster and Hahn (1993) who distinguish between direct financial costs (of 
engaging in trade), costs of regulatory delay and indirect costs (associated 
with the uncertainty of completing a trade). In their classification, Dudek 
and Wiener (1996) include not only search, negotiation, approval, 
monitoring and enforcement costs, but also insurance costs.  
 
The OECD (2001) has classified transaction costs into two categories:  
− non-policy related transaction costs, which are incurred by parties to 
voluntary (market) transactions, and  
− policy related transaction costs, which are associated with the 
implementation of policies.  
 
The former include the costs associated with gathering information, 
negotiating prices, ascertaining qualities, establishing exclusion 
mechanisms, organizing collective actions and so on. The latter cover the 
costs incurred by government in gathering information, planning and 
designing policies, collecting revenues, distributing payments, and 
monitoring the outcome of policies. 
 
According to Furubotn and Richter (1997), transaction costs involve the use 
of real resources that could be deployed alternatively elsewhere in the 
economy or the socioeconomic system. Transaction costs are pervasive at 
all levels and types of activity and inactivity and comprise the costs of 
establishing, maintaining, adapting, regulating, monitoring and enforcing 
rules as well as executing transactions. Interestingly, the opportunity costs 
of misallocated activities also fit into the category of transaction costs. They 
make a distinction between three types of transaction costs (p. 42): 
− the costs of using the market (market transaction costs), 
− the costs of exercising the right to give orders within the 
organization (managerial transaction costs), and 
− the costs of running and adjusting a political system (political 
transaction costs). 
 
For each of these three types, Furubotn and Richter recognize two variants:  
− fixed transaction costs (set-up costs for institutional arrangements), 
and 




Their taxonomy is the most complete to be found in the literature and 
comprises the costs of using the markets as introduced by Coase (1937), the 
managerial costs put forward by Williamson (1985) and the institutional 
costs discussed by North (1990). The Furubotn-Richter approach also 
absorbs the distinction made by Mullins and Baron (1997) between direct 
transaction costs (e.g. to initiate and complete a trade) and opportunity costs 
(e.g. the loss of time and resources due to delay or managerial supervision). 
Furthermore, transactions entail costs ex ante (e.g. the search and 
information costs and the costs of negotiating and forming a contract or 
agreement) and ex post (e.g. the costs of monitoring and enforcing a 
contract or agreement). In practice, however, ex ante costs often coincide 
with fixed costs and ex post costs with variable costs. It is important to 
recognize that the two types of costs are usually interdependent. Any 
attempt to reduce the former may affect the latter. 
 
In table 1, we offer an extended classification based on the Furubotn-Richter 
taxonomy that is thought to include all relevant types of transaction costs. 
This scheme will be used for policy evaluation of tradable emission rights 
versus environmental taxes in the next chapter, tradable entry rights versus 
road pricing in the fifth chapter and tradable deficit rights versus regulation 
in the sixth chapter. 
Table 1:Transaction Cost Taxonomy 
Transaction costs 
 
Fixed (ex ante) Variable (ex post) 
- Market - Information costs 
- Search costs 
- Signaling costs 
- Negotiation costs 
- Contract costs 
- Insurance costs 
- Managerial - Set-up costs  - Monitoring costs  
- Enforcement costs 
- Bonding costs 
- Political - Lobbying costs 
- Public support costs 
- Enacting costs 
- Operational costs 
- Compliance costs 
- Delay costs 
Source: Based on Furutbotn and Richter (1997) 
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4. Tradable emission rights versus environmental taxes86 
4.1. Introduction 
 
There is an increasing interest in having the government create markets in 
property rights to allocate various resources, such as environmental quality. 
The purpose of this chapter is to apply the theory of tradable permits to 
environmental problems. In order to do so, we will first discuss the different 
design issues related to emission rights. More specifically, location of the 
source and choice of the nature of the baseline matters when choosing a 
particular permit system. Then, we will elaborate on the most well-know 
cap-and-trade programs, namely the U.S. Acid Rain Program and 
RECLAIM. These case studies will help to understand the practical 
implications of introducing a system of tradable permits and lead to an 
inventory of general problems and possibilities of using tradable emission 
permits. Primarily, the key to a smooth functioning of the tradable permit 
market is a low level of transaction costs. However, it is a widely held view 
that corrective taxation entails substantial, though far fewer transaction costs 
than tradable permit systems. Therefore, we will explore all relevant market, 
managerial and political transaction costs associated with environmental 
taxes and tradable emission rights and conduct a comparative analysis.  
 
4.2. Design issues of tradable emission rights 
4.2.1. Emission versus ambient permit systems 
Tradable emission permits are an instrument well-suited to restrict 
emissions in situations where location of the source, relative to receptors, 
does not matter, such as with uniformly dispersed pollutants. In other cases, 
where location does matter, air quality goals or deposition targets at certain 
locations can be approached by the creation of transferable ambient permits 
or deposition permits. An ambient permit is defined as the permission to 
deposit a given quantity of pollutants at a specific receptor (Ermoliev, 
Michalevich and Nentjes, 2000, p. 39). When creating such a system, the 
target deposition level for each receptor has to be specified. After 
subtracting background deposition, the remaining deposition at each 
receptor can be distributed as deposition permits among sources. In order to 
emit a given quantity of pollutants, a source has to have the appropriate 
number of deposition permits for each receptor it affects. If a source wants 
to increase emissions, it has to obtain additional deposition permits for each 
of the receptors in reach of its emissions (Ermoliev, Michalevich and 
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86 Part of this chapter has been published as: Crals and Vereeck (2005) and Crals et al. 
(2005, forthcoming)  
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Nentjes, 2000, p. 39). An ambient permit system is appropriate for non-
uniformly mixed pollutants such as SO2, NOx, PM and VOC. However, the 
main reason that the system, although seemingly attractive from a 
theoretical perspective, has little practical application is because of the high 
transaction costs, especially with a large number of receptor points. 
Transaction costs inhibit trade by driving a ‘wedge’ between the price the 
buyer pays and that which the seller receives. As a result, transactions 
between sources are lower and a part of potential cost savings is not realized 
(Stavins, 1995, p. 139).  
 
Ermoliev, Michalevich and Nentjes (2000, p. 40) point out that some of the 
markets for deposition permits might be thin. This can be the case if 
concentrations in the receptor point are affected only by local sources which 
are small in numbers. As a result, there will be imperfect competition in the 
permit market. They have shown in their paper that a market for ambient or 
deposition permits with multiple receptors can basically work but trade has 
to be sequential and multilateral. This means that a source which supplies 
deposition permits needs two or more trading partners who have a demand 
for deposition permits. This naturally makes trade more complicated. 
Furthermore, the global cap can be forgotten when focussing on a small 
scale.  
 
Concluding, when the aim is to cap the emissions at lowest cost, an 
emission permit systems seems more appropriate. However, hot spots are 
almost impossible to avoid with these systems.  
4.2.2. Emissions versus input trading 
In principle, there is a need to regulate risks and impacts. However, it is 
quite difficult to trade risks directly. Therefore, policy typically moves one 
or two steps away from this level, leading to either emission permit trading 
or input permit trading. For example, a CO2 trading program evidently 
corresponds to the first type while a carbon trading program belongs to the 
second group. The choice between the two groups depends on the degree of 
uniform mixing of the pollutant. For example, it would be problematic to 
use a sulfur content trading program because SO2 is a highly non-uniformly 
mixed pollutant.  
 
Aside from this physical property, there is also an economic or political 
aspect, namely administrative feasibility. The general rule is, the closer to 
the actual impacts regulation takes place, the more complex it gets 
(Schneider and Wagner, 2003, p. 4). 
4.2.3. Absolute versus relative baselines 
The difference between relative and absolute targets can be argued as 
follows (Schneider and Wagner, 2003, p. 5): “One limits total emissions to 
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some absolute amount and may therefore limit growth, while the other is 
presumed to impose less of a constraint on growth in output, albeit at the 
cost of some growth in emissions”. Gielen, Koutstaal and Vollebergh (2002) 
have analyzed the most important differences between absolute and relative 
targets in case of emission trading. They show that relative cap-and-trade 
policies87 amounts to the implementation of an absolute cap-and-trade 
mechanism together with a subsidy on output or input.  
 
In practice, relative targets are often considered when establishing trading 
schemes. Gielen, Koutstaal and Vollebergh (2002) mention several reasons 
for this popularity. First of all, trading with relative targets is more easily 
combined with existing regulation and policies. Secondly, political 
acceptability exists because polluters only have to pay for emissions above 
the relative target and not for their remaining emissions. Also, relative 
mechanisms allow entry and expansion at no extra costs as long as 
emissions per unit of output or input are below the relative target. 
Nevertheless, in spite of this popularity, several reasons argue for using 
absolute baselines in tradable permit programs. The main reason is that 
trading with a relative cap is less efficient than trading with an absolute cap 
because a relative cap is a combination of a price on emissions and a 
production subsidy. Consequently, output will exceed the optimal output 
level and permit price and abatement costs need to be higher in order to 
meet the same emission target as in an efficient system with an absolute cap. 
Furthermore, the uncertainty is larger with relative caps. In addition, no 
revenue will be raised which could be used to lower the dead-weight loss of 
distortionary taxation. Finally, monitoring costs of relative caps will be 
higher. Schneider and Wagner (2003, p. 6) mention two other reasons which 
argue for using absolute baselines. First, without a specified baseline, 
reductions must be credited to an unobservable hypothetical, i.e. what the 
source would have emitted in the absence of the regulation. Second, relative 
baselines create significant transaction costs by essentially requiring prior 
approval of trades as the authority investigates the claimed counterfactual 
from which reductions are calculated and credits generated.  
 
4.3. Emission rights in practice 
 
When economists and policy makers are discussing tradable permits 
systems, they typically focus on the existing cap-and-trade systems in the 
United States because the international experience outside the U.S. is rather 
small88. We will first give an overview of some of other existing (credit as 
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87 Relative cap-and-trade policies can also be defined as policies that restrict emissions per 
unit of output or input.  
88 Europe has only relatively recently begun to develop such programs. For example, in 
July 2003 the EU parliament approved the directive to establish a greenhouse gas emission 
59
well as cap-and-trade) programs and then will further elaborate on two 
programs, namely RECLAIM which is implemented in the area Los 
Angeles of the United States and the U.S. Acid Rain Program where 
tradable permits are used for the first time on a large scale to contend with 
environmental pollution.  
4.3.1. Credit programs 
There a several examples of credit programs which have been or are 
currently running in practice. The most important ones are mentioned in the 
following table.  
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allowance-trading program for energy intensive sectors within the EU Member States 
(Schneider and Wagner, 2003, p. 2).  
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Table 2: Existing credit programs 
Country Program Traded Commodity Period of  
Operation 







Criteria air pollutants 
under the Clean Air 
Act 
1974 -Present Performance unaffected; savings of $5-12 billion. 
United 
States 
Lead Trading Rights for lead in 
gasoline among 
refineries 







sources of nitrogen 
and phospohorous 
1984-1986 No trading occurred, because ambient standards not binding 
Canada PERT 93
and GERT94








Source: Based on Stavins (2000)
                                                 
89 Environmental Protection Agency. 
90 Firms that reduced emissions below the level required by law received ‘credits’ usable against higher emissions elsewhere.  
91 Point sources are sources of emissions rights which are well defined, like the emissions of a firm.  
92 Non point sources are sources of emissions where the emission points are not well defined, like the transport sector.  
93 Pilot Emission Reduction Trading (PERT) 
94 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Trading (GERT) 
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4.3.2. Cap-and-trade programs 




Table 3: Existing cap-and-trade programs 
Country Program Traded Commodity Period of 
operation 
Environmental and economic effects 
United States CFC95 trading for 
ozone protection 
Production rights for some CFCs, 
based on depletion potential 
1987-
Present 
Environmental targets achieved ahead 
of schedule; effect of TP system 
unclear 
United States Acid Rain 
Reduction 
SO2 emission reduction credits; 
mainly among electric utilities 
1995-
Present 
Environmental target achieved ahead 






Local SO2 and NOx emissions trading 
among stationary sources 
1994-
Present 
Unknown as of 1997 
Chile Chilean Bus 
Licenses 
Bus licenses sold via auctioning 
system to address congestion related 
pollution in Santiago 
1991-
Present 
Congestion has been reduced, with 
emissions reduced proportionately 
Chile Chilean TSP 
tradable permits 
Total suspended particulates (TSP) 
from stationary sources in the 
Santiago area 
Emissions have decreased97; volume of 




Source: Based on Stavins (2000)
                                                 
95 Chlorofluorocarbons 
96 Regional Clean Air Incentives Market 
97 Also due to the introduction of natural gas as an alternative fuel.  
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4.3.2.1. The US Acid Rain Program (Title VI)98 
Contrary to the attractive efficiency feature of market-based approaches for 
internalizing environmental externalities, this approach was seldom used. 
The environmental policy in the United States was mainly based on source 
specific command-and-control regulation by either posing a limit on the 
emissions or requiring specific technologies (Joskow and Schmalensee, 
1998). The first use on a large scale of tradable emission permits was 
initiated by the Clean Act Amendments in 1990. At that time, the Bush 
Administration proposed a tradable permits approach in Title IV what 
became the Clear Air Act Amendments (CAAA) of 1990. Title IV was 
targeted at electric utility emissions (coil- and oil-fired electricity generating 
plants) of sulphur dioxide, the major precursor of acid rain (Joskow, 
Schmalensee and Bailey, 1998). In practice, Title IV places an aggregate 
cap on power plant emissions of SO2 of around 9 millions tons, effective 
from year 2000 onwards. This emissions cap is equivalent to a reduction in 
annual emissions of some 10 millions tons as compared with 1980 (Smith, 
2002, p. 47).  
 
The Acid Rain Program was implemented in 2 phases. Phase I, covering the 
period 1995-1999, required aggregate emissions reductions of around 3,5 
million tons per year from the 263 generating units with the greatest 
emissions at 110 mostly coal-burning electric utility plants located in 21 
Eastern and Midwestern states99. An additional 182 units joined Phase I of 
the program as substitution or compensating units, bringing the total of 
Phase I affected units to 445. Emissions data indicate that 1995 SO2 
emissions at these units nationwide were reduced by almost 40% below 
their required level. Phase II, starting in 2000, extended the scope of the 
aggregate cap on SO2 emissions to all coal-fired and oil-fired electric power 
plants above 25MW capacity. The act also called for a 2 million ton 
reduction in NOx emissions by the year 2000. A significant portion of this 
reduction has been achieved by coal-fired utility boilers that were required 
to install low NOx burner technologies to meet new emissions standards.  
 
The basic principle of the Clean Air Market program is called allowance 
trading or cap-and-trade and has several characteristics. The cap-and-trade 
approach first sets an overall cap, or maximum amount of emissions per 
compliance period, that will achieve the desired environmental effects. 
Authorizations to emit in the form of emission allowances are then allocated 
to affected sources, and the total number of allowances cannot exceed the 
cap. In the Acid Rain Program, sulphur dioxide emissions were 17,5 million 
tons in 1980 from electric utilities in the United States. Beginning in 1995, 
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98 Primarily based on the official site from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
www.epa.gov/airmarkets/
99 The so-called Table A units.  
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annual caps were set to decline to a level of 8,95 million allowances by the 
year 2010. One allowance permits a source to emit one ton of SO2. The 
basis structure of the tradable permit regime is built around an annual 
distribution of tradable emissions allowances mainly on a grandfathered 
basis. The permits may be used in the year of issue, or banked and used in a 
subsequent year100. As indicated by Burtraw (2000), the opportunity to bank 
allowances is expected to play a significant role in reducing compliance cost 
because it affords firms the flexibility to plan their investment activities. 
The permits can be traded freely across the entire US territory, on a 1:1 
basis, either directly between emitting firms or through brokers101. The EPA 
plays no role in trade, however, a small EPA auction of about 2,8% of the 
total issue of allowances begun in 1993. This was intended to stimulate the 
development of the market for permits. The revenues were to be recycled to 
regulated sources. This auction offered a solution for the concern that an 
active market for permits would not arise because emitting firms would 
keep their initial allocation and refuse to sell at each price (Ellerman et al., 
2000). At the end of the year, units must hold in their compliance sub 
accounts a quantity of allowances equal to or greater than the amount of SO2 
emitted during that year.  
 
An essential feature of smoothly operating markets is a method for 
measuring the commodity being traded. The owner or operator of a unit 
regulated under the Acid Rain Program must install CEM systems102 on the 
unit unless otherwise specified in the regulation. All CEM systems must be 
in continuous operation and must be able to sample, analyze, and record 
data at least every 15 minutes. Utilities can choose themselves how to 
reduce emissions i.e. by employing energy conservation measures, 
increasing reliance on renewable energy, reducing usage, employing 
pollution control technologies, switching to lower sulphur fuel, buying 
additional permits or other alternative strategies. Consequently, the utility 
can choose for the most cost-effective way to achieve the Clean Air Act 




                                                 
100 Borrowing is not allowed.  
101 Permits may be bought, sold and traded by any individual, corporation, or governing 
body, including brokers, municipalities, environmental groups, and private citizens. The 
primary participants in allowance trading are officials designated and authorized to 
represent the owners and operators of electric utility plants that emit SO2.  
102 Continuous Emissions Monitoring or CEM is the continuous measurement of pollutants 
emitted into the atmosphere in exhaust gases from combustion or industrial processes. 
CEM systems include: an SO2 pollutant concentration monitor, a NOx pollutant 
concentration monitor, a volumetric flow monitor, an opacity monitor, a diluent gas 
monitor and a computer-based data acquisition and handling system (DAHS) for the 
recording and performing calculations with the data. 
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Under the Acid Rain Program, anyone can purchase allowances, including 
both regulated companies and members of the general public. In addition to 
buying allowances directly from a company or individual who holds them, 
allowances can be bought in three ways: 
1. Through EPA’s annual auction. Once a year, EPA auctions a certain 
number of allowances at the end of March. Utilities, environmental 
groups, allowance brokers, and anyone else interested in purchasing 
allowances can participate. Allowances will be sold at the highest 
bidder until no allowances remain; 
2. Through a broker. Brokers bring together parties that have allowances 
to buy and sell. They are more appropriate for higher-volume 
allowance transactions; 
3. Through environmental groups that retire allowances so they can not 
be used to cover emissions. Some individuals and groups buy permits 
as a environmental statement because this will lower SO2 emissions 
of facilities.  
 
At the end of the compliance period, every source needs sufficient permits 
to cover its emissions. To accomplish this, EPA maintains an Allowance 
Tracking System (ATS). Each affected utility unit, corporation, group or 
individual holding allowances has an account in the ATS. Parties must 
notify EPA that records transfers in their ATS account. However, EPA 
records only when allowances are to be used to meet a unit’s SO2 emissions 
limitation requirement. An ATS account contains the following information: 
− Issuance of all allowances; 
− How many allowances an account holds; 
− How many allowances are held in various allowance reserves, such 
as the EPA auction reserve and the Conservation and Renewable Energy 
Reserve; 
− Deduction of allowances for compliance purposes; 
− Transfer of allowances between accounts.  
 
After the final submitted transfers are recorded on the ATS, EPA deducts 
allowances from each unit’s compliance sub account in an amount equal to 
its SO2 emissions for that year. If the unit’s emissions do not exceed its 
allowances, the remaining allowances are carried forward, or banked, into 
the next year’s sub account which then becomes the current compliance sub 
account. If a unit’s emissions exceed its allowances, the unit must pay a 
penalty and surrender allowances for the following year to EPA as excess 
emission offsets. Every unit has 30 days after the end of the year to present 
sufficient rights for the emission of the previous year.  
 
Ellerman’s et al. (2000, p. 314) analysis has indicated that the Acid Rain 
Program has thus far been a notable success. Title IV more than achieved 
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the SO2 emissions-reduction goal established for Phase I, and it did so on 
time, without extensive litigation, an at costs lower than predicted. 
Moreover, there has been 100% compliance by all affected sources. 
Therefore, the U.S. Acid Rain Program can offer valuable lessons for the 
design of a system of tradable permits in the future. As Ellerman et al. 
(2000, p. 315-316) state, the experience thus far with Title IV clearly 
establishes that large-scale tradable permit programs can work more or less 
as theory describes (see chapter 3). By providing flexibility to polluters 
along with rigorous emissions measurement and enforcement, such 
programs can both achieve stated environmental objectives and reduce 
compliance. However, it is also important not to forget that theory also tells 
us that the emissions trading approach is not well suited to some 
environmental programs103. 
 
Ellerman et al. (2000, p. 317-318) also indicate that efficient, competitive 
markets for tradable permits can develop when program design and 
implementation are favourable. His analysis (Ellerman et al., 2000, p. 197) 
shows that around the middle of 1994, a reasonably efficient market for 
allowances has emerged. That is, prices for allowances were easily available 
to buyers and sellers, transaction costs were low, arbitrage opportunities 
were quickly exploited, and buyers and sellers were taking advantage of the 
opportunities to reduce compliance costs by engaging in trading activity. 
The most important factors contributing to this efficient market were the 
fundamental design of an allowance and the subsequent implementation of 
the Acid Rain Program by the EPA. The key design elements were:  
− Rights to emit SO2 were being traded rather than reductions of SO2 
emissions104; and, 
− Each allowance was worth the same amount (one ton of SO2) 
regardless of when or between whom it was traded. 
 
Different estimations of the long term marginal and annual costs of the SO2 
program and cost savings from allowance trading are summarized in table 4. 
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103 For example, if a specific, isolated plant is emitting toxic chemicals that put nearby 
residents at excessive risk, emissions trading has no obvious role. It may be better to use 
emission fees or taxes to deal with problems of that sort, but direct regulation is likely to 
have more appeal.  
104 This distinction is important for the development of a market. Emissions are what 
damage the environment, and measuring them is, at least in this case, a relatively routine 
engineering problem. Specifying and fixing emissions reductions cannot be done so easily, 
though, unless it is known in advance what emissions would have been absent the control 
program begin implemented. Therefore, transaction costs will be much higher with 
emission reductions.  
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Table 4: Estimates of Long-run (2010) Annual and Marginal Cost of SO2 
program 




per ton SO2 
(1995 dollars) 
Average Cost 
per ton SO2 
(1995 dollars) 
Carlson et al. (1998) 1.0 291 174 
Burtraw et al. (1997) 0.9  239 
White (1997)  436  
ICF (1995) 2.3 532 252 
White et al. (1995) 1.4-2.9 543 286-334 
Van Horn 
Consulting et al. 
(1993) 
2.4-3.3 520 314-405 
ICF (1990) 1.9-5.5 579-760 280-467 
Source: Based on Burtraw (1999) 
 
For the evaluation of the program compared to prior expectations, the most 
useful study is ICF (1990), which was done for the EPA and available prior 
to enactment of the legislation. This study captured accurately the ultimate 
design of the regulation, and projected marginal cost of $579-760 (1995 
dollars) for full compliance under the program. In 2000, Butraw studied the 
costs of compliance and concluded by stating that these were significant less 
than anticipated at and before the program adoption. Important has been the 
role of changing fuel prices and in the long run the role of technological 
change. These factors combine to lower expected long-run costs by over 
half of what was anticipated at the outset of the program. 
 
While total costs, as we have seen, have been on the low side of predictions, 
allowance prices have been much lower than the long-run marginal cost of 
abatement, which they would approximate in a well-functioning market at 
long-run equilibrium with reasonably good information and low transaction 
costs. Furthermore, allowances prices are also less than the average cost of 
abatement which, in a world of efficient compliance decisions and varying 
abatement cost among units, would be lower than long-run marginal cost. 
As discussed by Ellerman et al. (1997, p. 42), the average total cost and the 
long-run marginal cost of abatement in 1995 were approximately $200 and 
$300 a ton, respectively; yet, since Phase I began, allowance prices have 
ranged from only $70 to $130. Two explanations are made by Ellerman et 
al. (1997, p. 42). The first is that the disparity reflects serious imperfections 
in the allowance market, driven largely by early defects in the EPA 
auctions. However, Ellerman’s analysis of the market evolution strongly 
suggests that it evolved quickly into a well-functioning market with low 
transaction costs, price transparency, and extensive trading activity. A 
second explanation for the gap between allowance prices and average 
abatement costs is that some utilities were forced by political pressures to 
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invest in high-cost abatement technologies, in particular scrubbers105, 
thereby helping to protect local businesses and jobs. 
 
In conclusion, efficient, competitive markets for tradable allowances may 
take time to develop, and the speed of development may be sensitive to 
some elements of program design. For example, as showed by Schmalensee 
et al. (1998, p. 66), the allowance auctions that the EPA was required to 
conduct seem to have facilitated both the price discovery process and the 
development of the allowance market. Price information is an important 
issue related to the design of an allowance market but market prices may 
well turn out to be higher or lower than predicted by studies.  
4.3.2.2. RECLAIM106 
The SCAQMD107 Governing Board adopted the RECLAIM (Regional Clean 
Air Incentives Market) on October 15, 1993. The goal of RECLAIM is to 
provide facilities with added flexibility in meeting emission reduction 
requirements while lowering the cost of compliance in the area around Los 
Angeles. This region, the smoggiest in the nations, is required to achieve 
federal clean air health standards by 2010. The flexibility allows facilities 
the possibility to find new ways of reducing their emissions at lower costs 
and to trade emission permits on the market. In particular, the program has 
replaced source-by-source controls on emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx) 
and sulphur oxides (SOx) with an emissions trading system for these 
pollutants, which limits the aggregate emissions within the area, and allows 
trading to determine the distribution of emissions across individual sources 
(Smith, 2002, p. 40). The RECLAIM program was anticipated by two years 
of research: six months to design the concept of the emissions trading 
program, one year feasibility study and one and a half year to develop the 
rules of the program.  
 
Throughout the development of RECLAIM, the following five criteria were 
used to evaluate program options: 
1. Enforcement of emission reductions must provide a confidence level 
equal to or greater than the existing air pollution control programs; 
2. Emissions reductions (air quality) improvements must be equal to or 
greater than the 1991 AQMP108 and future control plan requirements; 
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105 Since scrubbers remove about 95% of the sulfur in flue gas, units installing scrubbers 
require fewer allowances to cover emissions than they were issued for in Phase I. Thus, 
scrubbing increases the supply of allowances available for sale or banking for future use, 
and therefore helps to drive down allowance prices.  
106 This section is mainly based on studies done by the agency running the program itself 
(SCAQMD, 1998). However, there are also some academic studies used, including Smith, 
2002 and Stavins, 2000.   
107 South Coast Air Quality Management District. 
108 Air Quality Management Plan 
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3. Implementation costs must be lower than the cost projected in the 
1991 AQMP; 
4. Job impacts must be less than the cost projected in the 1991 AQMP; 
and, 
5. Adverse public health impacts should not result from implementation 
of the program.  
 
The development of RECLAIM began in 1990 and consisted of four phases. 
The first phase concluded with a public workshop that was held in October 
1990 to obtain input for the development of the concept. Phase II began 
again with a public workshop to review Phase I and receive further input. A 
draft concept for a trading program was prepared in Phase II and based on 
this draft, Phase III started with a full-scale feasibility study. This study 
evaluated different alternatives for the program. After a lengthy Public 
Hearing, Phase IV began with the development of a series of rules and 
documents to implement RECLAIM for NOx and SOx. The actual 
implementation of the program started on January 1, 1994.  
 
The basic concept of RECLAIM is that all major stationary sources with 
NOx and SOx emissions generally greater than 4 tons per year, will receive 
an annual emission cap and an annual rate of reduction. Sources such as 
equipment rental facilities, essential public services (including police, fire, 
landfills, waste water treatment facilities, hospitals, prisons, and schools), 
restaurants and dry cleaners are excluded from RECLAIM. At the 
beginning, the number of facilities included added up to 41 in the SOx 
market and 390 in the NOx market. Each facility received an annual 
emission allocation for sources emitting either NOx or SOx. Facilities can 
be in one or both markets. In practice, each facility received three sets of 
allocations as follows: a starting allocation for 1994; a mid-point allocation 
for 2000; and, an ending allocation for 2003. Consequently, the cap 
diminishes every year during 10 years (1994-2003). This reduction is 
equivalent to a 7 to 8 percent annual decrease in SOx and NOx emission in 
that period. The total SOx allocation began at 25 ton per day in 1994 and 
declined to 14 in 2000 and 10 (40 % of 1994 allocations) in 2003. The total 
NOx allocation began at 103 ton per day in 1994, declined to 35 in 2000 and 
26 (only one quarter of 1994 allocations) in 2003.  
 
Allocations are based on sources’ past level of activity (grandfathering). The 
allocation is calculated on the peak activity level over 1989 to 1992 and on 
the emission control requirements for year 2000 and 2003 specified by the 
1991 AQMP. Allocations were made to each RECLAIM facility at the start 
of the program, for each year from 1994 through to 2010. Allocations are 
valid in the specified one-year time period only, and there is no possibility 
for inter-temporal flexibility through banking or borrowing. As a result of 
this restriction on inter-temporal trade and the sharply-declining allocations, 
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the trading system operates against the background of an increasing scarcity 
of emission permits.  
 
RECLAIM offers several advantages, both for the public and the business 
communities. The major benefit of RECLAIM is that air quality goals 
necessary to protect human health can be met in a more cost-effective 
manner. Secondly, RECLAIM will provide more flexibility for industry and 
will enable facilities to improve their long term planning and management 
of emission. Namely, it allows each facility to choose the most cost-
effective strategy to meet annual emission targets. Facilities that hold 
emissions below their annual allocation can sell the difference to other 
facilities. RECLAIM also offers industry the ability to competitively 
develop and control their air pollution reduction strategy. Finally, 
RECLAIM will cap emissions, as opposed to the current practice of 
controlling emission rates. The public benefits from the program because it 
provides additional incentives for industry to reduce emissions and develop 
better pollution control technology.  
 
The major costs of the program are the emission monitoring costs. CEMS is 
used in approximately two third of the participating facilities. The other 
facilities are using less accurate and more inexpensive technologies to 
measure their emissions.   
 
The agency running the RECLAIM program, SCAQMD, is required under 
the rules of the program to make regular reports on various aspects of the 
program. Annual program audits are required on various specific topics, as 
well as a more comprehensive audit after three years of operation (Smith, 
2002, p. 41). This three-yearly audit addresses a wide range of topics under 
ten headings: 
− Changes in the number of sources subject to RECLAIM, including 
changes due to closure; 
− The allocation of RTCs109, in total, and between sources; 
− Emission reductions achieved by RECLAIM sources; 
− Trading activity and prices of traded RTCs; 
− Compliance and monitoring costs; 
− New Source Review Activity; 
− Socio-economic analysis; 
− Air Quality and Public Health effects; 
− Amendments to the RECLAIM program; and, 
− Changes to the program which are under consideration. 
 71 
                                                 
109 RECLAIM Trading Credits.  
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The two key issues of general interest covered by the audit are the effects of 
the RECLAIM program on emission levels and on the level and pattern of 
trading activity (Smith, 2002, p. 42-43). The report shows that, for the first 
three years, emissions levels were below aggregate allocations. 
Approximately 24% of total NOx and 27% of total SOx allocations were 
unused in 1996. Although emissions were on a declining trend, the 
allowance allocation was declining more rapidly, and the audit anticipated 
that the crossover110 years were about to be reached in 1999 for NOx and 
2001 for SOx. Trading volumes were substantial; SCAQMD reported that 
by the end of 1997 1200 trades had taken place, covering about 0,25 million 
tons of NOx and SOx RTCs. A considerable proportion of RTC trading 
activity has been ‘zero-price’ trading, such as transactions between two 
plants under common ownership. Only 15% to 20% of trades have been 
‘priced’ trades. The prices of TRCs have been well below the anticipated 
prices. However, these prices have highly increased in the further phases. 
Disadvantageous was the lack of automatic stabilization of prices because of 
the prohibition on inter-temporal trade. Finally, Stavins (2000) estimated - 
in ex ante evaluation of the cost savings of the RECLAIM program - yearly 
cost savings of approximately $58 million. This corresponds to a saving of 
42% compared to the traditional command-and-control compliance costs.    
 
4.4. General possibilities of using tradable (emission) permits  
 
In essence, tradable permits can be environmentally effective, economically 
efficient, flexible, and designed so as to limit unwanted distributive aspects 
(Kitamori, 2002, p. 71). These advantages are already extensively discussed 
in the second chapter and will be just briefly repeated here. First of all, a 
system of tradable rights enables the government to determine a certain 
amount of pollution (cap) which is thought of to be acceptable in a certain 
area or time period. Then, the cap is divided into quota, the so-called 
emission rights. Consequently, the government forbids all pollution in that 
area unless the polluter has an emission right. Polluters can trade their 
permits and consequently, a market will develop. When a polluter wants to 
emit more, he has to buy additional permits from others who pollute less. In 
principle, cap-and-trade tradable permit schemes deliver certainty in their 
quantitative impact on emissions levels. In addition, the price is determined 
by the market and hence reflects the real marginal willingness to pay of the 
polluter. Secondly, tradable permits achieve static efficiency by minimizing 
the overall cost of compliance by encouraging those firms that can abate 
pollution more cheaply to do so first, while allowing those with higher 
abatement costs to opt for buying additional permits or allowances. Thirdly, 
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110 Crossover years are years in which RTC demands exceed supply.  
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tradable permits allow firms greater flexibility in their choice of means for 
achieving the environmental objectives. Finally, depending on its design, a 
tradable permit scheme can better control the distributive effects of the 
policies, achieving desired income distribution or transfers among different 
groups through the choice of the initial permit allocation methods111 
(Kitamori, 2002, p. 72).  
 
Besides these theoretical advantages, it is worth noting that some of the 
basic characteristics of greenhouse gases (GHGs) are particularly suited for 
emissions trading. As described by Kitamori (2002, p. 73), the location of 
emissions sources does not matter for GHGs and therefore allowing full 
geographical flexibility. GHGs become quickly uniformly mixed in the 
atmosphere and hence it makes no difference in terms of global climate 
change impacts if more emission abatement occurs at one source in place of 
another due to trading. Consequently, GHG emissions trading will not lead 
to hot spots problems. Similarly, full temporal flexibility in borrowing and 
banking of GHG emissions permits would make very little difference in 
terms of environmental impacts because the residence time of GHGs in the 
atmosphere is so long. 
4.5. General problems of using tradable (emission) permits 
4.5.1. Issues relating to the initial allocation and distributive aspects 
In general, distributional effects112 have two parts, the effects that arise 
through changes in prices and return to factors, and the wealth effects of 
changing ownership of a resource (Crals and Vereeck, 2004b, p. 11). The 
price effects, which are the most complex effects, are the same regardless 
the form of regulation. In particular, they are unaffected by whether permits 
are auctioned or grandfathered. Tietenberg (2001a, p. 206) puts it as 
follows:  
 
‘Whatever the initial allocation, the transferability of the permits allows them to 
ultimately flow to their highest valued use. Since that use does not depend on the 
initial allocation, all initial allocations result in the same outcome and that outcome 
is cost-effective. It implies that with tradable permits the resource manager can use 
the initial allocation to solve other goals such as political feasibility or ethical 
concerns without sacrificing cost effectiveness.’  
 
In other words, regardless of whether a given volume of permits is 
auctioned or grandfathered, the permit price tends to be the same. We will 
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111 However, this equity aspect arising from initial permit allocation is one of the most 
controversial and politically sensitive areas in the process of designing any tradable permit 
program. 
112 A classification of the types of environment-related distributional concerns that can arise 
are discussed by OECD (2004, p. 8-10). They also elaborate on what a fair distribution of 
environmental policy incidence is (p. 10-12).  
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show this using a numerical example. Assume that MAC of two firms (A 
and B) are assumed to increase, up to the level of 2200 (Q0), at the point 
where, if no emission reduction occurred, 2200 would be emitted. Marginal 
abatement costs are assumed to be: 
 
MAC(A) = 5 . Q 
MAC(B) = 8 . Q 
 
Where Q = Q0 – allocation. First, we will calculate the market equilibrium 
price in case of grandfathering. We assume that each firm receives 1100 
permits for free. This leads to the following: 
 
 Firm A: allocation = 1100 → MAC = 5500 
 Firm B: allocation = 1100 → MAC = 8800 
 






























allocationQpf −= 0)( . When equating demand and supply, the 
market equilibrium price .  6769≅
 
Secondly, under the same assumption, we will calculate the market-
equilibrium price when all rights are auctioned. Marginal abatement costs 
then are:  
 
 Firm A: allocation = 0 → MAC = 11000 
 Firm B: allocation = 0 → MAC = 17600 
 
















Supply is fixed at 2200 permits. After equating demand and supply in this 
example, we find that the market equilibrium price of a permit 
again 6769≅ 113. 
 
This example demonstrates that prices for both firms will be the same in 
case of grandfathering or auctioning114. At least, this is the case in the 
absence of any significantly different effects on the final wealth (or income) 
resulting from the two approaches, auctioning and grandfathering115. Wealth 
effects occur because ownership is being transferred from the commons to 
either the taxpayer, under taxes and tradable permits with auctions, or the 
recipients of grandfathered permits. More specifically, auction and tax 
revenue can be used in a multitude of ways116 benefiting many different 
groups. In contrast, grandfathered permits redistribute wealth to 
shareholders. Only those who directly receive permits gain because a pure 
wealth effect117 is produced. The aggregate distributional effects depend on 
the sum of the price and wealth effects (Cramton and Kerr, 1999, p. 259).  
 
In theory, the distributional effects of tradable permits are similar to those of 
taxes since, as mentioned by OECD (2004, p. 17), in a partial equilibrium 
perspective, the use of a tax is comparable to a tradable permits system 
where the permits are auctioned118. However, the distributional effects will 
differ with the grandfathering of the permits where the rent is transferred 
from consumers to firms. As Parry discusses (2004, p. 366), grandfathered 
permits produce an income transfer towards higher-income groups at the 
expense of other households. This is because they create windfall gains for 
shareholders, who tend to be relatively wealthy; firms receive emission 
permits for free and the market value of the permits is reflected in higher 
firm equity values. There is no windfall gain to wealthy households under 
other market-based or command-and-control approaches. Under auctioned 
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113 Suppose firm A receives 1000 permits for free and B 1200. Based on MAC and demand 
and supply functions, we find again that the price 6769. 
114 This analysis can be expanded to a larger number of polluters in the market.  
115 The term grandfathering, which reflects the idea that entities should be allocated permits 
in some relation to past emissions, is used here to cover any kind of principle of free 
allocations.  
116 As Cramton and Kerr (1999, p. 261-262) point out, labor, consumption, payroll or 
capital gains taxes could be cut or the deficit could be reduced. Only the political process 
and the normal constraints on redistribution limit the flexibility of compensation under 
auctions  
117 Grandfathering is usually used to compensate some current owners of specific capital.  
118 The distributional implications of environmentally friendly taxes can arise from the 
following categories (OECD, 2004, p. 17):  
- the direct distribution effects on households arising from payment of the tax; 
- the indirect distributional effects (for example when taxes are directed to firms but 
consumers pay a part of the cost through price increases); 
- the effects arising from the expenditure of environmental tax revenues; and 
- the effects relating to benefits of environmental improvements. 
75
permits – as under emission taxes – the government obtains revenues that 
can be recycled in broad tax reductions, or reductions that favor the poor 
(Crals and Vereeck, 2004b, p 11)119. This was confirmed by Burtraw (2000) 
who said that, because scholars and policy analysts are attempting to draw 
lessons from the existing cap-and-trade programs, such as the U.S. Acid 
Rain and RECLAIM program, one area that should receive significant 
attention is the manner in which emission allowances are allocated to the 
industry. Evidence suggests that grandfathering of allowances can impose 
significant efficiency costs. Furthermore, this approach represents a 
tremendous transfer of wealth that raises equity issues as well. The possible 
significant inflows and outflows of money could thereby determine who 
would be the "winners and losers" of such a system. Burtraw (2000) 
recommends that emission allowances should be auctioned or allocated in 
some means that raises revenue for government that can be used to reduce 
other distortionary taxes. A hybrid program, in which some portion of 
allowances is grandfathered and the rest auctioned by the government120, 
could offer a compromise that would improve programs of this type in 
future applications.  
 
In general, taxes and auctioned permits are more likely to lead to equitable 
outcomes than grandfathered permits. Cost bearing is widely spread out and, 
in the long run, all costs are borne by consumers (Crals and Vereeck, 2004b, 
p. 12). Therefore, according to Cramton and Kerr (1999, p. 262), 
compensation should also be widely spread. To achieve this redistribution, 
auctioning permits or taxes are preferred.   
4.5.2. Issues relating to different kinds of pollutants 
Tradable permits are a suitable instrument for some pollutants but not for 
all. Particularly CO2 poses a challenge compared to other local air pollutants 
such as SO2 emissions. The latter are concentrated in a few industries while 
CO2 is practically emitted by any sector, from numerous point and non-
point sources. Also, reducing CO2 emissions means reductions in energy 
flows and a shift towards more sustainable consumption patterns in general, 
whereas for other pollutants, abatement technologies are more readily 
available (Kitamori, 2002, p. 73).  
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119 Examining the effect of a 15% reduction in U.S. carbon emissions under different 
allocation mechanisms, Dinan and Rogers (2002, p. 215) estimate that the lowest income 
households would be worse off under grandfathered permits while top income households 
would be better off. The low-income households would be better off if, instead, the permits 
were auctioned with revenues recycled in equal lump-sum rebates for all households.  
120 As used in the U.S. Acid Rain Program. However, in this program only a small amount 
is auctioned (see paragraph 4.3.2.1.).  
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4.5.3. Issues relating to social impact and political acceptability 
The use of economic instruments to implement environmental policy has in 
the past been viewed with considerable skepticism and these doubts have 
yet to be fully allayed. There can be little doubt that political acceptability is 
still a weak point of tradable permits in most of the world’s countries.  
 
OECD (2001, p. 75-80) categorized the general reasons for these doubts. 
The first one deals with the conflict about the idea of a ‘right to pollute’ and 
that of the right to sell these rights to pollute. This provocative expression is 
sometimes unwisely used in the literature with reference to emission permits 
and is particularly misplaced as the aim of tradable permits is not to 
recognize a new right to harm where no such right existed before, but to 
severely restrict the exercise of this right in areas where it was unlimited or 
already recognized in the regulations (OECD, 2001, p. 77). The concept of 
rights has a positive connotation in the context of basis rights, whereas, if 
taken literally, the concept of a ‘right to pollute’ is perceived as a cynical 
and negative notion that establishes a right to harm others. Furthermore, it is 
often viewed that a public reward can not be given to those who pollute and 
such persons can not be allowed to earn money by selling a ‘right to 
pollute’. Trading in pollutant emission permits would therefore be immoral 
by nature. The second weak point concerning the legitimacy of tradable 
permits deals with the fears of the local population with regard to both the 
environment and the potential impact on local employment. With tradable 
permits, no local community will be immune from new exposure to 
pollution and will not have at its disposal the means of controlling this new 
exposure directly at source. The concern over employment must be taken 
into account when designing the program by not undermining the economic 
properties that make tradable permits attractive since it is by allowing the 
costs of an environmental program to be kept as low as possible that any 
adverse impacts on the local economy and employment can be reduced 
(OECD, 2001, p. 79). Finally, there exists a fear of loss of market power on 
the part of different actors when introducing tradable permits. The 
administrative officials in public services are frequently members of groups 
hostile to the development of tradable permits, since introduction of the 
latter would remove their oversight from the choices of technology made by 
firms. Similarly, the introduction of tradable permits can lead to changes in 
the organization of internal responsibilities within firms by assigning 
responsibility for environmental matters to financial, and no longer solely 
engineering, departments. This shows that the successful introduction of 
tradable permits requires often a change in the culture of an organization 
(OECD, 2001, p. 79).   
 
Crals et al. (2005, forthcoming) mention the following reasons for the lack 
of political and social acceptability: 
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− Within the broad public, the following misconception dominates: a 
public good is now taxed and this price is more seen as a burden than as a 
means to initiate people to more sustainable behavior. Consequently, 
price mechanisms are often seen as more unjust than administrative 
regulation. This is also called price-aversion which exists for government 
intervention in general: people oppose all new taxes. Finally, people are 
very sensitive to redistribution aspects in the sense that the losers in this 
system are more identified than the winners. 
− Politicians are not very enthusiastic about price mechanisms because 
the voting public does not attribute a well functioning price mechanism 
to their activities. In other words, little re-election gains can be made. 
Moreover, direct regulation offers more possibilities to wield power than 
price mechanisms. 
− Within administration, little acceptability can be found because price 
policy does not belong to the policy traditions. Officials also more 
believe in the effectiveness of regulation. 
− Finally, interest groups are opposed to price control measures 
because these offer less negotiation space to influence political decisions. 
The efficiency gains of price control measures are a public good which 
unsatisfactory can be attributed to the political decision-making process.  
 
As price control measures become incorporated in a whole set of measures 
on the supply and demand side, legitimacy will increase. The level of 
acceptation is also dependent on the tax level and the use of the revenues 
that are created. It can be assumed that acceptability will increase as 
revenues flow back to the people who have paid.  
4.5.4. Issues relating to transaction costs 
Transaction costs may inhibit trade, and may therefore reduce the extent to 
which potential savings are realized in practice (Smith, 2002, p. 33). Rao 
(2003, p. 158) has suggested that the systems of market-based emissions 
trading, even the well-developed programs in the United States, still have a 
long way to go before being effective in any sense because of excessive 
transaction costs. However, there exists no empirical evidence that 
transaction costs have prevented trading or significantly affected prices of 
permits in the United States (Michaelowa et al., 2003). Moreover, the 
occurrence of high transaction costs in emissions trading does not imply that 
environmental taxation is any less susceptible. Because of the importance of 
this issue, we will examine this matter further by comparing the transaction 




4.6. Transaction costs 
 
Market-based environmental policy instruments are the practical outcome of 
the Pigouvian and Coasean legacies. From an ecological and economic 
perspective, it is clear that tradable emission rights outperform 
environmental taxes, but the crux of the former system seems the 
transaction costs it entails. While the literature on environmental economics 
has been discussing transaction costs of tradable permit systems (e.g. 
Stavins (1995), Woerdman (2001)), a comparative analysis of the 
transaction costs incurred by environmental policy instruments across all 
stages of the policy process is still lacking (Krutilla, 1999). It is our purpose 
to make a first attempt. In the previous chapter we have already proposed, 
by surveying the literature, a taxonomy of transaction costs. Using this 
taxonomy, a comparative assessment is made of the transaction costs 
generated by ecological taxation on the one hand, and tradable emission 
permits on the other.   
4.6.1. Determination of relevant transaction cost categories 
From table 1 in the third chapter, we first select those types of transaction 
costs that are relevant for assessing public policy. By analyzing the same set 
of cost categories, we try to set off criticism that most studies are 
incomplete or that different definitions make any comparison virtually 
impossible (Woerdman, 2001, p. 300). To pursue a market-based 
environmental policy, the following, more or less chronological transaction 
costs are likely to be incurred:  
− gathering information about environmental damages and the 
behavior of polluters,  
− securing public support for ecological policy,  
− lobbying politicians,  
− enacting legislation,  
− setting up the administration,  
− operating the environmental program,  
− searching for the relevant sources of pollution and designing the 
instrument accordingly,  
− negotiating with the environmental authority or among polluters 
(including signaling and bonding),  
− contracting with other polluters,  
− monitoring the behavior of polluters,  
− enforcing the legal requirements of the environmental program,  
− insuring against the costs of environmental damage claims,  
− private administration to comply with the program’s requirements,  
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− delay in policy implementation or execution. 
 
In our analysis, we will not discuss those cost types that are indifferent to 
both approaches and thus not relevant for comparative analysis. This is the 
case for insurance costs since they are determined by tort law and insurance 
market conditions. The same applies to parliamentary procedures and 
enacting costs which are incurred irrespective of the policy instrument 
chosen. While legislative delay may have serious environmental 
consequences, the transaction costs thus caused are just extra lobbying and 
public support costs. Although environmental taxes are sometimes imposed 
retroactively, we will not consider them as delay costs since they are not 
transaction costs inherent to the instrument. Hence, only lobbying and 
public support costs are considered as legislative costs. All relevant 
transaction cost categories are summarized in table 5. This scheme is the 
blueprint for the next paragraphs. 
Table 5: Chronological Transaction Costs of (Environmental) Policy Process 
Transaction costs Fixed Variable 
- Political Legislative costs 
- Lobbying costs 
- Public support costs 
 
- Market Information costs 
Search (planning) costs 
 
- Managerial Set-up costs  
- Political  Operational costs 
- Market Negotiation costs 
Contract costs 
 
- Managerial  Monitoring and 
enforcement costs  
- Political  Compliance costs  
 
4.6.2. Environmental taxes 
Corrective taxation is itself not costless. All relevant transaction costs 
associated with environmental taxes will be discussed first. 
4.6.2.1. Legislative costs  
The decision on the instrument to be applied in environmental policy is 
formally the competence of the legislator who is supposed to act to further 
the public interest. But politicians are also influenced by various interest 
groups (Stigler (1971), Becker (1983)) like the polluting industry, 
environmental organizations and bureaucracy. Lobbying is thus likely to 
prevail because those affected by a policy may benefit or suffer from the 
choice of the policy instrument. Therefore, they have an incentive to 
influence the political process. As Olson (1965) pointed out, lobbying and 
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subsequent lobbying costs are more likely to arise when interest groups are 
small and have a high per capita stake.  
 
Following Buchanan and Tullock (1975), we assume that the polluting 
industry prefers that policy instrument which maximizes profits. In the short 
run, the political decision to reduce emissions imposes scarcity and thus 
creates a rent. In a system of (non-) tradable quota, the industry may capture 
part of this rent. With ecological taxation, however, the government will 
confiscate the whole rent. Therefore, the polluting industry is most likely to 
campaign against taxes. Although environmental tax revenues can benefit 
the rest of society through increased spending or reduced taxing, the 
industry is expected to be a more effective lobbyist since it has fewer 
members with a higher per capita stake. Dewees (1983) has broadened the 
analysis by including (long-run) abatement costs and distinguishing between 
shareholders (who want to maximize share value) and workers (who seek to 
retain their jobs). This time, their interests are very alike though. Taxation 
reduces production, profits and jobs since output prices will increase 
reflecting environmental taxes as well as long run abatement costs.  
 
Without explaining their preference ordering, it used to be ascertained that 
environmentalists eschew market-based approaches (Hahn, 1989). However, 
if we plausibly assume that ecological organizations are risk-averse and 
wish to maximize the reduction of pollution, they are likely to advocate an 
environmental policy that is certain and effective, or even over-effective. 
Since information, let alone perfect information on damages is often 
lacking, the impact of emission charges on total emissions is highly 
uncertain. This has led to a change of mind among environmentalists who 
nowadays campaign for the implementation of tradable permits schemes.  
 
Assuming that (environmental) bureaucrats have a strong preference to 
maximize the budgets they administer (Niskanen, 1971), they are likely to 
lobby in favor of environmental taxes which not only increase their 
spending power, but also entail substantial information gathering and 
collecting costs for which additional budgetary sources have to be tapped. 
 
The decision which environmental policy instrument should be chosen is 
made by politicians who also seek re-election (Peltzman (1976), Hahn 
(1990)). They thus have a clear incentive to favor their voters and decide in 
line with their preferences (Helfand, 1999). A traditional leftist politician 
will consider the interests of the working class with some concession to 
environmentalists. A traditional right-wing politician will weigh the 
interests of shareholders and workers and rank them above the 
environmentalists. Both the traditional left and right are thus expected to 
dislike environmental taxation. However, the executive branch of 
government relies on the bureaucracy for information and implementation. 
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This might explain why taxation, largely preferred by bureaucracy, has been 
more widely applied.  
 
From the private interest approach, it follows that public support for 
environmental taxes is low. Nevertheless, an environmental authority that 
wishes to impose eco-taxes, has some options to successfully raise the level 
of public support. Assuming a low treasury preference, the costs of public 
persuasion can be mitigated by linking the implementation to an 
environmental tax reform, earmarking the revenues or taking advantage of 
an environmental catastrophe. 
 
In conclusion, it seems reasonable to state that that the legislative costs of 
environmental taxation, in particular rent-seeking costs, are substantial. 
4.6.2.2. Information costs 
The literature on environmental tax policy leaves room for a possible net 
welfare gain of corrective taxation. The argument implicitly assumes, 
however, that the tax authority knows both the damage and benefit functions 
of victims and polluters (Baron, 1985) along with the price elasticity of 
demand, which is largely dependent on the availability of non-polluting 
alternatives and income elasticity. If not, the environmental tax authority 
can not set the optimal tax rate in terms of its emission goals. In practice, 
this type of information is hard to get by, so that governments become 
involved in a trial-and-error process of adjusting and readjusting the tax rate 
in an attempt to reach the emission target (Woerdman, 2002, p. 31). This 
scepticism is shared by the European Commission which points out that, 
while a levy set too low will not fully correct the externality, a tax set too 
high replaces one distortion by another (COM, 1997). Sandmo (1975), 
however, has convincingly demonstrated the positive welfare effects of 
corrective second-best taxation in a general equilibrium setting. But, once 
again, it requires additional information about existing distortions.  
 
Information costs may further rise when differentiated taxes are to be 
implemented in accordance with pollution characteristics (for example, 
different fuel types) or the benefits derived by each victim from abatement 
in case of incentive taxation (see below). This would require differentiated 
assessments of individual utilities (Kolstadt, 1987).  Finally, environmental 
pollution is often the result of accidents. Uncertainty also complicates the 
correct assessment of expected social costs.  
 
From this, it can be concluded that the information costs related to effective 
and efficient environmental taxation are high. 
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4.6.2.3. Search (planning) costs 
First-best analysis expects the tax authority to use personalized taxes and 
lump sum transfers since they do not bring additional distortions to the 
economy. Baumol and Oates (1988) have asserted that the link between the 
environmental externality and the tax base should be carefully established 
and that the corrective environmental taxes should be levied as close as 
possible to the source of pollution. If it were possible to locate the polluters 
and the victims, the question remains who should be taxed. In case of 
incentive taxation, the victims pay the taxes that finance the abatement. 
When this linkage principle is violated, there is a risk that the tax incidence 
is unduly shifted or that resources are reallocated to non-taxed uses. 
Locating the environmental damage is easy in theory, but not in practice 
since victims may spread in time and place. However, if taxes are not linked 
to the sources of pollution, free rider effects might occur.  
 
Search costs can be somewhat mitigated, though, when the source can be 
linked to the cause of pollution. Taxing substances entails fewer information 
and search costs compared to personalized or incentive taxation. Search 
costs can be further reduced when the tax units are already identified. This 
is the case for user charges and indirect tax rate differentiation for healthy 
products or income tax deductibles for environmentally friendly behavior by 
consumers or businesses.  
 
However, it should be pointed out that a trade-off exists between search and 
planning costs on the one hand, and the efficacy of the tax instrument on the 
other. 
4.6.2.4. Set-up costs 
With the rise of the modern welfare state, the scope of taxation has 
increased dramatically (Webber and Wildavsky, 1986). Consequently, 
governments have set up large agencies to administer and collect all types of 
direct and indirect taxes that touch upon almost every aspect of human life 
(consumption, production, business initiative, work, home and even death). 
If the new environmental taxes can be levied and collected by an established 
tax agency, set-up costs are negligible and sunk.  
 
For example, charges levied on products that also fall under a VAT or sales 
tax regime can easily be administered by the direct tax administration. 
Analogously, the real estate tax agency is well equipped to levy user 
charges, for example on water provision, since it holds relevant information 
on the properties of buildings.  
4.6.2.5. Operational costs 
Negligible set-up costs do not imply that the costs of tax administration are 
low. Environmental taxation requires specialized personnel that gathers the 
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information discussed above, identifies the correct tax base, determines the 
optimal tax rate, feeds that information into the existing tax system and, if 
revenues are earmarked, collects the tax money and establishes a special 
fund. Although overhead costs can be spread among taxpayers, the costs of 
operating the tax administration are certainly not negligible and rising with 
the complexity of the tax law. 
4.6.2.6. Negotiation costs 
Although corporations and tax authorities often negotiate tax deals that may 
include environmental taxes and personalized tax deductibles for abatement 
investments, it is assumed that these negotiations are restricted to larger 
companies and that no tax bargaining occurs among tax subjects. As a 
matter of fact, taxation is compulsory precisely to eradicate these transaction 
costs. Hence, negotiation costs are relatively small. 
4.6.2.7. Contract costs 
No costs are incurred as a result of contracting over environmental taxes.  
4.6.2.8. Monitoring and enforcement costs 
Because polluters want to reduce the tax burden, they can choose to invest 
in abatement equipment (if the pay-off exceeds the tax payments), to reduce 
their polluting activities, to switch to non-taxed activities or to try and 
escape tax payments. Clearly, the environmental tax administration has to 
perform costly monitoring activities to ensure compliance and enforce tax 
payments (Bontems and Bourgeon, 2001). It is important to distinguish 
three different problems: tax evasion, tax avoidance and tax delinquency. 
While tax evasion is a fraudulent effort to escape a tax obligation, tax 
avoidance occurs when a taxpayer adapts his behavior in a lawful manner so 
as to minimize tax payments. Tax delinquency refers to a (temporary) 
failure to pay the tax obligation and will not be discussed here. 
 
Tax enforcement relies on a mix of instruments: disclosure requirements, 
audits, on-site inspections and penalties121. What is important in our 
analysis, is that the costs of the monitoring and enforcement methods are 
determined in general by the transparency of the tax formula. The simpler is 
the tax rule, the harder it is to contest or manipulate. The complexity of the 
tax system is thus raising the monitoring and enforcement costs (Kaplow, 
1996). Complexity typically arises from the need to make the tax base and 
rate accurately reflect the goals of public policy. More accurate tax rules 
may better serve equity or efficacy, but are also more costly to monitor and 
enforce. Kaplow has, therefore, suggested that the original policy goal may 
be sacrificed to some extent for the sake of lowering enforcement costs. The 
Baumol-Oates linkage principle provides proof for that: the closer a tax is 
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levied to the source or victim of pollution, the more effective is the tax, yet 
the more costly is its implementation due to information problems. It can 
thus be concluded that monitoring and enforcement costs are proportionate 
to the information and search costs associated with more complex rules. In 
case of environmental taxation, they tend to be very high. 
4.6.2.9. Compliance costs 
Administrative mechanisms to prevent tax evasion also lead to costs made 
by the taxpayers to comply with the rules. The main source of compliance 
costs involves recordkeeping and banking operations. Compliance costs can 
be substantial and are estimated, for example, at 7 percent of total income 
tax revenue (Slemrod and Sorum, 1984). Like the previous cost category, 
compliance costs arise on account of more accurate, yet complex rules that 
link taxes more directly to the impact of pollution.  
4.6.2.10. Conclusion 
From this analysis, two main conclusions can be drawn. First, the 
transaction costs of environmental taxation are conditional upon the selected 
tax base. Although set-up costs are relatively low when drawing upon 
existing tax administrations, the enforcement and compliance costs are 
likely to be substantial. The latter costs are determined by the tax rules’ 
complexity which, in turn, seems a consequence of the linkage principle. 
The more accurately the tax base is defined, the higher the information costs 
and subsequent monitoring, enforcement and compliance costs. The main 
reason is that personalized taxes give an incentive for taxpayers to hide 
information in order to lower their tax payments.  
 
Secondly, there appears a trade-off between transaction costs and the 
efficacy of environmental taxes. Corrective taxation, though desirable in 
principle, may entail prohibitively high transaction costs that can only be 
reduced to some extent by sacrificing its original goal viz. matching private 
and social costs. In conclusion, transaction costs rely on the design of the 
tax system. 
4.6.3. Tradable emission permits 
The introduction of a tradable permit system serves two purposes, namely to 
effectively cap environmental harm and efficiently internalize the 
environmental costs by setting the right price for the permits. The latter aim 
can be impaired in part by the prevalence of prohibitively high transaction 
costs. Will transaction costs greatly reduce the benefits of an emissions 
trading system as some authors122 have suggested? 
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4.6.3.1. Legislative costs 
It has been argued that a polluting industry has rent-maximizing incentives 
to prefer emission quotas over environmental taxes (Buchanan and Tullock, 
1975). Trading quotas gives firms the flexibility to adjust their level of 
output or abatement to maximize profit. Before trade among polluters can 
start, the environmental agency has to distribute the permits. This can be 
done in essentially two ways: for free or by auctioning. In the former 
scenario, the industry happily captures the rent from imposed scarcity. If the 
permits are auctioned, however, profits are absorbed by the price that has to 
be paid. In case of an auction, the effects on profits and jobs are likely to be 
negative and similar to environmental taxation. Dewees (1983), however, 
has pointed out that the interests of shareholders and workers may be at 
conflict here. While the former can make a profit on excess permits by 
installing new abatement technology, jobs are expected to be lost when 
higher abatement costs and/or profits are reflected in output prices. The 
industry as a whole is, thus, assumed to prefer freely distributed emission 
rights. 
 
In the private interest approach, environmental organizations are understood 
to optimize the efficacy and certainty of environmental policy. This may 
explain their (recent) zeal for the implementation of tradable emission 
permits programs. Since an auction of permits may yield additional funds 
for environmental improvement, they rationally prefer this distribution 
mechanism. 
 
Bureaucrats’ budget-maximizing behavior is constrained, among others, by 
performance audits of a supreme auditing office. When civil servants are in 
regular need to demonstrate that they have not been wasting taxpayers’ 
money, they will carefully consider the efficacy of policies. Since 
environmental targets are more likely to be met under a cap-and-trade 
program, this clearly countervails their tax preference. If politicians would 
decide in favor of the implementation of tradable emission rights, 
bureaucrats have clear budget-maximizing incentives to favor an auction 
system. 
 
Recently, Stavins (2002, p. 14-15) wrote that, although the political world 
was slow to embrace the use of market-based instruments for environmental 
protection, they have moved center stage, and policy debates look very 
different from the time when these ideas where characterized as “licenses to 
pollute” or dismissed as completely impractical. It is clear that market-based 
solutions have gained in acceptance. The idea that the efficacy of the 
existing policies is insufficient compared to emissions’ trading brought 
about this favorable change of perception vis-à-vis tradable permits 
(Woerdman, 2002, p. 452). Politicians from the left to the right, all seeking 
re-election, are inclined to support tradable emission rights. While the leftist 
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electorate would prefer auctions to increase public spending, freely 
grandfathered tradable permits are more likely to appear on the political 
agenda under a right-wing coalition in order not to impair the profitability of 
companies. The removal of political barriers is also reducing the remaining 
public support costs of tradable emission rights. Public support can be 
further enhanced through workshops in local communities or with industrial 
and environmental groups and by new feasibility studies revealing more 
participatory implementation scenarios. 
 
Since political and public support is on the rise, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that rent-seeking costs remain relatively low.  
4.6.3.2. Information costs 
Tradable emission permits have one major cost advantage. The 
environmental authority only has to set the total amount of pollution (rights) 
deemed acceptable and does not need to gather additional information about 
damages, abatement costs or price elasticities. The initial distribution of the 
permits, however, may entail some information costs. Basically, there exist 
three schemes to distribute the emission rights among polluters:  
− free (no information is needed about past of future pollution of 
market participants), 
− auction,  
− grandfathering or updating, i.e. based on historical, respectively last 
year’s emissions which requires the regulatory agency to keep individual 
emission records. 
 
The design of the program may thus be a source of data collecting costs. 
Saving transaction costs through the free distribution of permits does not 
harm the efficacy of the instrument since trading ensures that the permit 
ends up in its highest valued use. Hence, compared to environmental 
taxation, information costs are negligible.  
4.6.3.3. Search (planning) costs 
Apart from the initial distribution of rights, the design of a cap-and-trade 
program entails several other planning issues such as the geographic area, 
the span of temporal flexibility and the nature of the permit (Harrison, 
1999).  
 
A larger geographic area is more likely to guarantee a sufficient number of 
trading partners. To ensure market liquidity, a tradable permit system thus 
has to be set up on a sufficiently large scale. Moreover, pollution is a typical 
cross-border problem that needs a solution on an international, global level. 
The permits that are distributed at the beginning of each year should remain 
valid for one year only since borrowing, i.e. the use of next year’s permits, 
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not only causes great monitoring and enforcement problems, but also 
encourages speculative behavior. As far as the nature of the permit is 
concerned, the cap sets a physical limit on total pollution, for instance 
million tons of CO2. When the production of CO2 is the outcome of fossil 
fuel consumption, CO2 permits may take the form of tradable fuel permits. 
 
Once again, search costs are dependent on the design of the program (for 
example, allowing borrowing). Since low cost alternatives do not impair the 
efficacy, it is fair to conclude that search costs can be kept low. 
4.6.3.4. Set-up costs 
To regulate the market, an environmental agency is to be set up holding 
three important responsibilities: determination of the annual cap, 
distribution of permits and enforcement of the system. These new tasks 
seem to require the establishment and funding of a new public agency or 
division. The extent of the set-up costs is largely dependent on the 
distribution system chosen. For example, in contrast to the free distribution 
of rights will grandfathering, updating or auctioning of permits necessitate 
substantial investments in information technology and/or auction design. 
These costs are not system-specific. For example, a system of tradable 
cordon rights is likely to use the same information technology (viz. license 
plate scanning) as the entrance toll system recently implemented in London. 
The market for tradable fuel permits can be set up with technology that 
already exists and works today. The permits can be put on smart cards that 
are fraud-resistant and allow easy and inexpensive transactions (at cash 
dispensers and gasoline stations). Recharging the card can be done via the 
internet using an individual internet account number (Crals, Keppens and 
Vereeck, 2004). 
 
In conclusion, set-up costs can be substantial and are determined by the 
information needs of the distribution mechanism and the availability of 
trading technology. Free distribution and existing technology are likely to 
induce the least set-up costs. 
4.6.3.5. Operational costs 
The operational costs also largely depend on the initial distribution method 
and the trading regime. More data and personnel are needed to feed the 
information requirements of a grandfathering or updating program than a 
free distribution scheme. When the permits are auctioned, maintenance costs 
have to be taken into account as well. Sometimes, the approval from the 
environmental agency is needed to complete a trade. For that reason are 
simple approval processes, few requirements and well defined emission 
rights essential to keep operational costs down (Hahn and Hester, 1989, p. 
378). According to Mullins and Baron (1997, p. 31), the rules for governing 
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the trading system can have a dramatic effect on transaction costs. For 
instance, it will make finding an acceptable buyer or seller more difficult.  
 
So, in order to keep operational costs down, permit holders should be able to 
sell their excess permits with as little regulatory interference as possible. 
4.6.3.6. Negotiation costs 
When entering into negotiations, parties first have to search for other 
partners to trade. When market participants are confronted with substantial 
search costs, fewer transactions will be concluded. The environmental 
authority can, therefore, set up different market types to facilitate the trade 
of permits:  
− direct search markets (without intermediaries),  
− brokered markets (with intermediaries but with market players still 
holding the rights),  
− dealer markets (where intermediaries hold the rights), 
− auction markets (where the environmental agency holds the rights). 
 
Financial institutions or insurance companies can reduce search costs by 
acting as brokers between buyers and sellers. Tietenberg (1999) has argued 
that these costs can also be reduced by establishing a clearing-house.  
 
Once a party has found another party to trade, bargaining will start. This 
bargaining process will be standardized and entail fewer transaction costs 
when information on permit prices is publicly available. Clearing-houses, 
spot and futures markets and auctions are most likely to ensure that prices 
are publicly available.  
 
Negotiation costs thus depend upon the design of the trading regime and the 
observability of permit prices.  
4.6.3.7. Contract costs 
The costs of contracting are zero since the purchase of a permit is a spot 
transaction. Since there is no time lapse between the promise and actual 
transfer of the emission right, there is no room for opportunistic behavior 
that necessitates contractual protection of the buyer. 
4.6.3.8. Monitoring and enforcement costs 
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Basically, there are two ways to monitor a tradable permit program: 
upstream where producers are monitored, and downstream where policing is 
focused on the end-users. Significant differences between the two 
approaches exist with regard to the type and number of market players that 
need to be monitored. Whereas an upstream scheme has fewer and larger 
agents, downstream monitoring involves more players and thus higher costs. 
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Yet, downstream monitoring may yield significant public awareness 
benefits.  
 
Nevertheless, from a transaction cost perspective, tradable permit programs 
should be monitored upstream. Besides, upstream holders of emission 
permits will shift their permit costs to the end-users who will be confronted 
with their polluting consumption via higher output prices anyway. 
 
Enforcement comprises four stages (Tietenberg, 1985): detection of the 
violation, notification of the offender, negotiation about compliance 
measures and sanctions for non-compliance. The first stages are determined 
by the transparent nature of the permit traded. The last stages should set 
penalties high enough, in particular well above the marginal cost of 
abatement, to provide sufficient incentives for a high degree of compliance. 
If the penalties are not high enough, participants have an incentive to pay 
the penalties instead of buying permits.  
 
The choice for upstream monitoring with fewer and larger agents seems at 
conflict with the demand for a liquid market. In other words, there is a 
trade-off between negotiation costs on the one hand, and monitoring costs 
on the other. 
4.6.3.9. Compliance costs 
If other regulatory systems are already in effect that oblige firms to compute 
their emissions, no additional compliance costs need to be made for 
determining whether permits need to be bought or sold. Reversely, 
compliance costs may arise if additional administrative requirements have to 
be fulfilled to comply with the permit system. These costs involve primarily 
recordkeeping which depends on the accuracy requirements by the 
environmental authority and the complexity of the commodity (permit) 
traded. 
4.6.3.10. Conclusion 
Three conclusions can be drawn from the transaction cost analysis. First, 
contrary to popular belief, set-up costs are relatively low and not a major 
impediment for the implementation of a tradable permit system.  
 
Secondly, the amount of transaction costs incurred is largely determined by 
the design of the system, in particular the distribution and trading regime. 
To summarize, a tradable permit system implemented on a large scale, 
monitored upstream by an environmental agency that distributes tradable 
fuel permits of limited validity for free and that, without regulatory 
interference, sets up a brokered market using existing (internet) technology 
will entail far fewer transaction costs than a small system monitored 
downstream with permits auctioned off by an environmental authority that 
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subsequently strictly regulates a direct search market and that allows 
borrowing of emission rights.  
 
Thirdly, permit trading creates a trade-off between some cost categories. 
While an upstream system saves monitoring costs, it may add to negotiation 
costs because the market is less atomistic. It should be pointed out, though, 
that there hardly exists a trade-off between transaction costs and efficacy. In 
conclusion, cap-and-trade programs do not need to suffer from prohibitively 
high transaction costs if they are smartly designed.  
4.6.4. Transaction Cost Comparison 
Does environmental taxation entail fewer transaction costs than emission 
permits and can it explain the overwhelming use of the former instrument? 
The introduction of a new policy instrument always poses serious problems 
for comparative assessment because such an analysis favors the status-quo. 
Mishan (1967) pointed out that the welfare derived from existing markets is 
simply better represented in both the social demand and supply curves. One 
method of evaluating the relative performance of alternative policy 
instruments is transaction costs analysis. This approach, however, tells us 
little about absolute performance. For example, a sure way of reducing 
transaction costs is to eliminate transactions. So, we rephrase our central 
question as given the objective that pollution has to be effectively curbed, 
which policy instrument entails the least transaction costs? To answer this 
question, we compare the same transaction cost categories.  
4.6.4.1. Information and search costs 
Although sometimes thought to be similar as “market-based” instruments, 
huge differences are ascertained in data collection necessary to run 
respectively an ecological tax system and a tradable emission rights 
program. Whereas a cap-and-trade system requires information about total 
pollution, environmental tax policy makers also need to assess damages, 
abatement costs and price elasticity to set the appropriate tax. Though these 
costs can be lowered by using a more easily observable tax base, this 
solution comes at a price: free-riding behavior will occur since the 
corrective tax loosens or looses its link with the source or victim of 
pollution.  
4.6.4.2. Monitoring, enforcement and compliance costs 
The time and energy spent on monitoring, enforcing and complying with 
environmental policy increases with the complexity of the rules. 
Unfortunately, complexity is often the corollary of accuracy. The relative 
ease of monitoring and enforcement is thus dependent on the transparency 
of the system, which, in turn, is determined by availability of information. 
By consequence, the costs of monitoring, enforcement and compliance are 
unmistakably higher for environmental taxation.  
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4.6.4.3. Negotiating and contracting costs 
Taxes entail almost virtually no negotiation and contracting costs since 
environmental tax bargaining is rare. Trading in the market for emission 
permits, on the contrary, seems prone to substantial negotiation costs. 
However, brokers and auctions may not only reduce the search costs of 
buyers and sellers, but also their bargaining costs since they ensure that 
prices are publicly available. As explained before, the sale of a permit is a 
spot transaction that does not entail any contracting costs. 
4.6.4.4. Administrative costs 
Environmental taxes have yet another advantage. They can be administered 
and collected by the large, already existing and immensely experienced tax 
apparatus. These relatively small set-up costs can not conceal the substantial 
operational costs of tax collection. Administrative costs of permit trading 
are incurred through the creation of an environmental agency – if not in 
existence yet – and a distribution mechanism. The latter, however, need not 
lead to substantial costs when permits are distributed for free or by 
auctioning. Only grandfathering and updating are likely to entail significant 
set-up and operational costs. 
4.6.4.5. Legislative costs 
Finally, legislative costs are not a good decision criterion to adopt or reject 
one approach. Lobbying against the introduction of one system can be easily 
interpreted as rent-seeking in favor of the other. Moreover, lobbing costs are 
by large inversely proportional to public support costs. 
4.6.4.6. Conclusion 
All results are summarized in table 6. From this table, it can be inferred that 
tradable emission permits can give rise to significant transaction costs, but 
so may environmental taxes. While the former will provoke more set-up 
costs, the latter is burdened by information costs. Essentially, it all comes 
down to the appropriate design of the policy instrument. Whereas 
transaction costs of permit trading are dependent on the choice of the 
distribution and trading regimes, it is the definition of the tax base that 
determines the transaction costs of environmental taxation. So, it can not be 
concluded that taxation, by its very nature, entails fewer transaction costs 
than tradable permits. On the contrary, a well-designed permit trading 
system is likely to generate even fewer transaction costs (see table 7). A 
clever tax design may also save transaction costs, but, unlike permits, this 




Table 6: Comparative transaction costs of market-based environmental policy instruments. 
Transaction costs F*/V° Environmental  
Taxation 
Tradable emission permits 
Information costs F Very high (pollution per source, damages, price 
elasticity) 
High (grandfathering or updating) 
Very low (cap, free distribution or auction) 
Search (planning) costs F Very high (emission and incentive taxes) 
Average (product charges) 
Low (user charges, indirect tax differentiation, 
income tax breaks) 
High (banking and borrowing) 
Low (one year validity) 
Negotiation costs F Very low (tax packages) High (direct search market) 
Low (brokered or dealer market) 
Very low (auction market) 
Contract costs F Non-existing Zero (spot transaction) 
Set-up costs F Very low (existing tax administrations) Average (existing technology) 
Low (free distribution) 
Monitoring and 
enforcement costs 
V High (emission and incentive taxes) 
Average (product charges) 
Low (user charges, indirect tax differentiation, 
income tax breaks) 
High (downstream) 
Low (upstream) 
Lobbying costs F High (industry con, bureaucrats pro) 
Low (environmentalists, politicians) 
High (free distribution: industry, right wing 
coalition) 
High (auction: bureaucrats, environmentalists, 
left wing coalition) 
Public support costs F High (treasury) 
Average (earmarked revenues) 
Low (environmental tax reform) 
High (auction) 
Low (free distribution) 
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Operational costs V High (tax personnel) High (grandfathering, averaging) 
Average (auction) 
Low (free distribution) 
Compliance costs  V High (tax forms) Average (permit register) 
* = fixed, ° = variable
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4.6.5. Policy implications 
The main characteristics of a cap-and-trade program are its efficacy and 
static and dynamic efficiency. By setting a cap, the system imposes a 
physical upper limit on the total amount of pollution. Because no more 
pollution rights are distributed than the overall cap allows, the system, by 
definition, always meets its goal. In other words, installing a quantitative 
cap is the most effective way of curbing environmental pollution. Polluters 
can meet their environmental obligations by complying with their emission 
allowances, buying additional emission permits, or investing in emission 
reduction. Since some can abate pollution more cheaply than others, the 
latter will choose to buy emission rights from the former. It would be 
inefficient to impose the same emission rules on all agents. The market price 
for emissions gives polluters a clear incentive to search for permit cost 
reductions through cleaner technology. Therefore, tradable permits also 
yield dynamically efficient outcomes.  
 
Information deficiencies render environmental taxation neither very 
effective, nor efficient. However, since policy-makers are more familiar 
with taxes than with tradable rights, they tend to believe that the 
implementation of environmental taxes is less complicated and entails fewer 
transaction costs, particularly set-up and negotiation costs. The comparative 
analysis of transaction costs presented in this chapter clearly refutes this 
argument.  
 
Transaction costs pose additional considerations in the design and 
comparison of policy instruments. For example, whereas the free 
distribution of emission rights minimizes administrative costs, the 
auctioning of permits is likely to eradicate negotiation costs by bringing 
buyers and sellers together and revealing permit prices. So, while not 
suitable for the initial distribution, auctions (as well as brokered markets) 
have an important role to play in the allocation of excess permits. Market 
transparency asks for a sufficiently large area to be implied in the program. 
To counter the subsequent signaling and monitoring costs, the 
environmental authority should facilitate auctions or brokered markets and 
monitor the system upstream.  
 
Table 7 reveals that, from a transaction cost perspective, the optimal 
tradable permit system is a large scale, upstream operation in which the 
environmental agency distributes the permits for free at the beginning of 
each year and ensures that excess permits can be sold via a brokered market 
or auction. Table 7 also shows that user charges, indirect tax differentiation 
for environmentally friendly products and income tax deductibles for 
environmentally friendly behavior entail the least transaction costs, yet more 
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than the optimal tradable permit scheme. Moreover, these instruments are 
hardly as effective. 
 
Table 7: Transaction Cost-effective Environmental Market-based Policy Instruments 
Transaction costs F*/V°  Environmental taxation Tradable emission 
permits 
Information costs F Very high (pollution per 
source, damages, price 
elasticity) 





F Low (user charges, indirect 
tax differentiation, income tax 
breaks) 
Low (one year 
validity) 
Negotiation costs F Very low (tax packages) Low (brokered or 
dealer market) 
Contract costs F Non-existing Zero (spot 
transaction) 







V Low (user charges, indirect 
tax differentiation, income tax 
breaks) 
Low (upstream) 






right wing coalition) 
Public support 
costs 




Operational costs V High (tax personnel) Low (free 
distribution) 
Compliance costs  V High (tax forms) Average (permit 
register) 
Total costs  Low fixed costs of less 
effective taxes, still high 
variable costs 
Low total costs 
* = fixed, ° = variable 
However, the choice between tradable permits and emission taxes can only 
be made when case-specific factors are taken into account. Which 
instrument is best, depends upon a variety of characteristics of the 
environmental problem: social legitimacy, political feasibility, economic 
impact and regulatory context. Furthermore, transaction costs are historical 
costs. What are prohibitively high costs today (for instance, information 
costs), need not be prohibitive tomorrow (for instance, because data 
collection has improved). So, transaction analysis needs to be 
complemented by cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness studies. Certainly, the 
argument that tradable emission rights are effective, but entail prohibitively 
high transaction costs can no longer be maintained.
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5. Tradable entry rights versus road pricing123 
5.1. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, it was demonstrated that emissions trading can be 
environmentally effective, economically efficient, flexible and designed so 
as to limit unwanted distributive aspects. However, although some countries 
are developing domestic permit trading initiatives, governments tend to 
favour emissions taxes because they are considered to have lower 
transaction costs than permit trading. We have dismissed this view based on 
a comparative transaction costs analysis.  
 
The effectiveness of permit trading is considered to be guaranteed in a 
permit trading scheme because emission sources operate under an emission 
ceiling and this ceiling is assumed to be lower than business-as-usual 
emissions. The transportation industry not only struggles with pollution 
problems and greenhouse gas emissions; also problems such as congestion, 
noise and traffic accidents are important issues related to transport. A cap-
and-trade system could offer a solution to some of these problems. This 
chapter focuses on the potential use of tradable rights systems in the 
transportation industry in order to achieve more sustainable transport.  
 
The chapter is organized as follows. First, the context of the transport sector 
is discussed. More specifically, the main arguments for and against the use 
of tradable permits in the transport sector are analysed and relevant areas are 
identified. Secondly, three different tradable transportation rights (TTR) 
scenarios are distinguished, namely tradable vehicle kilometre permits 
(TVKP), tradable fuel permits (TFP) and tradable entry permits (TEP). 
Then, the evaluation criteria of the scenarios are given. In the following 
section, these scenarios are developed and evaluated with special attention 
to the initial distribution of the permits, temporal and spatial flexibility, 
monitoring and enforcement issues and the acceptability of the system. An 
important obstacle of tradable transportation rights would be the prevalence 
of prohibitively high transaction costs. Consequently, a comparative 
analysis is conducted in which the transaction costs of tradable entry permits 
are compared with those of road pricing. Finally, we will conclude by 
formulating policy implications. 
 
5.2. Transportation industry context 
5.2.1. General observations 
In our modern world, sustainable development has become an issue of 
worldwide concern. The E.U., for instance, has stated that sustainable 
development must be the central goal in all policies (European Commission, 
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2001). The standard definition of sustainable development is: ‘meeting the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs” (Brundtland Report, 1987). It is a strategy that 
requires the integration of economic growth, social equity and 
environmental management. This idea of sustainable development was 
spurred by a gradual change due to unsustainable economic policy. 
Meteorological observations show that since 1900 the European average 
annual temperature has increased with 0.3 to 0.6°C. Furthermore, climate 
models predict a further increase of approximately 2°C in 2100 compared to 
1990 levels. The European Environment Agency (1998) claims that the 
greenhouse effect will cause the Arctic ice to smelt, increasing sea and 
ocean levels by 1-2m; thus flooding many parts of the world like 
Bangladesh and the Netherlands. To make sure that the further increases in 
temperatures are limited to maximum 0.1°C each decennium, the industrial 
countries have to limit their greenhouse emissions (Carbon Dioxide (CO2), 
methane,…) by the year 2010 with at least 30-55% compared to the level of 
1990. These reductions are much higher than agreed in the Kyoto 
protocol124. It is unlikely that the E.U. will achieve these CO2-reductions 
since the most recent ‘business-as-usual’ scenario of the European 
Commission (made before Kyoto) indicates an increase in CO2 emissions of 
about 8%, with the largest increase in the transport sector (39%)125 
(European Environment Agency, 1998). In addition, measurements have 
indicated that transportation accounts for more than half of the very fine 
particulate matter126, a major public health concern127 (Dayomi, 2000, p.4). 
Since these trends are not sustainable, the necessity of a sustainable 
transport network is obvious. The OECD (2002) forecasts that traffic growth 
(in vehicle kilometres travelled) is such that the current strategies will be 
inadequate to reduce the overall emissions over the coming 30 or 40 years. 
Reducing overall emissions will only be possible by combining technical 
solutions for reducing emissions (for instance the usage of Intelligent 
Transport Systems128), enhancing the energy efficiency of engines and 
managing demand.  
 
To summarize, there are several reasons why negative externalities of 
transport and traffic receive often such a prominent place in the public 
debate (Nijkamp, 1999, p. 552): 
                                                 
124 Under the Kyoto Protocol, the industrialized countries must reduce their emissions by at 
least 8% below 1990 levels within the commitment period 2008-2012.  
125 In most industrialized countries, the transport sector is one of the most significant 
greenhouse gas emitter and particularly of CO2, the main greenhouse gas associated to 
transport activity (for instance 34% of CO2 in France in 1999, 30% of CO2 in the US in 
1997) (Raux, 2002, p. 143).  
126 Particulate matter (PM) is the general term used for a mixture of solid particles and 
liquid droplets in the air. These particles originate from both stationary and mobile sources 
and also from natural sources. 
127 Transport accounts for 49% of carbon dioxide emissions, 50% of nitrogen oxide 
emissions, 34% of carbon monoxide emissions, 30% of hydrocarbon emissions and 9% of 
particulate emissions.  
128 Intelligent Transport Systems involve the application of information, communication 
and control technologies for the collection, processing, integration and supply of 
information to enable authorities and operators to improve the operations of transport 
systems and to enable individual users of the transport system to make better informed, i.e. 
more intelligent, transport decisions.  
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− The transportation sector has an important structuring impact on the 
spatial economy; 
− The transport infrastructure is collective in nature and regarded as a 
public goods characterized by the non-excludability postulate; 
− Traffic and transport have often an important strategic, sometimes 
political and military meaning which far exceeds local interest; 
− Transportation infrastructure is often supplied in indivisibilities, so 
that there is an obvious scope for natural monopolies; and 
− Mobility and transport generate a variety of unpriced effects which 
show up as social costs in other segments of society (e.g. noise 
annoyance).  
 
Altogether, there is a broad-based perception that the position of 
transportation and mobility in the light of broader and ecological objectives 
is problematic. It is therefore no surprise that new policies are necessary in 
the concept of sustainable transport. Raux (2002, p. 147) distinguishes two 
main criteria that can be used for judging the relevance of permit systems in 
the transport sector. These are, on the one hand, the ability to impose a 
constraint or a right defined in a quantitative manner within a specified 
space-time, and, on the other hand, the ability that agents have to transfer all 
or a portion of these quantitative obligations. Permit systems are of 
particular interest in following cases: 
− Where a given environmental performance must be achieved in a 
context of uncertainty over agents’ price response functions129; 
− Where agents are more sensitive to quantitative signals than to price 
signals130; 
− Where local and regional problems arising from transport activities 
are targeted; and 
− When permits can be allocated for free, this enhances the 
acceptability of the new instrument.  
 
In general, the introduction of a tradable permit system in road transport or 
tradable transportation rights (TTR’s) serves two purposes, namely:  
1. To effectively cap global environmental harm caused by road 
transport; and 
2. To efficiently internalize the environmental costs by setting the right 
price for TTR’s.  
 
The latter aim depends in turn on the number of participants, the transaction 
costs, hence the liquidity of the market for TTR’s (Noll, 1981). One 
obstacle, indeed, would be the prevalence of prohibitively high transaction 
costs. When a market participant has substantial search and negotiation 
costs, it will lead to fewer transactions and, finally, undermine the 
functioning of the market. Moreover, prices will not accurately reflect 
marginal values. Specific attention will have to be paid to setting up a 
                                                 
129 In such cases, a permit system is more likely to achieve a quantitative objective than 
taxation.  
130 This depends on the price elasticity of the demand. This will be discussed in more detail 
in the following subsection.  
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transparent, atomistic market. Alternatively, the efficiency of the market 
also depends on the administrative costs of the TTR system which increases 
with the number of participants. Much depends on the technology that is 
used (Raux, 2002) and the monitoring approach. In an upstream system, the 
regulatory and market authority monitors producers, while policing in a 
downstream system focuses on end-users. It is easy to understand that an 
upstream system has far fewer and larger agents leading to lower 
administrative costs. Finally, the relevant market has to be defined since the 
relationship between emissions and pollution is not always straightforward. 
Pollution at a given point in time and space is the likely consequence of 
many emissions from several locations and their interaction. Dobes (1999) 
points out that this is particularly true for transport. The transport sector is 
different from other sectors where tradable permits have been used to date. 
First of all, transport is not a homogeneous good. Modes and nature of trips 
vary and so does the pollution caused by them. Likewise, transport not only 
generates environmental damage by emitting CO2 and small particles, but 
also other negative externalities such as congestion, noise and road 
accidents. Since public road infrastructure is heavily subsidized, it is 
reasonable to argue that the transport market is distorted. Secondly, 
compared with other industries where tradable permits have been used, 
transport systems involve mobile, rather than fixed sources of emissions. 
Finally, the domestic transport sector provides a non-tradable service. Of 
itself, its output can not be produced overseas as a substitute for domestic 
production of transport services (Dobes, 1998). However, it could affect 
other sectors from which demand for domestic transport services is derived.  
5.2.2. Prices versus quantities in case of inelastic demand 
The idea that road users should be charged their marginal external costs is a 
widely accepted principle in the economic as well as in the transportation 
literature (Crals, Keppens and Vereeck, 2004, p. 122). However, while 
analysts see road pricing as an attractive policy tool, most attempts131 to 
introduce economic incentives of this type in the transport sector have 
failed. These failures may mostly be due to the fact that the public does not 
support these measures, but empiric research132 also suggests that the 
inelasticity of the demand makes it difficult to introduce the appropriate 
price incentives (Graeme, 2001). In principle, tradable permits achieve the 
same result as taxes. Whereas a tax sets a price and leaves regulated entities 
to adjust the quantity, a tradable permit system sets a quantity and the price 
adjusts according to the resulting supply and demand for permits. We will 
analyze if inelastic demand exists in the transport sector and if so, whether 
prices or quantities are preferred. 
 
Some empirical studies have tried to calculate relevant price elasticity’s in 
the transport sector. TRACE (1998) and de Jong and Gunn (2001)133 have 
                                                 
131 The introduction of road pricing in the Netherlands has failed while road pricing 
measures in Germany seem to have been postponed. Austria, in contrast, in contrast, was 
successful in implementing a road pricing scheme in 2004. 
132 For empiric research about the inelasticity of the demand for car use and fuel, we refer 
to Glaister and Graham (2002a).  
133 They reviewed evidence from more than 50 recent studies (1985 and later) for Member 
States of the European Union, reporting average unweighted values of short- and long-run 
elasticity’s for car trips and car-km. The short-run included only mode choice effects; the 
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provided comprehensive and up-to-date surveys of car time and fuel price 
elasticity’s of car travel. Regarding the effects of changes in fuel price, they 
found that in the short-run, car trips and car-km respond in much the same 
way. The short-run fuel price elasticity was –0,16 for both car trips and car-
km. In the long run, the elasticity of car-km to fuel prices increases quite 
substantially, to -0,26, but only marginally for car trips (-0,19). Thus, the 
immediate consumer response to a fuel price change is to modify the 
number of trips made, but over time they make even more substantial 
changes to the distance traveled134. In general, comparing the fuel price and 
car time elasticity’s, de Jong and Gunn’s results show that in the long-run 
the elasticity of car-km with respect to car time is much higher than the 
elasticity of car-km with respect to fuel price. Regarding fuel demand 
elasticity, Graham and Glaister (2002a) surveyed the international literature 
on fuel demand135. Their findings can be summarized as follows: weight of 
evidence in the literature suggests that the long-run price elasticity of 
demand for fuel falls between -0,6 and -0,8, and the short-run elasticity 
between -0,2 and -0,3 (Graham and Glaister, 2004, p. 270). In conclusion, it 
is fair to state that the demand for fuel, car trips and car-km is rather 
inelastic (Crals and Vereeck, 2004b). 
 
In practice, price elasticity has an influence when choosing between taxes 
and tradable permits. Probably the most important feature of a tradable 
permit scheme is that it achieves a specific goal by specifying the cap that 
will be allowed in total. By contrast, to secure a quantity target with a tax, 
there must be fairly certain knowledge about the relevant price elasticity’s 




t   ε; (1) 
with ε being the price elasticity, t the tax rate and p the price. The tax 
elasticity indicates the percentage at which the demand of energy will be 
reduced if the tax rate is increased by one per cent. Schöb (1996) uses the 
first order condition of household maximization136, inserts the tax elasticity 
into a rearrangement of the first order equation137, and solves for the optimal 
tax rate t*, which leads to: 
 
                                                                                                                            
long-run included some combination of mode choice, destination choice, travel frequency 
choice, relocation of population and retail and service activities.  
134 de Jong and Gunn (2001) argue that this may be due to adaptations in some combination 
of mode choice, destination choice, relocation of population and retail and service activities  
135 Graham and Glaister (2002b) gathered a literature survey of 113 studies published 
between 1966 and 2000, and collected 1083 fuel demand related elasticity estimates.  










xRδ . The marginal environmental damage is 
noted by MED, R represents the tax revenue,  is the marginal excess burden and W the 
social welfare function. For a complete analysis of the tax elasticity we refer to Schöb 
(1996). We use this analysis to prove that knowledge about price elasticity’s is necessary to 
reach a certain target when using taxes.  
137 Rearranging the equation from footnote 134 gives: MB = p + MED - 


















MED . (2) 
Equation (7) shows that the optimal tax rate is a function of the marginal 
environmental damage (MED), the marginal excess burden of the rest of the 
system and the tax elasticity (which in turn depends on the price elasticity as 
shown in equation (1))138. In general, goods and services for which demand 
is inelastic should have a high tax rate since charging their prices does not 
create much distortion. Conversely, the government should set lower tax 
rates on price-elastic goods since small price changes may create large 
distortions in the quantity demanded (Gentry, 1999, p. 307). Therefore, 
price elasticities should be known before setting a tax rate in order to induce 
the right incentives from the tax system.  
 
Conversely, tradable permits pose a cap on the use, irrespectively of the 
price elasticities. When a permit system is introduced, the regulated item 
becomes scarce and the cost (inclusive of the permit) rises. This rise in cost 
will evidently lead to a rise in the price. The change in price depends on 
relative elasticities of supply and derived demand. In general, long run 
supply elasticity will be higher than the short run, because producers can 
adapt their behavior. The elasticity for demand depends partly on all the 
possible ways that downstream producers and consumers can reduce their 
use through i.e. fuel switching, increased fuel efficiency and changes in 
consumption (Cramton and Kerr, 2000). For example, figure 4 illustrates 
how tradable permits reduces the quantity from Q0  (uncontrolled fossil fuel 
demand) to Q* (carbon cap translated into a fossil fuel cap) and raises the 
price of fossil fuel. It is also clear that, as fossil fuel becomes restricted, the 
price buyers pay rises to clear the market, and the price suppliers receive 
falls. The permit price is the difference between these prices. The social cost 
is the sum of the loss of consumer and producer surplus (B). Consumer 
surplus is measured as the area under the demand curve (A) to reflect the 
amount that consumers would be willing to pay to have the price lowered to 
its original level. The demand in this example is highly inelastic meaning 
that prices will raise substantially.  
                                                 
138 The optimal tax rate is different from the Pigouvian tax because this is completely 
determined by the marginal environmental damage. However, the Pigouvian tax turns out 
only to be optimal in two circumstances. First, if there is no distortion of the tax system (i.e. 
δ=0) and second, when, at optimum, the tax elasticity is equal to unity. However, this is 
rarely the case and therefore we will not further elaborate on Pigouvian taxes.  
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Figure 4: Price of fossil fuel with inelastic demand 














Source: Based on Cramton and Kerr (2002). 
 
Concluding, taxes as tradable permits will both induce an equilibrium price 
in case of inelastic demand. However, when establishing taxes, this price 
inelasticity needs to be known ex ante, while a permit system sets a quantity 
and the price adjusts without information about relevant price elasticities. 
Consequently, information costs of taxes are much higher than those of 
tradable permits in case of inelastic demand. 
 
In addition, elasticity of demand and supply is a determining factor in 
discussing the incidence of the regulated cap, i.e. who bears the true burden 
of tradable permits and taxes139. In general, the incidence depends upon the 
relative elasticities of demand and supply. The burden is shifted forward to 
consumers if the demand is inelastic relative to supply; the burden is shifted 
backward to producers if supply is relatively more inelastic than demand. 
For example, in case of mineral oil prices in small countries where the price 
elasticity of demand is low, the consumers have to bear the costs because 
the consumer price of these products is determined by the prices on the 
international spot markets. In contrast, if the price elasticity is high, only a 
small part of the burden of an environmental measure which increases the 
production costs of a good can be passed to the consumers. Thus, the 
producers, shareholders, managers as well as workers of these firms have to 
bear the costs (Schneider and Weck-Hannemann, 2003, p. 2).  
 
5.3. Tradable transportation rights 
 
                                                 
139 By incidence we mean the ultimate economic effect of taxes on the real income of 
producers or consumers.  
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The global of transportation activity is the result of a combination of factors 
relating to land use (location of activities and consequences for distances 
traveled), the supply of infrastructure and services (price and quality of 
service for different modes of transport), technical features of transport 
vehicles (energy source, unit consumption and emissions) and the intensity 
of vehicle use (mobility as a function of economic and social trends). These 
factors all offer potential fields of action for controlling nuisances in the 
transport sector (Raux, 2002, p. 148-149). However, we will focus on three 
scenarios140 of tradable transportation rights because of different objectives. 
Then, we will discuss the evaluation criteria which will be used for the 
assessment of the expected efficiency of the three scenarios.  
5.3.1. Potential for permit programs in the transportation industry: 
three scenarios 
First, we give a comprehensive review of the possibilities to introduce a 
tradable permit scheme for the use of road infrastructure. The possible 
permit schemes are based on Hau’s (1992) classification of road use 
charges. The following table illustrates the possible charging and tradable 
permit schemes. 
Table 8: Methods to regulate road use 
Target Charging Scheme Tradable Transportation 
Rights 
Vehicle Ownership Registration tax 
Annual licence fee 
Vehicle ownership permits 
Vehicle use Fuel Tax 
Tax on vehicle parts 
Fuel permits 
Vehicle Kilometre permits 





Driving days permits 
Vehicle use, place 
& time 
Differential fuel taxes Differentiated Fuel Permits 
Point charging Tolling, road pricing and 
cordon-based pricing 




Congestion based charging Differentiated vehicle 
kilometre permits 
Source: Based on Keppens and Vereeck (2004) 
 
Vehicle ownership permits challenge the dominance of the car culture, the 
possession of private cars and reincarnates the culture of public transport. A 
well-known system of vehicle ownership permits is functioning in 
Singapore. The basic purpose of a tradable fuel permits system is to achieve 
an environmental goal, namely reduction of CO2 emissions caused by cars. 
The tradable vehicle kilometre permits system sets an upper limit based on 
the total vehicle kilometres of a reference year which are allocated among 
all participants. Tradable differentiated vehicle kilometre permits have two 
objectives. Besides a reduction of car use, more specifically during peak 
                                                 
140 There are various definitions of scenarios. The following definition, which covers all 
aspects of scenario development may be useful (Nijkamp et al., 2004, p. 293): ‘a scenario 
describes the present situation in (segments of) society, together with likely and desirable 
future states of this society, and series of events (or transition paths), which may connect 
the present situation and future states of society’. Consequently, scenarios enable us to 
reduce complexity and facilitate decisions about future events by arranging and classifying 
information and preventing information overload. Ideally, scenarios may help us to gain 
insight into the consequences of various strategies and enable us to compare them.  
141 E.g., Singapore Area Licensing Scheme 
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hours in congested areas, this system also aims to reduce the emission level 
caused by private road transport. Tradable corridor permits aim to solve the 
problem of traffic congestion on major highways while tradable entry 
permits (or cordon permits) set an upper limit on cars driving into an urban 
area.  Tradable parking permits have a limited geographical scope and apply 
only to employees of individual firms, industrial zones or school campuses. 
Verhoef, Nijkamp and Rietveld (1997) explore also the possibilities of using 
tradable permits on the supply side (automobile and fuel industry). This can 
also be categorized as upstream permits. These types will not be further 
discussed because a rather insignificant change in car use can be expected, 
although they can have considerable environmental gains.  
 
Secondly, three types of tradable transportation rights are discussed and it is 
indicated why these types are chosen. The first scenario involves controlling 
vehicle use and is focused more precisely on vehicle kilometres traveled 
(Tradable Vehicle Kilometres Permits or TVKP). As already pointed out, 
the OECD (2002) forecasts that traffic growth, in vehicle kilometres 
travelled, is such that the current strategies will be inadequate to reduce the 
overall emissions over the coming 30 or 40 years. Consequently, the goal of 
this system is to limit total vehicle kilometres travelled. Disadvantageous is 
that it neglects other problems like congestion and noise. The most common 
approach to noise control is still through regulation or funding for acoustic 
protection around transportation infrastructure. With respect to congestion, 
control is still achieved essentially through the waiting line, despite the 
ongoing and long-time debate about congestion pricing (Raux, 2002, p. 
149).  
 
The second scenario concerns total fuel consumption by vehicles, and 
focuses more specifically on CO2 emissions (Tradable Fuel Permits or TFP). 
In the year 2000, transport related CO2 emissions had increased by 128 
million tons or 18% compared to 1990 (European Environment Agency, 
2002). CO2 emissions by passenger cars account for 50 % and are forecasted 
to become twice as big in 2020 in spite of the increasing fuel efficiency of 
modern engines (Commission of the European Communities, 2003). This is 
due to the production of larger and faster cars with more energy consuming 
accessories as well as changing driving conditions (e.g. road congestion). 
Without effective policy measures, CO2 emissions are expected to grow 
further. In the past, the cornerstone of the European strategy to reduce CO2 
emissions was an environmental agreement with the car industry to improve 
fuel efficiency. In 1995, the European Automobile Manufacturers’ 
Associations (ACEA) committed themselves to realize an average CO2 
emission value of 120 g/km for all new cars, if possibly by 2005 and at the 
latest by 2010. In 1999, the EU recommended a CO2 emission target of 140 
g/km and postponed the previous target (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1999). However, these agreements are unlikely to lead to the 
desired reduction in CO2 emissions. It is expected that even with full 
implementation of the ACEA agreement, a growth of 11 % CO2 emissions 
is still to be expected (without the agreement, emissions would increase by 
29%) (European Environment Agency, 2001). This steady rise is due to an 
increase of car mileage and ownership per capita and the use of more 
powerful engines. Therefore, to reach the targets imposed by the Kyoto 
Protocol, complementary policy measures need to be taken. The European 
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Commission’s expert group on transport and environment states 
(Commission of the European Agency, 2000):  
 
“A CO2 tax can lead to suboptimal outcomes if it is used as a single instrument. 
[…] It may be difficult to find the tax level that actually leads to the emission 
reduction required.”  
 
Instead, the expert group considers emissions rights trading as a more 
promising policy approach for all or parts of a country’s sources emitting 
CO2 mainly because the system is cost-effective142. The group further 
emphasizes that permit trading should focus on the end-user, i.e. the single 
car driver. 
In the third scenario, we focus on urban transport (Tradable Entry Permits or 
TEP). Suburbanization and reduction of urban density, the increase of car 
ownership and the expansion of the road network have made the car the 
prevailing urban transport mode. This evolution causes not only congestion, 
but also safety and environmental problems. Because road network supply 
at present does not meet the demand, a reduction of the use of private cars in 
the city seems desirable. The idea that road users should be charged their 
marginal external costs is a widely accepted principle in the economic as 
well as in the transportation literature (Button and Verhoef, 1998). The 
focus has been mainly on pricing mechanisms: cordon and congestion 
pricing, variable taxation and other taxes. Internalizing the congestion 
externality by means of tolling was already recognized by Dupuit in 1844 
and well-founded by economists like Pigou in 1912 and Knight in 1924.  
However, as discussed by Jones (1998), most attempts to introduce 
economic incentives of this type in the transport sector have failed. These 
failures may partly be due to the technical difficulties of introducing the 
appropriate price incentive but politico-economic reasoning also suggests 
that road pricing is rarely adopted because the public does not support these 
policy measures. More recently, the introduction of road pricing measures in 
Germany seems to have been postponed due to technical difficulties. 
Austria, in contrast, was successful in implementing a road pricing scheme 
in 2004, but the measures hardly differentiate with respect to ecological 
characteristics. In addition, the revenues are earmarked for financing road 
infrastructure. To counter these disadvantages of road pricing, we will 
discuss a system of tradable entry permits.  
5.3.2. Evaluation criteria 
For the assessment of the expected efficiency of the three scenarios, we will 
use as a leading principle that the more the scheme differentiates, or at least 
lends itself to differentiation, in accordance with the various dimensions that 
determine the marginal external costs of road trips, the higher its 
                                                 
142 In July 2003, European parliament adopted a directive that creates a trading program in 
greenhouse gas emissions rights for energy intensive industries within the EU (European 
Commission, 1995). Operating on a European instead of a national scale increases the 
number of participant and reduces the costs because it increases market liquidity as well as 
the market for low emissions technology. Six greenhouse gases are included in the scheme. 
The program is estimated to cover about 46% of the EU’s total CO2 emissions by the year 
2010. Starting a three year try-out period in January 2005 (with legal enforcement from 
January 2008 on), approximately ten thousand companies are involved. The chemical 
industry is excluded since it is a relatively small player in CO2 emissions.  
 106 106
effectiveness. The following table gives a rough idea of these dimensions 
(Verhoef, Nijkamp and Rietveld, 1997, p. 536). This table can be a helpful 
instrument in assessing the expected effectiveness of the various schemes 
discussed in the following paragraph. 
Table 9: Dependence of various marginal external costs of road usage on 
various trips characteristics 
Trip CharacteristicMarginal external cost 








*** * ** *** 
Noise *** ** *** *** 
Safety *** ** ** * 
Congestion *** *** *** * 
* relatively weak dependence, ** moderate dependence, *** relatively strong 
dependence 
Source: Verhoef, Nijkamp and Rietveld (1997, p. 536) 
 
As indicated in the table, each of the marginal external costs depends on the 
mileage. Environmental externalities are in addition strongly related to the 
vehicle used. As the type of vehicle, there is   also a relatively strong 
dependence between noise and area of driving. External safety costs of 
accidents may to some extent depend on the area and time of driving. An 
individual’s contribution to congestion externalities is strongly dependent 
on time and area of driving. Verhoef, Nijkamp and Rietveld (1997) also 
mention that driving style is an important factor that makes actual external 




We will discuss three different types of tradable transportation rights and 
design them following some specific characteristics. The choice of these 
characteristics is based upon the already existing cap-and-trade programs, 
such as the U.S. Acid Rain Program and the California RECLAIM program 
as described in the fourth chapter. These programs have proven that 
emissions trading have considerable potential in practice, as well as in 
theory. Also the framework developed by Harrison (1999, p. 24-25) 
provides a useful tool in the design process. He identifies three subsequent 
steps: 
1. Threshold issues which include decisions regarding the basis purpose 
and nature of the program: 
− Purpose of the system;  
− Geographic area; and 
− Nature of the commodity traded (distinction between cap-and-trade 
programs and credit based systems). 
2. Design issues which include the decisions that arise as the program is 
designed and turned into a specific regulatory program: 
− Geographic and temporal flexibility (i.e. banking and borrowing); 
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− Institutional framework (the possibility that third parties, for 
example brokers, participate or setting up an auction or another 
institution to increase liquidity and establish market prices);  
− Initial distribution of rights (only relevant in cap-and-trade 
programs); and 
− Sources that are required or allowed to participate (possibility to ‘opt 
in’ to the program). 
3. Implementation issues which include the decisions that come to the 
fore as the program is implemented: 
− Certification of permits (for credit-based programs); 
− Monitoring and reporting of emissions; 
− Determining compliance and enforcing the trading program; and 
− Maintaining and encouraging participation (encourage participation 
of sources whose participation is optional). 
 
Although these categories are clearly interrelated, they provide a useful way 
of organizing the many specific elements and decisions that must be made 
to develop concrete programs.  
5.4.1. Tradable vehicle kilometre permits 
A tradable vehicle kilometre permits (TVKP) system restricts the number of 
vehicles kilometres allowed to drive. First, the different design elements are 
discussed and secondly, the system is evaluated. 
5.4.1.1. Design  
The design elements are based on the framework developed by Harrison 
(1999, p. 24-25). 
 
Threshold Phase 
TVKP intend to limit the amount of vehicle kilometers in the European 
Union, with a clear focus on the car. Implementing the system on a 
European scale increases the number of market players and vindicates the 
free movement of goods and persons in the European Union. For reasons of 
acceptability and feasibility, trucks and heavy duty vehicles are not included 
in the system. The cap is set on the total amount of car kilometers of the 
reference year, 1998143.  
 
Design Phase 
Because of the social dimension of mobility, permits are distributed for free. 
Consequently, the system does not necessarily imply an additional tax 
because only individuals who need more permits than initially received have 
additional costs. Furthermore, the system allows some freedom at 
                                                 
143 The goal of the common transport policy in the E.U. is to deal with the increasing 
congestion and to encourage more environmental friendly transport modes. Furthermore, 
the E.U. wants to comply with the Kyoto commitments. However, Kyoto is only a first 
step. Thereafter, the E.U. should aim to reduce atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions by 
an average of 1% per year over 1990 levels up to 2010. Another goal is to shift road 
transport to transport by rails, water and public transport, to achieve that the share of the 
road transport in 2010 will not exceed that of 1998. This explains the choice for 1998 as a 
reference year and implementation on a European scale.  
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individuals because they can choose between buying additional permits or 
changing their behavior and choosing other transport modes. Therefore, 
public support is expected to be larger in comparison to a traditional tax 
system. In principle, the distribution of permits can occur at different times, 
for example in the beginning of the calendar year or together with the tax 
declaration. Moreover, the free distribution of the permits can be based on 
different criteria:  
− Age, for example 0-18 year, 18-64 and 65+. These age categories 
have a clear link with economic activity144; 
− Location in order to, for example, induce people to live in the city 
centre by allocating them more TVKP; 
− Income in order to reduce social inequality; 
− Economic activity, for example active, non-active and retired 
population; 
− Family situation. A distinction can be made between singles, 
families without children, one child, etc.  
 
These distribution criteria can be evaluated based on criteria such as need, 
social equality, environmental planning etc. We choose for TVKP to be 
distributed based on age, divided up in three age categories because of the 
link with the social activity of the population which has an important 
influence on the demand for transport.  
 
The validity of a permit is set on one year. Banking and borrowing is not 
allowed mainly because, in case of banking, the tradability can show a 
cyclical pattern. Borrowing is not allowed because individuals will not be 
forced to change their behavior if they can keep borrowing rights.  
 
Implementation Phase 
For the creation and organization of a TVKP system, a European institution 
needs to be established. This institution has three important responsibilities. 
First, it has to allocate the TVKP at the national bureaus, according to the 
population of every country for each age category. Secondly, it has to 
monitor the national bureaus on correct enforcement of the TVKP system. 
Finally, it is responsible for the creation and organization of the auction. 
Individuals, who do not need their yearly allocated TVKP, can use this 
auction to sell their excess permits at the price of that day.  
 
In the start-up phase, permits are allocated at all individuals on January, 1 
which are valid until their birthday (in terms of percentages). Permits are 
again allocated on everyone’s birthday. The state register office is 
responsible for this distribution because they dispose of the necessary 
information. Although the population is entitled to a certain amount of 
yearly rights, these are allocated on a monthly basis. A yearly distribution 
can cause namely prices to fall at the end of the year as individuals save up 
                                                 
144 This is assuming that compulsory education exists until the age of 18 and retirement is 
possible starting at the age of 65.  
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their permits145. Transit traffic will be obliged to buy a ‘travel vignette’ 
when entering the European Union146.  
 
The monitoring will occur downstream, at the level of the different 
consumers. Unmanned cameras will monitor whether the registration system 
is activated in every car. Furthermore, cars will be checked at the yearly 
motor vehicle inspection and by unexpected police controls. Sanctions have 
a deterrent effect, which will induce individuals to avoid violations. These 
sanctions need to be determined ex ante and exceed the costs of compliance 
considerably.  
 
The technology needed to make a system of TVKP feasible has some 
specific requirements: 
1. Registering kilometres traveled (on-board unit); 
2. Differentiated introduction, meaning that the system needs to be 
applicable: 
− In a pilot project; 
− On the entire road network; and 
− For each European road user. 
3. Privacy: the anonymity of the car users needs to be guaranteed. This 
requires only registration of non-compliers and not of every vehicle 
user147. 
 
In a TVKP system, four different parties can be distinguished: 
1. A European institution; 
2. The E.U. Member States; 
3. The permit holders; and 
4. The vehicle users.
                                                 
145 Individuals can misjudge their own situation, as a result of what they can have excess 
permits at the end of the year.  
146 This is already necessary in some European Countries, i.e. the “Autobahnvignet” in 
Austria.  
147 The registration of time and/or place also disrespects the privacy of the car users.  
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Figure 5: Operation of TVKP 
 
 
The model comprises six processes: 
1. A European institution allocates the rights to the E.U. Member States; 
2. This European institution also monitors the Member States;  
3. The Member State informs the permit holders and the vehicle users; 
4. The Member State distributes the permits among the population; 
5. The permit holder trades the right with the vehicle user; and 
6. The vehicle user is monitored by the Member States. 
 
The rights are materialized by means of a smart card. Because of the 
uniformity of the on-board unit, this system can also be used for other 
transport modes. The calibration, monitoring and installment of the on-
board unit can be performed by an existing authority, for example the 
department responsible for the registration of vehicles and license plates. It 
is also possible to differentiate the type of on-board unit according to 
vehicle type, such as environmental performance. Moreover, the possession 
of an on-board unit can be linked with the state register number of the 
owner148.  
 
The monitoring aspect has the following characteristics: 
− The memory in the smart card registers the transactions which can be 
monitored when recharging the card. Furthermore, by checking if all 
vehicle users have a permit account, fraud can be traced; 
− The on-board unit should register all kilometres traveled. The 
functioning and calibration of the on-board unit is checked at the yearly 
motor vehicle inspection. 
− The cameras serve as monitoring tools. 
 
Finally, the TVKP system is proposed to the public by conducting a 
marketing campaign. This means that all media (radio, television, written 
press and internet) are used to inform the public. Permit holders and vehicle 
users will be explained their rights and duties in the TVKP system. Also an 
info-desk and info-line will be set up to answer questions.  
                                                 
148 A license plate is often also connected with the state register number of the owner.  
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5.4.1.2. Evaluation 
A TVKP system guarantees that the vehicle kilometre reduction goal and 
the corresponding emission reduction are always reached. Furthermore, 
avoiding the system by refueling across the border is difficult because of the 
implementation on a European scale. However, the disadvantages of TVKP 
are the following: 
− The price of a tradable vehicle kilometre can rise considerably 
because of low price elasticity. Consequently, opportunity costs of car 
transport will increase and this can lead to public or social pressure to 
lower the cap;    
− Distrust of the implementation of new concepts; 
− Downstream monitoring problems; 
− TVKP are an imperfect indicator of CO2-emissions, even when cars 
are divided in several categories. Consequently, other instruments are 
more suited for climate policy.       
 
In terms of control and enforcement, TVKP may be cumbersome in 
practice, especially because there is no one-to-one correspondence between 
individuals and vehicles (Verhoef, Nijkamp and Rietveld, 1997, p. 537). 
Furthermore, a potential disadvantage of TVKP is the difficulty of applying 
this in a spatially differentiated manner. For example, in a system of 
congestion kilometre permits, rights are distributed to drive on congested 
roads during peak hours. The amount of congestion rights is based on the 
capacity of the roads. For example, one vehicle kilometre permit enables a 
car to drive one kilometre outside the city and outside peak periods. More 
tradable permits are necessary for other time/place combinations. However, 
this can entail difficulties in administrating, monitoring and enforcement.  
5.4.2. Tradable fuel permits  
In this paragraph, the different design elements of a tradable fuel permit 
(TFP) to reduce CO2 emissions of road transport by passenger cars are 
described. Many of the emissions of road transport are directly dependent 
on fuel consumption (CO2 emissions directly) and insofar as they are not, 
they will in any case depend on mileage driven which is in turn related 
closely to fuel consumption. Furthermore, critical remarks when evaluating 
the system are made.  
5.4.2.1. Design  
Again we will use the framework of Harrison (1999, p. 24-25) for the design 
of the system.  
 
Threshold Phase 
The primary goal of the TFP program is to reduce CO2 emissions caused by 
passenger car transport. The aim is to comply with the targets laid down in 
the Kyoto Protocol. This would mean that the TFP program must realize an 
8% reduction of private road transport related CO2 emissions by 2012149. 
 
                                                 
149 The introduction of a permit program for individuals would be a major step towards an 
increasing public awareness of the problems addressed in the Kyoto Protocol.  
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The system will have to be implemented on a European scale. This allows a 
sufficient number of market players which enhances market liquidity as well 
as the development of the internal market. Moreover, pollution by CO2 
emissions is a cross-border problem that, in accordance with the Kyoto 
Treaty, can only be solved on an international, if not, global level.  
 
Under a cap-and-trade program, an upper limit of total emissions has to be 
fixed. Using 1990 figures on CO2 emissions by passenger, the total amount 
of passenger car mileage is multiplied by the amount of CO2 emissions per 
passenger vehicle, which leads to a total of 404 million tons of CO2 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2000). In order to achieve an 8 
% reduction by 2012, private passenger cars in the EU are allowed to emit 
372 million tons of CO2.  If the TFP system was to become operational in 
2008, the cap would be equal to the total emissions of CO2 by passenger 
cars in 2007 and gradually decrease to Kyoto levels. Allowances take the 
form of tradable fuel permits that hold the right to consume fuel. 
 
Design Phase 
The TFP’s will be distributed at the beginning of each civil year. Their 
validity is limited to one year. The imposition of a time limitation is likely 
to make monitoring and enforcement by the regulatory authority more easy. 
Banking (i.e. the transfer of rights to the next year) and borrowing (i.e. the 
use of next year’s permits) are not allowed to discourage speculative 
behavior. However, there are no geographical restrictions. TFP’s can be 
used in the whole European Union. 
 
To coordinate the system and set up the market, a European institution will 
be founded with three important responsibilities:  
1. Distribution of TFP’s among member states, which, in turn, distribute 
them among their citizens;  
2. Determination of the annual cap for the EU and each member state; 
and 
3. Supervision of the member states on the correct compliance with the 
TFP system. 
 
Financial institutions or insurance companies can act as brokers between 
buyers and sellers. The usage of these established institutions that are well 
known by the general public is likely to minimize transaction costs. 
 
As Rietveld, Nijkamp and Verhoef (1997) have pointed out, several groups 
of permit holders should be distinguished. To create sufficient political and 
social support, TFP’s should preferably be distributed for free to three age 
categories: youngster (0 till 18 years), active citizens (19 till 65 years) and 
retired people (above 65 years). This is merely for reasons of fairness and 
legitimacy since, as stated by Montgomery (1972) following Coase, the 
initial distribution of permits will not affect the ultimate allocation. 
 
Implementation Phase 
Five players are involved in this European scheme: 
1. A European agency; 
2. The EU-member states; 
3. The permit holders;  
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4. The vehicle users; and 
5. The fuel distributors. 
 
Figure 6: Operation of TEP 
 
 
The European agency has to distribute the rights among the Member States. 
They, in turn, have a duty to inform the permit holders, vehicle users and 
fuel producers before distributing the allowances among their citizens. The 
fuel rights are then traded between the permit holders and vehicle users. The 
fuel distributors have to devalue the permits when fuel is bought. The 
Member States also have to set up a system to monitor fuel distribution.  
 
Basically, there are two ways to monitor a tradable rights program: 
upstream, where fuel producers are monitored, and downstream where 
monitoring is focused on the end-users of fuel (Haites and Mullins, 2001). 
There are significant differences between the two approaches with regard to 
the both the type and number of market players who need to be monitored. 
An upstream scheme will have far fewer and much bigger actors. In terms 
of organizational efficiency, an upstream monitoring system entails fewer 
players, hence less administrative costs. While downstream monitoring 
involves more players and may lead to higher administrative costs, it has to 
be pointed out that a more comprehensive plan may yield bigger social 
benefits. Nevertheless, monitoring in the TFP program should be done 
upstream. The fuel companies will have to hand the right amount of TFP’s 
to the monitoring agency for the volume of fuel they have distributed.  
 
Under the U.S. Acid Rain Program, enforcement comprises four stages 
(Tietenberg, 1985): 
1. Detection of the violation, 
2. Notification of the offender, 
3. Negotiation about compliance measures, or 
4. Sanctions for non-compliance. 
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This approach will be copied for the TFP permit program. As mentioned 
before, a European regulatory agency will monitor the member states. When 
they fail to comply (with this or any other requirement), the EU Treaty 
obliges the Union to take action and start an infringement procedure against 
the Member State. This procedure can be initiated by the European 
Commission or after an individual complaint. If no solution is reached, the 
case will be submitted to the European Court of Justice, which can rule to 
impose a penalty payment on the member state. 
 
In general, tradable permit programs are prone to evasive behavior which is 
a major issue for enforcement. Although the system will be introduced on a 
European scale, there remains the problem of citizens crossing the Union’s 
border to refuel. Levying an import tax on full gasoline tanks or obliging all 
outgoing transport to refuel may resolve that problem. 
 
The TFP program can be implemented with technology that already exists 
and works today. The permits will be put on so-called smart cards that are 
fraud-resistant and allow easy and inexpensive transactions. When refueling 
at a gas station, the smart card discharges TFP at a terminal. It should be 
impossible to refuel without using this card, otherwise the program is 
ineffective. Recharging the card can be done at bank terminals or via the 
internet using an individual internet account number. The permit holders can 
sell their surplus fuel permits via financial institutions or the internet with as 
little regulatory interference as possible. Different market structures can be 
set up to facilitate the trade of TFP’s: 
1. Direct search markets (without intermediaries), 
2. Brokered markets (with intermediaries but with market players still 
holding the rights), 
3. Dealer markets (where intermediaries hold the rights), and 
4. Auction markets (where an agency holds the rights). 
 
Following Wrigley (1997), it is highly likely that an electronic market will 
emerge. 
5.4.2.2. Evaluation and recommendations 
Tradable fuel permits is a promising policy instrument. It reconciles 
(dynamic and static) efficiency and effectiveness concerns with social and 
ecological goals. Since a genuine market price is established, the TFP 
program induces benefits from the welfare maximization properties of the 
market system. Moreover, it provides clear incentives for technological 
innovation when cost reduction from innovation outweighs the price paid 
for TFP’s. Since the cap is an upper limit on the externality to be restrained, 
the TFP program and alike will, by definition, always reach its goals. When 
the goal is an ecological one, placing a cap is the most effective way of 
curbing environmental pollution. Finally, the TFP program will lead to 
income redistribution from polluters to non-polluters. From a social 
perspective, this seems quite fair (polluters pay principle). It should be clear 
that the initial distribution of TFP’s can be manipulated to promote certain 
income redistribution. This aspect, however, is likely to be highly 
controversial. There are, of course, some other issues remaining. 
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The Kyoto target of an 8 % reduction in CO2 emissions is an objective that 
not necessarily has to be met by private vehicle transport. When higher 
emissions reduction rates are more likely (and less costly) in other areas 
(like central heating), then these opportunities should be explored and 
exploited first. This is not a criticism on the TFP system as such, but a 
warning that the efficiency rates of reduction programs in different areas 
should be carefully examined and compared. Tradable rights systems can be 
applied for various alternative schemes. However, since car related CO2 
emissions account for 12 % of the total emissions and a further growth is 
forecasted, it seems reasonable to target it. Moreover, the introduction of a 
permit program for individuals seems a major step in increasing public 
awareness for the problems raised and addressed in the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
Actual policy measures to reduce CO2 emissions can easily be fitted into a 
future TFP program. The TFP program is likely to lead to more 
technological innovation in the car industry and it is compatible with fuel 
taxes. When TFP’s are distributed via auctioning, fuel taxes may even be 
cut back. Furthermore, the TFP program can be applied to other emission 
gases (CO, N2O, HC, SO2 and volatile organic compounds), transport 
modes and sources in other sectors. Public transport operators, for instance, 
can set the ticket price to include the TFP. Alternatively, passengers can use 
their TFP’s and discharge their smart card when they buy a ticket and travel 
by public transport. The TFP program can also include to other household 
activities; Verhoef, Nijkamp and Rietveld (1997) describe a tradable CO2 
permit scheme for the Netherlands, which includes CO2 emissions of inland 
shipping and railway use and those produced by the household energy 
consumption. Fleming (1997) proposed a similar tradable quota system to 
shift national economies away from their dependence on fossil fuels. 
 
Since the TFP program does not require the development of any new 
technology, set-up costs will be relatively low as are enforcement costs 
when monitoring is done upstream. What remains difficult to estimate, are 
the costs of institutional (political and administrative) preparation.  
 
The TFP program is very flexible in manners how to achieve the overall and 
individual objective. 
1. The fuel industry may develop less polluting fuels; 
2. Vehicle manufacturers can develop less polluting engines; and 
3. Car users can change their transport behavior.  
 
Since TFP’s affect total CO2 emissions, the possible effects of such a 
program can be classified in three categories: 
1. Reduction in emissions per fuel unit, 
2. Reduction of fuel consumption per passenger kilometer; and  
3. Changes in the total amount of passenger kilometers.  
 
Following Pargal and Heil (2000), it is expected that the TFP program will 
have an effect on fuel type and fuel efficiency, average age and size of the 
car fleet, number and length of trips, road congestion and road conditions, 
occupancy rate and modal choice. However, it is our belief that (with 
reference to table 9), for the regulation of congestion and localized 
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environmental externalities, both in particular relevant to urban areas, 
additional measures may be needed.      
5.4.3. Tradable entry permits 
Are tradable entry permits (TEP) a valuable alternative for road pricing? To 
answer this question, we will first design the system in a city centre. 
Secondly, the various possible (side)-effects of such a system are discussed. 
Finally, TEP are compared with tolling or road pricing systems, such as the 
congestion charging scheme in London.  
5.4.3.1. Design  
Using the methodology as developed by Harrison (1999), three main aspects 
in the organization of the permit program are distinguished, namely the 
threshold, design and implementation issues.  
 
Threshold Phase 
The basis purpose of a TEP system is to set an upper limit on cars/trucks 
exiting the ring-road and driving into the city centre. A tradable permit 
enables one car/truck to enter a city centre during a working day between 7 
a.m. and 8 p.m. The price of the permit is determined at the time when the 
city centre is entered150. But it is fair to state that the cost-effective outcome 
will be achieved by the market because demand will be very high in peak 
periods which increase the price of a permit.  No TEP are required for 
leaving the city centre. Because of fairly obvious reasons such as 
stimulating public transport and maintaining commercial activities in the 
city centre, the following groups are not included in the system: 
− Public transport, namely regular services buses; 
− Merchandise vehicles; 
− Police vehicles; 
− Fire brigade vehicles; 
− Military vehicles; and 
− Taxis and emergency services. 
 
Trucks are included because by using TEP, they are stimulated not to enter 
the city centre during peak hours. The cap of the system is determined by 
the capacity of the approach roads. 
 
Design Phase 
All citizens of a certain city (starting from a certain age, for example 18) are 
assigned a number of free permits. The free distribution is applied primarily 
for reasons of fairness and legitimacy. In this way, one of the major sources 
of social opposition against road pricing, namely its redistributive impacts, 
could to a considerable extent be overcome (Verhoef, Nijkamp and 
Rietveld, 1997, p. 539). Moreover, the regulator now gives the scheme a 
progressive151 element assuming that the use of the permits is more 
                                                 
150 Table 9 has indicated that, for the regulation of congestion, one would actually have to 
use a system that allows for differentiation over time, space, and individual trip lengths.  
151 The regressivity or progressivity of a tradable permit or tax can be explained to a great 
extent by the burden that is borne by the share of the population that is located in the poorer 
sections.  
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concentrated in the richer sections. Than, citizens not owning cars (and 
living in poorer sections) are rewarded by giving them smart cards which 
they can sell to car owners. An auction is set up for the non-residents and 
freight traffic. In the beginning of the calendar year, the permits are 
distributed for free by the local government offices. Those residents who 
use public transport or do not commute can sell their excess permits on the 
stock market to non-residents who want to enter the city.  
 
Implementation Phase 
Financial institutions or insurance companies can act as brokers between 
buyers and sellers. The usage of these established institutions which are well 
known by the general public is likely to minimize transaction costs.  
 
Figure 7: Operation of TEP 
 
 
Three actors are involved in our TEP system, namely the urban government, 
the permit holders and the vehicle users. The urban government distributes a 
number of permits among the residents. This local authority also informs the 
permit holders and the vehicle users. Then, permits are exchanged between 
the permit holders and vehicle users through an auction. Finally, the local 
authority depreciates the permits and monitors the car users at the entrance 
gates.  
 
The TEP program can be implemented with technology that already exists 
and works today. The permits will be put on so-called smart cards that are 
fraud-resistant and allow easy and inexpensive transactions (Crals, Keppens 
and Vereeck, 2004). At the entrance gate, all vehicles are observed. The 
electronic beacons communicate with the on-board unit. By passing the 
entrance gate, the smart-card will be depreciated automatically, depending 
on the time entering the city centre. Such a system guarantees sufficient 
anonymity, as road users will not receive a fully specified overview of their 
trips at the end of the month (Verhoef, Nijkamp and Rietveld, 1997, p. 536). 
If the vehicle does not dispose of a working on-board unit or if the credit on 
the smart card is insufficient, an image of the number plate will be made. 
Using automatic number plate recognition (ANPR), this number plate will 
be identified and the vehicle owner is obliged to pay a fine. The monitoring 
and enforcement are therefore based on existing technologies which are 
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already operational. This technology comprises number plate recognition 
and CCTV (Closed Circuit TeleVision) camera observation at the entrance 
gates.   
 
Finally, it is important to stress that the smart cards could in principle be 
valid for all (urban) areas in the country, with the rates charged being 
different over time and place, so that the market for trading is sufficiently 
large and transparent. 
5.4.3.2. Evaluation  
Using the framework of Bohm and Russell (1985), the following criteria 
will be used to assess the TEP system: 
1. Information intensity. This first criterion attempts to measure the need 
for information which has to be available to the implementation 
agency. Under a TEP system, it needs to know how to set the cap. 
More specifically, it has to calculate the capacity of the access roads. 
Furthermore, it needs information about the citizens of the city centre 
in question, their age and addresses. Market players also have 
information needs about permit prices, number of permits and how to 
buy and sell permits. As already pointed out, financial institutions can 
act as brokers by providing information and search for potential 
trading partners. Information intensity is part of transaction costs 
which will be discussed in more detail in this chapter.  
2. Ease of monitoring and enforcement. The monitoring is organized 
downstream, meaning at the level of the individual users and is 
analogous to monitoring systems of existing cordon pricing systems.  
3. Flexibility in the face of change. A changing demand for permits due 
to economic growth or decay will be reflected in the permit price, 
which will act as an economic stabilizer. Another source of flexibility 
is the bureaucratic ability to reduce the total amount of permits. Due 
to limited time validity, the government can adjust the total amount of 
permits to present needs. In case of market distortions, it can buy back 
or sell additional permits.   
4. Dynamic effects. The TEP system rewards sustainable travel behavior 
patterns of citizens and provides a continuing incentive for them to 
search for innovative approaches for further permit reductions, for 
instance carpooling or using public transport. 
5. Distributional effects. Through the choice of the initial permit 
distribution method, a desired income redistribution or transfer among 
different groups can be achieved. However, this equity aspect arising 
from the initial permit allocation method is often one of the most 
controversial and politically sensitive areas in the design process as 
already pointed out. In our current design, the TEP system rewards 
sustainable travel behavior patterns of citizens. 
5.4.3.3. TEP versus other road pricing systems  
In this section we compare TEP with other road pricing systems, such as the 
London congestion charging scheme with regard to effectiveness, cost-
effectiveness and technology. 
 
Tradable permits are effective in the sense that the target is always realized: 
no more cars/trucks are allowed to enter the city centre during working days 
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then the capacity of the road allows. In other words, the cap ensures the 
effectiveness of the system (Koutstaal and Nentjes, 1995). A rise in demand 
for road use and therefore permits will drive up the price but the amount of 
TEP remains unchanged because the cap is fixed. In a system of tolling or 
cordon pricing, the amount of cars driving into the city is determined ex 
post. For example, in a growing economy demand for road use can rise and 
consequently congestion can increase. Ultimately, the amount of cars 
driving into the city may well exceed the optimum level due to a high price-
inelasticity of the demand. Literature regarding elasticities of demand with 
respect to congestion charges is relatively rare. In Singapore, however, 
where charges are revised regularly, there has been considerable scope for 
evaluating effects of price changes. Dodgson et al. (2002) summarize 
various studies for Singapore suggesting point elasticities in the order of -
0.12 to -0.35 with respect to congestion charges. More commonly calculated 
are elasticities of demand with respect to fuel prices. Goodwin (1992) 
calculated short-run and long-run elasticities of -0.16 and -0.32 respectively. 
These numbers are still considered standard values for the responsiveness of 
car travel demand with respect in fuel prices. The preliminary results 
suggest that the London Scheme has so far been successful in achieving the 
stated congestion reduction targets. Furthermore, traffic reduction has been 
higher than expected, which means that elasticities might have been 
underestimated prior to the implementation of the Scheme (Shaffer and 
Santos, 2003).  
 
When examining alternatives types of transport policy instruments, a key 
question is whether particular instruments are likely to result in marginal 
abatement costs being equated across sources. Revesz and Stavins (2005) 
have shown in their analysis of the cost-effectiveness of taxation that each 
agent will carry out abatement up to the point where its marginal control 
costs are equal to the tax rate. A challenge with charging systems is 
identifying the appropriate tax rate. The government is not able to set this 
appropriate level without knowing the costs of control. In practice, 
governments become usually involved in a trial-and-error process. First, an 
arbitrary rate is chosen and the corresponding amount of reduction is 
observed. If this reduction is smaller than desired, the tax will be raised and 
vice versa.  
 
In London, due to the rather crude nature of the area licensing scheme, the 
system lacks the ability to adequately charge differentiated prices both 
temporally and spatially. Ultimately, the Mayor settled upon a £5 charge, 
deciding that it provided adequate incentive to achieve significant 
congestion reduction, but with less public backlash likely to be associated 
with a higher charge (Shaffer and Santos, 2003). Compared to pre-charging 
conditions, the amount of all cars entering the central zone has decreased by 
31% in 2003. This reduction in the number of cars has been partially offset 
by increases in incoming motorcycles, taxis and buses. Traffic levels (all 
vehicles) inside the central zone have decreased by 15%, which is close to 
the objectives which were stated before introducing the program (Shaffer 
and Santos, 2003). 
 
TEP are cost-effective in sense that they allow citizens to choose for the 
least costly means of achieving the objective. Under a permit system, an 
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acceptable overall level of congestion is established and distributed or 
auctioned off among citizens in form of permits. Car users can choose 
between complying with existing permit specifications or by purchasing 
additional permits. The price of one entry permit is determined by the 
market, hence truly reflects the citizens’ marginal willingness-to-pay. Those 
commuters who are able to reduce their usage of the approach roads 
relatively cheaply and easily will do so, rather than purchasing permits. 
They can, e.g., in the short run shift to public transport or combine their 
tradable permits with other commuters and carpool. However, in the long 
run, citizens can also relocate close to their work or close to a railway 
station. Of course, these possibilities are only valid provided that parking 
facilities and public transport are adequate to set off the increasing amount 
of users.  
 
Finally, a TEP system relies on the same technology that is used in existing 
entrance zone systems such as in London and Rome. In London, the 
congestion charging scheme is based on camera-technology. The number 
plates of each vehicle, also the vehicles that are exempted or have already 
paid, are registered. In Rome, a combination of smart-card responder and 
camera-technology is used. For the TEP system, we have opted for the 
combination in Rome for the following reasons: 
− Since a smart-card can easily be (re)moved, transactions (such as 
recharging) can be done relatively simple; 
− Since only the number plates of non-compliers are registered, there 
is a significant reduction of the number of data that need to be redirected 
to the server which simplifies the processing, and; 
− The sense that ‘big brother’ is watching is limited. 
 
In conclusion, we can say that technology does not differ very much 
between TEP and road pricing systems. The only difference lies in the 
design of the system that is chosen and its specifications.  
5.4.3.4. Conclusions 
In this paragraph, a system of TEP is designed using the methodology 
developed by Harrison (1999). One tradable permit enables one car/truck to 
enter the city centre during 1 working day and applies for all private cars 
and trucks driving into a city centre between 7 a.m. and 8 p.m. The price of 
this permit is determined by the time that the city is entered. All citizens of 
the city centre are assigned a number of free permits. Furthermore, an 
auction is set up for non-residents and freight traffic. After evaluating the 
system, it was found that TEP offer citizens a lot of freedom in choosing 
how to meet the reduction goal. Furthermore, the system provides a lot of 
flexibility to policy makers because the cap can be adjusted over time. TEP 
also give an incentive for citizens to search for other, more sustainable 
means, of transportation, such as carpooling or using public transport. 
 
Compared to other road pricing systems, tradable permits are more effective 
and cost-effective. The cap ensures the effectiveness of the system while the 
tradability guarantees the cost-effectiveness. Compared to existing cordon 
pricing systems, the same technology is used which proves that technology 
will not preclude the use of TEP. 
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5.4.4. Comparison of the different scenarios 
In order to compare TVKP, TFP and TEP, the main design elements will be 
summarized in the following table:
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Table 10: Main design elements of TVKP, TFP and TEP 
 TVKP TFP TEP 
Purpose / cap Limit # vehicle kilometers – cap set on total # 
vehicle kilometers of reference year (1998) – 
only cars are included in the system 
Reduce CO2 emissions, cap 
based on CO2 emission per 
passenger vehicle 
Limit cars/trucks entering a city 
centre – cap based on capacity 
of the approach roads 
Geographical 
area 
European Union European Union City centre 
Allocation 
method 
Free distribution based on age categories Free distribution based on 
age categories 
Free to citizens – auction for 
other road users 
Temporal 
flexibility 
Banking and borrowing not allowed Banking and borrowing not 
allowed 




European and national institution – 
downstream monitoring 
Upstream monitoring at level 
of fuel companies 
Downstream – number plate 
recognition of non complying 
vehicles 
Technology Smart card and on-board unit Smart cards and on-board 
unit 
Smart cards and on-board unit / 
entrance gates 
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The main advantages and disadvantages of these three possible applications 
are summarized in table 11. 
Table 11: Advantages and disadvantages of TVKP, TFP and TEP 
Program Major advantages Major disadvantages or limitations 
TVKP Directly related to mileage No incentive to avoid peaks or to 
change car technology 
TFP Relatively simple control and 
enforcement 
Not suitable for controlling time-
dependent and place-dependent 
externalities 
 
Controls both mobility and 
energy efficiency 
TEP Suitable for time-dependent 
and place-dependent 
externalities 
May be perceived as complicated 
 
Finally, we will discuss the relationship between the three scenarios and the 
marginal external cost. Under a tradable vehicle kilometre permit system, 
each individual receives a certain number of personal vehicle kilometres, 
which can be traded. The overall target, defined as total vehicle kilometres, 
has a close connection to the trip characteristic mileage. Furthermore, as 
shown in table 9, there is a relatively strong dependence between mileage 
and environmental externalities, noise, safety and congestion. The idea is 
that, as vehicle kilometres diminish, so will marginal external costs. This is 
the case of environmental externalities, but because the system is less easy 
to apply in a spatially differentiated manner, noise, safety and congestion 
are not really being dealt with.  
 
Probably the most promising direction for the use of tradable permits in the 
regulation of road transport externalities, particularly in environmental 
externalities, is through as system of tradable fuel permits. This system 
creates simultaneous incentives to reduce car use and, in long run, to 
purchase energy-efficient, and often cleaner, vehicles. For the regulation of 
localized (noise) and congestion environmental externalities, tradable fuel 
permits are less suited.  
Tradable entry permits are mostly directed to time and area of driving 
(congestion) but, insofar that external costs are, at the margin, higher in 
urban areas than elsewhere, there exists a relationship between tradable 
entry permits and noise, safety and general environmental externalities. 
These results are summarized in the following table.  
Table 12: Relation between the three scenarios and the marginal external 
cost 
Marginal external costScenario (influence on trip 
characteristic) Environmental 
externalities 
Noise Safety Congestion 
TVKP (mileage) *** * * * 
TFP (mileage and vehicle 
used) 
*** *** ** ** 
TEP (time, area) * ** ** *** 
* relatively weak relation, ** moderate relation, *** relatively strong relation 
Source: own analysis 
 
Concluding, it seems that for the regulation of non-localized and time-
independent external costs of road transport (often environmental 
externalities), tradable fuel permits offer the most attractive option, 
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providing simultaneous incentives to reduce mobility in the short run and to 
purchase environmentally friendly and energy efficient cars in the long run 
(Verhoef, Nijkamp and Rietveld, 1997, p. 545). Fort he regulation of time-
dependent and localized externalities, often congestion and other 
externalities in urban areas, a supplementary system of tradable entry 
permits appears to be effective.  
  
5.5. Transaction costs 
 
Does road pricing entail fewer transaction costs than tradable transportation 
permits or are the costs of both systems prohibitively high which explains 
their limited use? In order to compare instruments that induce the same 
incentives, we will perform a transaction cost comparison for road pricing 
and tradable entry rights. Those two instruments have the same main 
objective, namely to reduce congestion and, to a lesser degree, noise, safety 
and environmental externalities152. The design and goal of tradable entry 
permits are already discussed in the previous section. Road pricing is a 
generic term for charging for the use of roads or a specific section of the 
road network using direct methods153. Examples include traditional methods 
using toll booths such as turnpikes and toll roads, as well as modern 
schemes employing electronic toll collection such as the London Congestion 
Charge, the Singapore Area Licensing Scheme154 and the Trondheim Toll 
Scheme in Norway155. The aims of road pricing are several. The most 
obvious is financing: raising money to pay back the construction of the road 
or to build new facilities. A second aim is management, by varying charges 
by time of day (sometimes called congestion pricing or value pricing), users 
can be discouraged from making trips during the peak times and encouraged 
to travel in the off-peak, thus balancing flows and reducing congestion loss. 
A third aim is to discourage driving altogether, which is often supported by 
environmentalists. A fourth aim, more applicable to rural areas, is to directly 
charge for any public bad that arises from use of a road.  
5.5.1. Determination of relevant transaction cost categories 
The following cost categories will be compared in our transaction cost 
analysis: 
                                                 
152 On the contrary, tradable fuel permits are best compared with carbon taxes because 
distributing fuel permits at an upstream level will reduce planning costs, but then the 
resulting price effect on car users and other fuel users would akin to a carbon tax.  
153 This is in contrast to indirect charges such as gas taxes, or other types of taxes.  
154 The Singapore Area Licensing Scheme, introduced in 1975, charged drivers entering 
downtown Singapore, and thereby aimed to manage vehicle traffic. It is one of an umber of 
anti-congestion policies that has operated in Singapore since the 1970s. In September 1998, 
the Area Licensing Scheme was terminated as Singapore switched to the current Electronic 
Road Pricing System.  
155 This system was initially introduced to fund the building for new ring roads so that the 
heaviest traffic would not have to pass through the city centre. The charge is 1.60 $ and 
lorries pay a rate double that of cars. More than twenty toll booths were built, closing off all 
approaches to the city. The drivers have to fit a little plastic device to the windscreen of the 
car which communicates with the toll booth when the car passes through, deducting money 
from the user’s account. The Trondheim toll system is due to be removed in 2005, when the 
initial aim of building and improving the city’s ring roads will have been completed and 
paid for.  
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− Legislative costs (fixed) which includes lobbying costs, public 
support costs and legal barriers costs; 
− Information costs (fixed) about external costs; 
− Search (planning) costs (fixed) for the appropriate design of the 
system; 
− Operational costs (variable) including technology costs; 
− Negotiation costs (fixed) between car users or between the 
government and car users; 
− Contract costs (fixed) with other car users; 
− Monitoring and enforcement costs (variable); and 
− Compliance costs (variable). 
5.5.2. Road pricing 
Using price-based schemes in transportation is not costless. Therefore, we 
will first discuss all relevant transaction costs associated with road pricing.  
5.5.2.1. Legislative costs 
The relevance of the public support problem when considering road pricing 
policies is shown by the uneasiness it provokes within the community. Jones 
(1998) notes that, the reason why road pricing has never been widely 
implemented has been the public and political acceptability. According to 
him, the main public concerns about road pricing are: 
− Drivers find it difficult to accept the idea that they are charged for 
congestion, which is something nobody wants, as opposed to paying for 
something they wish to acquire; 
− Traffic congestion could also be relieved by improving public 
transport or using restraint measures such as pedestrianisation or 
restrictions to access in certain areas; 
− Price inelasticity of the demand for car use will make the system 
ineffective; 
− The technology used with road pricing will be unreliable; 
− Electronic road pricing may violate the privacy of the driver; 
− If the pricing system is a cordon, it will cause congestion around the 
cordon, thus shifting the problem to previously uncongested areas; 
− Road pricing is a form of taxation and even if the revenues were 
earmarked, there would always be fear that the government may change 
the rules; and 
− Road pricing is unfair because those least able to pay the charges 
will be excluded. Of particular relevance is the fact that many individuals 
do not perceive pricing to be an appropriate mechanism to eliminate 
excess demand (Oberholzer-Gee and Weck-Hannemann, 2002, p. 361). 
They also state that individuals much prefer the first-come first-served 
principle to pricing when private goods are scarce. Some variant of first-
come first-served is of course how most road space is allocated today.  
 
In order to assess the acceptability of road pricing, not only individuals but 
also interest groups need to be considered such as industries (motor, freight, 
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public transport, road building), user group (motorists, truckers, passengers, 
contractors), environmental groups (walking/cyclists, anti-pollution, rail 
travellers, conservationists), and residents (pedestrians, recreation, shoppers, 
home owners) (Santos, 2000). Wieland et al. (2004) classify the relevant 
actors and interest groups as follows: 
− The transport providers and their interest groups (transport firms like 
railways, airlines, private infrastructure providers, but also lobbying 
groups like automobile clubs, user groups and the like); 
− Politicians/regulators/bureaucrats (namely all individuals wielding 
political influence in the transport sector); 
− The public and its different interest groups (all citizens who may 
have their opinion on a certain element of transportation policy); and 
− The media. 
 
These interest groups play an important role in the implementation process 
of road pricing because they are affected by the policy which, in turn, means 
that lobbying is likely to prevail. We will indicate now what their 
preferences are and how they will react to the introduction of road pricing. 
 
Assuming that transport providers prefer that instrument which maximizes 
profits, it is likely to expect that those affected by road pricing are likely to 
campaign against it. However, those who benefit from the policy, for 
example public transport if expanded in order to meet the rising demand, are 
expected to lobby in favour of the policy, again inducing substantial 
lobbying costs. It is also expected that interest groups, with a perceived 
stake in the system, to oppose marginal cost based pricing policies, may be 
much more common than similar organisations acting for their support 
(Niskanen, 2003). It can be in the interest of workers of transport providers 
to continue existing policies they are used to. They either may not 
understand the new policies they should be responsible for or they may be 
afraid of likely organisational rearrangements and even for losing their jobs.  
 
Road users are normally the group whose members are likely to lose out 
when road pricing is introduced. This is however an argument to target 
revenues from road pricing to projects that benefit drivers. It can be 
assumed that resistance will be lower when taxes are channelled back to the 
transportation sector. Earmarking revenues for the purpose of maintaining 
and improving the road infrastructure apparently convinces some drivers 
that the increase in taxes is in their best interest (Oberholzer-Gee and Weck-
Hannemann, 2002, p. 365).  
 
Marcucci and Marini (2003) have analyzed the interrelation between voting 
and the political support. They state that the decisions concerning the 
adoption of road pricing measures are taken by politicians that operate under 
a re-election constraint and have perfect foresight on the aggregate voting 
intentions of their constituency. Such politicians will, therefore, promote 
only those policies that would pass an election test. However, there can be 
policies supported by the majority ex post that could fail a voting test ex 
ante as well as policies that are supported ex ante but would not be voted for 
ex post. The failure in adopting potentially Pareto-improving policies by the 
politicians could be explained, for instance, via the different organizational 
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ability of lobbies, pressure groups, policy time inconsistency, spatial 
inconsistency and politicians’ credibility. However, perhaps the most 
important reason to be optimistic about the prospect of road pricing systems 
is that fact that many voters regard environmental issues as fairly important 
(Oberholzer-Gee and Weck-Hannemann, 2002, p. 359). However, in 
contrast to the general support for environmental programs, citizens appear 
to be less concerned with road congestion per se. Without a doubt, 
congested roads are seen as a major issue. But Oberholzer-Gee and Weck-
Hannemann (2002, p. 361) indicate that air pollution is considered worse 
than traffic congestion. Therefore, to make road pricing schemes politically 
more acceptable, the environmental impacts need to be emphasized on. By 
focusing exclusively on road congestion per se, economists forgo the 
support of environmental groups which often see themselves as anti-
automobile.  
 
Bureaucrats will try to expand their budget. Because road pricing is likely to 
expand their budgets, lobbying costs tend to be substantial. Moreover, they 
will try to minimize efforts to acquire information and thus invite interest 
groups to submit information via hearings. Consequently, a decisive role is 
played by scientists and consultants due to the complexities inherent in 
transportation policy. These scientists are interested in higher research funds 
and thus will promote an active transportation policy of the government 
(Michaelowa, 1998).  
 
A word on the influence of the media may also be in order here. The 
primary objective of private mass media is to earn money. Transportation 
issues are able to raise emotions and in these very cases the media can 
become very influential. For example, the most important cause of the 
failure of introducing road pricing in the Netherlands was a campaign 
(“Stop Rekeningrijden”) that was started by the Dutch Automobile 
Association and was strongly supported by the media, which started a whole 
supportive campaign by itself (Wieland et al., 2004).  
 
In general, without any additional measures, public support for road pricing 
will be relatively low. However, several measures can be taken in order to 
make road pricing more acceptable (Marcucci and Marini, 2003):  
1. Make sure the objective of the scheme meets the main public 
concerns. The cost-based level of price reflects the intensity of 
demand and the revealed preference of travellers for certain times and 
locations. A high price draws attention and mobilizes resources to 
popular routes for investments. Therefore, road pricing can serve as a 
guide in the planning of investment and the improvement of services 
(for example public transport providers); 
2. Demonstrate that there are no effective alternative solutions;  
3. Earmark the revenues and provide alternatives;  
4. Keep the scheme as simple as possible. The system should be simple 
to understand and convenient for motorists to use. Extremely complex 
and continuous pricing gradations should best be avoided because of 
‘bounded rationality156’ on the part of drivers’ cognitive limitations. 
                                                 
156 The property of an agent that behaves in a manner that is nearly optimal with respect to 
its goals as its resources will allow.  
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For safety reasons, driver’s attention ought not to be diverted for more 
than a very short time period in the process of using the system; 
5. Consider carefully all technological issues. The road pricing should be 
able to operate reliably under all conditions and should charge users 
correctly; and  
6. Address equity issues. It is necessary that the toll-tax incidence of the 
road pricing system is publicly perceived as fair for it to be 
acceptable. This is related to the use of the revenues, where a truly 
revenue neutral system, where all the revenues from road pricing are 
directly or indirectly returned to the population of users, is assumed to 
be fair.  
 
From a psychological perspective, road pricing acceptability is strictly 
intertwined with the following issues: (1) problem perception; (2) mobility 
related social norms; (3) importance of the aims to be reached by the 
measures; (4) perceived effectiveness and efficiency of the policy157; (5) 
equity; (6) revenue allocation; (7) attribution of responsibility and (8) 
information and awareness158. This also shows that, as stated before, 
revenue allocation is an important aspect of the public support costs. 
Following Santos (2000), revenues could be split in three parts and allocated 
equally to the following categories: (1) reduction in existing taxes or 
increase in social expenditure, (2) construction of new roads, improvement 
of existing ones or improvement in the standards of maintenance of the road 
infrastructure, and (3) improvement in public transport services159. The 
categories of expenditure to which the revenues would be allocated are: (a) 
monetary reimbursement to trip makers, (b) replacement of general taxes 
presently used to fund transportation services and (c) new transportation 
services. In principle, the most rational approach, economically speaking, is 
not to treat these revenues differently than other forms of governmental 
income, and to choose their most effective destination based on the 
preferences of the democratically elected government. However, revenues 
are often earmarked and used to subsidize improvements in the behaviour of 
specific target groups, usually the ones that paid the tax in the first place. 
When this is done, several negative characteristics, which are observed in 
subsidies, may arise (Bressers and Huitema, 2000, p. 73-74).  For instance, 
many subsidies are aimed at the introduction of so-called ‘end-of-pipe’ 
techniques, where pollution is not prevented but only cleaned up afterwards. 
These techniques are often not the most cost-effective ones. In summary, the 
way in which revenues from road pricing is spent is often not aimed at an 
optimum contribution to the policy target or to the general good of society, 
but rather at making the extra charges acceptable by reducing (re)allocation 
effects as much as possible, regardless of the overall economic rationality of 
the process. 
 
                                                 
157 In order to enhance economic efficiency, the road pricing system should be able to 
charge directly - as closely as possible - the external costs arising out of road use.  
158 The system should inform the motorists of the prices to be charged ahead of time and 
place, so that the trip decision can be rationally made and rerouted if necessary.  
159 However, it should be noted that the European Union is now working on a directive on 
the use and calculation of tolls. It is suggested that the toll revenues can only be used for 
infrastructural costs (Standaard, 2005). If such a directive would be decided on, using 
revenues for the improvement of public transport services is no longer possible in the 
European Union. 
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Legislation itself can also impose clear constraints on transport related 
policymaking. In particular, urban transport policies may to a great extent be 
directed to promote more general (rather than transport specific) goals: 
fiscal policies, economic vitality of a city, competition between 
communities to attract business and taxpayers, social and equity related 
goals, etc (Niskanen, 2003). Therefore, whilst there is a lack of laws that 
would facilitate or support the implementation of road pricing, at the same 
time there are important laws in many countries that can hamper or even 
prevent direct charges for road use. Such laws may be related to fiscal 
taxation, or they may be concerned with certain basic national constitutional 
rights or guarantees, such as freedom of access or movement, privacy needs 
and civil liberties. These laws can conflict with the need for road pricing, 
especially in case of different prices according to types of users (vehicles), 
space and time. Laws related to fiscal taxation may explicitly state that road 
pricing or taxes must not vary over time. And civil liberties legislation can 
constrain those forms of road pricing that need tracking of the location of 
individual vehicles. However, as stated by Niskanen (2003), most legal and 
institutional barriers could potentially be removed at national level if only 
sufficient socio-political acceptability (i.e. political will) existed.  
 
In conclusion, this analysis clearly shows that legislative costs of road 
pricing, in particular lobbying costs, public support costs and legal barriers 
costs (which are dependent on the public and political support), can be 
substantial.  
5.5.2.2. Information costs 
In order to internalize external effects, the road charge on the individual user 
should be related to the marginal costs imposed on the rest of society – 
highest in congested conditions, lower in uncongested conditions but still 
calculated to cover pollution, noise, accident and road repair costs. As stated 
by Nash (2000), transport users are both suppliers of essential inputs and, 
obviously, consumers of the output. The optimal price will, therefore, differ 
from the usual definition of social marginal cost, the derivative of the total 
social cost (TSC) with respect to output, or traffic volume (Q). The total 
social cost is the sum of producer costs, user costs and costs external to the 
transport sector: 
 
  TSC = TC Prod + TC User + TC Ext (3) 
 
where TC Prod, TC User and TC Ext are functions of Q.  
 
Maintenance costs are also a part of a transport system’s total cost. 
However, very few research studies take maintenance cost properly into 
account in a road congestion pricing scheme (Chu and Tsai, 2004). In 
reality, maintenance costs depend on a road’s traffic condition, which is 
composed of various classes of vehicles traveling on the road. For example, 
in the case of transport infrastructure services, the definition of price-
relevant marginal cost is the following: 
 




∂ + MC ext     (4) 
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The reason that this definition differs from marginal social cost is because 
part of user cost already born by the individual user making the decision is 
not relevant to the price that should be charged; only user costs imposed on 
others should be included in the price. Consequently, to calculate an 
efficient road charge, information on user costs and total marginal costs is 
needed.  
 
Setting efficient prices therefore requires: 
− An understanding of the physical relationships between traffic, 
congestion and environmental costs; 
− An ability to value, in monetary terms, changes in congestion and 
emissions of pollutants when traffic changes; and 
− A technically and economically feasible pricing regime to charge for 
the congestion and environmental costs.  
 
Congestion and environmental costs are highly variable across space and 
time. Even in highly congested conditions, the network as a whole is used as 
only a small fraction of its rated capacity. For several hours per day, the 
entire network is essentially uncongested. Efficient use of road space 
therefore requires a highly differentiated tariff which will induce substantial 
information costs. More specifically, congestion costs must be quantified 
before road pricing can be implemented. The social costs of congestion can 
be measured by the deadweight loss and calculated from the difference 
between the marginal social costs and the price actually paid by trip makers. 
In general, the charges should be paid by all road users, including trucks and 
buses, at levels reflecting as accurately as possible the relative costs 
imposed by different kinds of vehicles. 
 
From this, it can be concluded that information costs related to optimal road 
pricing, i.e. internalizing all external costs, are high.  
5.5.2.3. Search (planning) costs 
A flat fee for road use does not provide the right incentive which properly 
represents the social costs of road use. Congestion costs are only one of the 
externalities associated with urban traffic. There are also the diverse 
environmental costs of noise, atmospheric pollution, community severance, 
and so on (Button, 1995, p. 41). In many cases, these externalities are 
positively correlated with congestion, e.g. noise and emissions rise with 
frequent deceleration and accelerations and traffic on congested roads travel 
at speeds well below the most efficient for their engines. The conclusion 
which is often drawn, therefore, is that road pricing would contain some of 
these adverse third party environmental effects even it did not optimize 
them. In some cases, however, this application leads to excessive temporal 
and spatial spreading of traffic. Road pricing could equally result in more 
environmental damage at times (especially early mornings and evenings) 
and in places (for instance, in residential areas) where only limited nuisance 
exists currently. Consequently, linking the road charge to the external 
effects is necessary in order for the road pricing scheme to be optimal. From 
a scientific point of view, it becomes more and more evident that an external 
effect of a human activity interacts with its environment in a manifold way 
and that the interaction is a very complex system (Rudel, 2003). Therefore, 
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the relationship between a cause and its effect can be a very complicated 
function, with thresholds, feed-back relations, time lags and so on. This 
clearly shows the difficulty of establishing a relationship between a cause 
such as air pollution and health problems and of identifying the cause in 
order to apply the polluter pays principle. The difficulties to establish 
scientifically the exact relationship between cause and effect are also 
reflected in any attempt to monetize the external effect. For the valuation, a 
broad range of techniques have been developed over the last decades. 
Examples are (Verhoef, 1996, p. 23-24):  
• Behavioral approaches such as 
− Hedonic techniques: an example of hedonic techniques is the 
property value approach which infers willingness-to-pay for a non-
market effect from observed behavior (revealed preferences) in property 
markets. It is thus relevant only when the studied non-market effect 
influences property values; 
− Travel cost methods: this method is a revealed preference method 
which values preferences indicated by actual behavior in a surrogate 
market. Specifically, an individual spends time and resources when 
traveling to and from a particular resource site. The travel cost method 
might be applied when individuals voluntarily visit a site to use 
recreational resources, to collect resources or to deposit wastes. The 
method employs regression analysis to estimate the relationship between 
visitation rates and travel costs incurred to and from the site160;  
− Production factor method: this method is based on the fact that many 
natural resources, processes and qualities are used as production factors. 
Improvement of environmental quality may lead to a reduction of 
production costs for the sector making use of the relevant quality. This 
method tries to value natural qualities by valuing their impacts on 
production costs; 
− Contingent valuation methods: with this method, individuals are 
asked via a survey to imagine that a market exists for a particular 
resource, good or service, and, contingent upon this hypothetical market, 
to state their valuation of the associated benefits and costs161.  
• Non-behavioral approaches such as: 
− Damage costs; 
− Costs of illness; and  
− Prevention costs which consider only investments that have already 
been realized to internalize external costs162.  
 
From a theoretical point of view, behavioral techniques deserve preference, 
as they aim at assessing the individuals’ valuation of the effect. However, 
costs are much higher when undertaking valuation studies.  
It can thus be concluded that search costs, as information costs, are higher 
when the external costs are fully internalized. Road pricing based on 
congestion costs entails fewer information and search costs compared to a 
                                                 
160 For a more detailed description, see Fuguitt and Wilcox, 1999.  
161 Ibidem. 
162 E.g. investments in noise protection as an approximation for people’s willingness to pay 
to reduce noise avoidance.  
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full road pricing system based on all relevant external costs. Consequently, a 
trade-off exists between search costs on the one hand, and the optimality of 
the road pricing instrument on the other. Furthermore, search and planning 
costs are even higher when behavioral techniques are used to valuate the 
various external effects.  
5.5.2.4. Set-up costs 
It has become customary to use the term road pricing for a set of policy 
instruments that intend to charge vehicles the marginal external costs they 
are causing at the time when and at the location where travel occurs. 
However, depending on the pricing technology several types of road pricing 
systems can be distinguished (De Borger, Peirson and Vickerman, 2001, p. 
41-43): 
− Area licensing (vignettes): Under this system, a license is required to 
drive in certain areas and, in some cases, at certain times of the day. This 
is a rather simple scheme which insufficiently differentiates with respect 
to congestion conditions which limits the efficiency of the instrument; 
− Cordon pricing: The idea is to define a cordon and to charge all 
vehicles upon entering that area. To be efficient, the fee charged should 
be differentiated according to travel conditions. If toll collection is not 
done electronically, an inconvenience is that the system itself causes 
some congestion. Electronic collection overcomes this problem;  
− Automatic vehicle identification (AVI) is the first of two systems of 
electronic road pricing. With AVI, automatic means are used to check on 
and register entrants to an area where charges are levied. Information 
about the car is registered at the time of passing by certain checking 
points (gantries)163. This requires charges which are billed to the user at 
regular intervals. These charges can be varied according to the degree of 
congestion; and 
− Electronic road pricing with smart cards: Smart cards help to solve 
the privacy problem for the user of the smart card. Registration and 
billing is done via the card, and no identification of vehicles is necessary. 
Of course, there is still a need for a back-up vehicle identification system 
to identify illegal users of a tolled road, but this can hardly be considered 
as a threat to individual privacy.  
 
Traditional ways of collecting tolls (e.g. tollbooths in France) have high set-
up costs and can impose long waiting periods on drivers. But with the 
advent of electronic tolling and other technologies, there are no significant 
technical barriers to more direct and efficient charges for road use. For 
example, in-vehicle meters, which record the travel characteristics of the 
vehicle can be used for congestion-based, time-based or distance-based 
charging (Santos, 2000). They do not require any roadside equipment but 
they have to be connected to the odometer164 of the vehicle from which 
                                                 
163 These checking points need to be permanently constructed in sufficient numbers to fully 
cordon off a route or area within road pricing is to be applied. These gantries must also be 
tied together with a dedicated communication system and all that data must be collected in 
an operations system. 
164 An odometer is an instrument provided in an automotive vehicle to indicate the total 
number of miles that have been travelled. The odometer, as the speedometer, is driven by a 
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average speed, time and distance can be obtained. There are also other 
systems which enable automatic vehicle identification for the purpose of 
charging for congestion to the proper driver. In London, for example, the 
congestion charging scheme is based on camera-technology. The number 
plates of each vehicle, also the vehicles that are exempted or have already 
paid, are registered. In Rome, a combination of smart-card responder and 
camera-technology is used.  
In theory, potentially the biggest cost involved in setting-up a charging 
scheme would be the cost of establishing a vehicle fleet with the necessary 
equipment on-board. In general, the set-up costs vary with the type of 
technology and with the size of the scheme in question. However, due to the 
latest developments, technology is no longer a barrier for the introduction of 
road pricing (Santos, 2000). As these sorts of applications become more 
widespread, it may gradually become a standard item in new cars which 
reduces set-up costs.  
 
Finally, a road charging scheme also needs to be set-up administrable. The 
key issues involved here are the costs of telecommunication between on-
board units and back-office and the costs of setting-up the back-office 
processing operation. If the road pricing can be levied and collected by an 
established agency, set-up costs are of course smaller than in the case that a 
whole new back-office needs to be set up.  
5.5.2.5. Operational costs 
The operating costs of road pricing scheme can be substantial, depending on 
used technology. Registering drivers for any scheme, processing records of 
vehicle movements into charges, and issuing these charges as bills to drivers 
requires a significant back-office operation and, in case of a large number of 
vehicles, significant costs. The major driver of these operational costs seems 
to be labor. In addition, operating costs will rise with the complexity of the 
road charging scheme. However, in case of synergies with existing vehicle 
and driver services, additional costs of road charging schemes could be 
reduced considerably if these synergies are exploited properly.  
5.5.2.6. Negotiation costs 
As road pricing refers to charging for the direct use of the road, car drivers 
will be directly affected by the scheme. Because the system is compulsory, 
individual users are affected and the price is determined by the 
internalization of external effects, it is assumed that no negotiation between 
the regulating authority and road users takes place. However, road users can 
negotiate among themselves in order to minimize their costs. For example, 
car users can decide to carpool when commuting in order to limit payments. 
Negotiation costs will then incur between affected parties. Nevertheless, 
negotiation costs are assumed to be relatively small.  
5.5.2.7. Contract costs 
The costs of contracting are zero because of a spot transaction without time 
lapse between buying the road charge and the actual use of the road. 
                                                                                                                            
cable that the two share. When the vehicle is in motion, this cable moves a series of gears in 
the odometer, turning a set of numbered drums that count the miles travelled. 
 134 134
5.5.2.8. Monitoring and enforcement costs 
Intuitively, it seems plausible that agents would have less of an incentive to 
evade low-cost regulation, and, therefore, that incentive-based instruments 
would be less costly to enforce. However, the conditions for minimizing 
enforcement costs turn out to be different from the conditions for 
minimizing abatement costs; consequently, an allocation of control 
responsibility among firms which minimizes enforcement costs will not 
necessarily minimize abatement costs (Krutilla, 2002, p. 259).  
 
Any charging scheme will need a system of enforcement to deal with non-
compliance behaviour by road users. This is, dependent on the nature of the 
system, likely to take on of three forms: 
− Failure to pay by users who are already registered with the charging 
authority; 
− Attempt by road users to provide fraudulent information about their 
identity or entitlement to exemption; and 
− Driving in a charging area without having made arrangements to 
pay.  
 
In general, enforcement against the non-payer or the person who seeks to 
defraud the system will involve a range of processes designed to identify the 
offender, to demonstrate that an offence has taken place and to apply the 
appropriate sanction. Enforcement will therefore need to reflect some key 
principles. First of all, enforcement must provide an effective sanction 
against evasion, ensuring that the public is aware that it is likely to become 
caught and face significant penalties as a result. Secondly, penalties should 
be proportionate and consistent with those of other infringements, while 
providing effective sanction against persistent evaders. Thirdly, enforcement 
should be simple and cost-effective, without imposing disproportionate 
additional burdens on police and courts. Finally, privacy issues165 should be 
taken into account. Road charging potentially involves privacy problems 
because data collected can be used for billing purposes, thus linking 
information on vehicle movements with individual citizens (Secretary of 
State for Transport, United Kingdom, 2004).   
 
The greater the complexity of any road charging scheme, the greater the 
specificity of data that need to be gathered about road use and the greater 
the enforcement costs. Furthermore, the greater the extent to which 
enforcement is pursued, the lower the marginal returns. In most 
circumstances, enforcement authorities will be faced with decisions about 
how far to pursue cases where there is little prospect of recovering the cost 
of enforcement, although to do so will increase the deterrent effect. 
Consequently, there is a trade-off between evasion rates, enforcement costs 
and the likelihood of detection. Technology also plays an important role in 
enforcement. If cameras are used to detect vehicles which are evading the 
charge, enforcement costs will be high because of the high number of 
cameras needed which, in turn, are also expensive to operate. However, if 
                                                 
165 Privacy issues fall into two types: those relating to personal autonomy (the right of 
individuals to go about their daily lives without intrusive surveillance from public 
authorities) and those connected to information privacy (the right of individuals to have 
some control over the way information about them is used).  
 135 135
electronic vehicle identification (EVI) is used which involves setting a 
device in vehicles, enforcement costs could be significantly reduced.  
5.5.2.9. Compliance costs 
Road users incur costs to comply with the road pricing scheme. In order to 
minimize these costs, any road pricing scheme will need to reflect the 
following strategies: 
− Ease of use: charge payers must have easy access to the means of 
registration and payment; 
− Ease of understanding: charge payers must know exactly what is 
expected of them; 
− Customer service; and 
− Social inclusion: to be achieved through ensuring the widest range of 
methods of payment.  
 
The primary source of compliance costs for road users involves taxpayers’ 
loss of time, namely the amount of time that road users are delayed by 
paying charges. Costs will increase if road users have to pay at toll booths. 
However, electronic payments will minimize compliance costs. 
Consequently, like the previous cost category, compliance costs decrease on 
account of applied technology which uses electronic payment methods. In 
general, more precise rules might reduce ambiguity, easing compliance 
costs and might close avenues for complicated avoidance schemes (Kaplow, 
1996, p. 138).  
5.5.2.10. Conclusion 
Two main conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. First, the nature and 
level of transaction costs associated with implementing road pricing vary 
with the type of system being used. More specifically, transaction costs are 
conditional upon the physical relationship between the road charge and the 
external costs. The more accurate the charge, in terms of internalization of 
all external effects, the higher transaction costs, more specifically 
information, search and planning costs. 
 
Secondly, technology plays an important role in transaction costs of road 
pricing. While road pricing with electronic vehicle identification entails 
relatively high set-up costs per vehicle (setting a device in each vehicle), 
operational, monitoring, enforcement and compliance costs will be reduced. 
However, if is relied on camera technology, set-up costs per vehicle will be 
much lower while here, set-up costs of the gantries, operation, monitoring, 
enforcement and compliance costs will increase. In conclusion, transaction 
costs depend on the design of the system and the used technology. 
5.5.3. Tradable entry permits 
One of the major challenges in designing permit systems is how best to 
reduce implementation and transaction costs. Transaction costs can occur 
for several reasons and as a result of which, the optimization problem of a 
participant who wants to trade in permits will change. As stated by Stavins 
(1995), the effect of transaction costs is ‘unambiguously to decrease the 
volume of permit trading regardless of the specific forms that the marginal 
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control cost functions and transaction costs function take’. Furthermore, the 
great number of users in the transport sector constitutes an obvious obstacle 
to introduce tradable permit systems, since negotiation costs are assumed to 
appear, a priori, prohibitive. We shall examine this question by discussing 
all relevant transaction costs associated with tradable entry rights.  
5.5.3.1. Legislative costs 
In case of tradable entry rights, it can be assumed that different lobbies will 
build up a considerable resistance against this regime, since it is against 
tradition to limit the right to free access to road infrastructure and the free 
choice of transport means. The automobile plays a fundamental role in 
mobility, as there is frequently no transport alternative. Therefore, tradable 
permits can make an explicit restriction on freedom of movement which is a 
fundamental right that is universally recognised in declarations of human 
rights (cf. United Nations) (Raux, 2002, p. 148). However, more and more 
actors are now looking very closely at tradable permits as an interesting 
approach to reduce the problems of road congestion. For example, the idea 
of using tradable permits on the Alpine corridors166 might be a promising 
start in the European transport policy to clearly set quantitative goals and 
incentives to more sustainable transport system (Rudel, 2003).  
 
If a regulatory authority is to negotiate successfully with market participants 
who are often organised in professional groupings with means of exerting 
considerable political pressure, that authority will have to have effective 
powers, backed by a strong political commitment. When low-cost 
adaptation is possible, there is less need for strong political will. For 
example, when introducing the gasoline lead reduction program in the 
U.S.167, there were affordable technological solutions available for replacing 
lead, and the consumption of leaded gasoline was already on a downward 
track because of renewal of the automobile fleet (Raux, 2002, p. 179). On 
the opposite, the commitment of the politicians will have to be stronger if 
the range of low-cost adaptation possibilities is limited. At the moment, 
there is no proof of large political will when it comes to reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions, or, at least, that whatever will exists, may be 
insufficient in light of the scope of the changes required. However, there is 
no doubt that public opinion is becoming increasingly aware of the gravity 
of the situation. Yet because of the complexity of the system and the social 
costs of imposing abrupt lifestyle changes are deemed unacceptable, the 
required policy decisions have been delayed (Raux, 2002, p. 179). From a 
policymaker’s perspective, there is no guarantee that a tradable permit 
system can be past by the legislature. Indeed, the more stringent the 
proposal, the less chance it will pass. Since even the attempt to pass new 
legislation is costly, policymakers may decide that it is simply not 
                                                 
166 The Alpeniniative launched the idea of introducing a kind of exchange market for 
tradable permits giving the right to cross the Alps in Switzerland or even on the whole 
Alpine bow. This idea has been taken up by the federal administration and is now being 
investigated in a research project of the Swiss association of transportation engineers.  
167 The objective of this program was to eliminate use of lead as a gasoline additive in the 
United States. This system of granting refineries rights to add lead to gasoline was part of a 
family of permits based on the concept of averaging. The program was in place form 1979 
to 1996.  
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worthwhile to spend the political resources necessary to push a tradable 
permits proposal against industry resistance.   
 
The transport industry, as the polluting industry, has rent-maximizing 
incentives to prefer quotas over taxes. The argument of the number of 
industry jobs is often taken by workers who want to keep their jobs. 
Furthermore, the tighter the cap, the more resistance and lobbying can be 
expected from the industry. Regulated entities will oppose to absolute or 
severe norms because these can limit their growth. They prefer a system of 
relative or soft norms. However, relative norms have the danger that 
national goals are exceeded when regulated entities are growing. When 
choosing absolute norms, participants will prefer that the rights are 
grandfathered because auctioning off the permits will bring along additional 
costs. With grandfathering of permits, a tradable permit scheme creates an 
asset of value to firms168. So, even if a firm now has to buy permits to cover 
all its use, it still can acquire the value of those additional permits by selling 
them in the future if its actual use is lower than what is allowed. This in turn 
creates an incentive for individuals to comply with their caps. Furthermore, 
road users can save considerable expenditures with grandfathered permits, 
since the individual user has to pay only for additional permits, if needed. 
Taken as a group, permit holders who receive permits for free only have to 
make additional expenditure for reducing car use. Consequently, resistance 
of industry against the use of economic instruments to control road use can 
be overcome more easily in a system of tradable permits with 
grandfathering than auctioned permits (Nentjes and Dijkstra, 1994).   
 
Organized pressure groups, buoyed up by strong public sensitivity to air 
pollution, congestion, noise or employment, can weigh heavily on public 
debate over a tradable permits program. For example, trade unions are 
mostly interested in the preservation of employment. Since an auction of 
permits may yield additional funds for transport improvement and makes 
the car user really pay for its use, some pressure groups rationally prefer this 
distribution mechanism. Environmental movements are generally opposed 
to the principle of giving ‘a right to pollute’. They prefer a system that 
forbids pollution rather than allowing it. They also morally object to setting 
a price on environment. 
 
Bureaucrats have clear budget-maximizing behaviour and if politicians 
would choose for the implementation of tradable transportation permits, 
their preference lies with an auction system.  
 
The legal specification needs constitute to an important part of legislative 
transaction costs. The tradable right and the cap need to be defined legally 
and this should be related to a (just) initial distribution of the rights for 
                                                 
168 The permits acquire a monetary value which, in case of grandfathering, achieves 
importance for individuals not only because they serve as a legal justification of the 
individual’s behavior but (assuming a decline in the individual’s use) they also serve as 
(potentially quite valuable) trading goods. Furthermore, if the initial allocation takes place 
on the basis of actual use in a given year, rather than on the basis of an equally strict 
standard for all actors, free allocation also means that individuals which already did their 
best in the past to reduce use as much as possible are disadvantaged, compared to 
individuals which so far have invested little in sustainable transport (Bressers and Huitema, 
2000, p. 74) .  
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individual actors to make trade possible. Furthermore, although 
grandfathering is financially more attractive and acceptable to firms than 
auctioning, it is unclear whether grandfathering is also acceptable to 
governments because it could constitute state aid under EC law if it is seen 
as a distortion of fair competition. For a successful implementation of trade 
in rights, some fundamental legal questions need a clear answer and barriers 
need to be removed.  
 
In conclusion, this analysis shows that political and public support is on the 
rise but much depends on the design of the system. However, legislation 
needs to be adapted to this evolution, which means that legislative costs 
remain relatively high.  
5.5.3.2. Information costs  
In a system of tradable permits, no information is needed about price 
elasticity’s or abatement costs. The regulating authority only needs to set the 
height of the cap. These costs are dependent on the choice of the tradable 
permit system. In a system of TEP, the level to look for is the capacity of 
the roads. Furthermore, data are needed about citizens for distributing the 
permits but this information is available at the governmental agency169. 
After establishing the cap, prices will adapt automatically to changing 
circumstances. This cap will often be politically determined which can 
become a laborious and time-consuming exercise. The objective of this cap 
is to set a reasonable pressure for adjustment, not a disruptive force that 
could invite a countervailing reaction.  
 
The initial distribution of the permits leads to different information costs. 
While with free distribution no information is needed about past or future 
use of the private car, grandfathering will entail much more information 
costs. As with emission permits, the initial distribution method does not 
affect the efficacy of the instrument and therefore, compared to road pricing, 
information costs are negligible.  
5.5.3.3. Search (planning) costs 
The most important planning issues that will be discussed are: geographical 
area, choice of permit allocation and temporal flexibility.  
 
The first aspect is whether a system of tradable transportation rights is 
confined by boundaries of a certain territory. If is chosen to implement the 
system on a European scale, it should be decided how the permits are 
distributed among the different Member States. A clear distinction should be 
made between the tasks at central EU level and those delegated to Member 
States. Permits can be grandfathered and sold at the E.U. level or they can 
be allotted to the Member States who in turn distribute them. With regard to 
this last option, it should be realised that Member States would not be 
allowed to use their permits to support specific sectors or firms by 
grandfathering permits in excess of those allowed by the rules of 
grandfathering. If, for the execution of various tasks, a national bureau as 
well as a European institution need to be set up, planning costs are higher. 
                                                 
169 In comparison, information is required about the desired amount of CO2 emissions when 
introducing tradable fuel permits.  
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The tasks of a national bureau consist of, among others, the registration of 
the ownership of the permits, grandfathering of permits to designated actors 
and monitoring and enforcement. A large scale is well-suited for cross-
border problems and ensures market liquidity. The potential for trade not 
only depends on the number of actors but also on the supply and demand for 
permits and this, in turn, depends on differences in abatement costs.  
 
Secondly, permits can be allocated to different target groups. Allocating 
permits to individuals is attractive primarily because it would provide a 
direct incentive to reduce fuel consumption or vehicle use not only through 
choice of vehicle, patterns of travel behaviour (including mode choice) and 
residential location, but also through driving behaviour such as reduced 
acceleration. But there are also some disadvantages which are frequently 
used to criticize the allocation of permits to individual users of transport. 
The most significant disadvantage would be the substantial planning costs 
incurred if individuals participate in the tradable permit market. These 
planning costs are, for example, a centralized electronic system that is 
needed to handle a large number of transactions and a large scale public 
education campaign. Furthermore, if permits in the transport sector are 
grandfathered (issued free, approximately on the basis of past usage of fuel 
or km travelled), special arrangements would need to be made for migrants, 
new car owners and tourists. Allocating of permits to fuel wholesalers, or 
producers, offer another alternative but this is not applicable to tradable 
entry rights. Here, planning costs would be lower170. The two different ways 
of distributing can also be combined, meaning that rights can be distributed 
to individuals, but monitored at the level of fuel wholesalers or producers.  
 
Imposing time limits on the use of tradable permits offers a convenient 
administrative mechanism for planning and controlling use on an annual 
basis. Tradable permits issued at the beginning of the year would simply 
expire at the end of that year, and new ones would be issued for the next 
period. Governments would be aware in advance of the maximum annual 
level, assuming no cheating. However, time limits could generate large 
movements in prices at various times of the year (Dobes, 1999, p. 89). We 
assume that, if permits are valuable assets, they will tend to be used 
reasonably soon (unless there is an expectation of appreciation in real 
value), or be sold. Otherwise, the holder would incur an opportunity cost 
similar to holding cash at home rather than in an interest-bearing deposit.  
 
As with emission rights, it is fair to conclude that search costs are largely 
dependent on the design of the system. In general, low cost alternatives do 
not impair its efficacy. However, in case of tradable entry permits, search 
costs will be high because permits are allocated to individuals.   
                                                 
170 However, the effect of rationing fuel through the quotas established by a tradable permit 
system is passed on to all vehicle operators in the form of higher prices, which gives the 
impression to individuals that more taxes are levied (Dobes, 1999, p. 87-88). 
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5.5.3.4. Set-up costs 
To coordinate the system and set up the market, an urban (or national or 
European171) institution will need to be founded or used to perform several 
tasks. This institution will be responsible for the distribution of the permits, 
the determination of the cap and the supervision. As with emission permits, 
the extent of the set-up costs is dependent on the distribution system chosen. 
Tradable entry permits make use of auctioning and free distribution which 
induces high set-up costs. Data will have to be collected for determining the 
quota which individuals will receive when permits are grandfathered. These 
costs however only have to be incurred once. The costs of setting up the 
yearly auction are higher. These responsibilities belong to the urban 
authority. 
 
Organization set-up costs are also dependent on the technology used. 
Permits can be put on so-called smart cards which are installed in the 
vehicle and used in conjunction with an in-lane camera/reader to 
communicate identifying information about the vehicle, customer, and 
account balance information of the non-complier. Some portions of the 
smart card information are fixed, such as vehicle and customer data, while 
others are updateable, such as permit credit balance, which changes each 
time permits are reloaded and the smart card is used.  
5.5.3.5. Operational costs 
As with emission rights, few requirements, approval processes and well 
defined entry rights are necessary to keep operational costs minimal. 
Approval procedures for trades between individuals imply that individuals 
willing to trade have to make costs before trading. This reduces their 
potential cost savings. Less trade takes place than would be possible 
(Bressers and Huitema, 2000, p. 75). Trading may be further limited if one 
adds further constraints such as limited information. This means that traders 
select their partners randomly (Koutstaal, 2002, p. 270). Bureaucratic 
interference therefore should be kept as low as possible because this can 
obstruct the system and entail substantial operational costs. Citizens need 
the freedom to decide themselves who to trade with and how to comply with 
the cap.  
 
In conclusion, analogous to emission rights, permit holders should be able to 
sell their excess permits with as little regulatory interference as possible in 
order to keep operational costs low.  
5.5.3.6. Negotiation costs 
Negotiation costs occur because of bargaining between citizens or between 
the government and individuals. However, as with emission rights, 
institutions and different market structures can be set up to facilitate the 
trade of permits such as direct search markets, brokered markets, dealer 
markets and auction markets. If an electronic market emerges, negotiation 
costs will be further reduced.  
 
                                                 
171 The need for a European institution is only necessary when introducing tradable fuel 
permits. Tradable entry permits are mostly implemented on an urban scale, which reduces 
the need for an institution because most tasks can be performed by the urban authority.  
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Once a party has found another party to trade, bargaining will start. When 
information on prices is publicly available, this bargaining process will be 
standardized and entail few transaction costs. When citizens are confronted 
with substantial search costs, fewer transactions will occur and hence the 
functioning of the market will be undermined. Ultimately, negotiation costs 
will be minimized by a transparent market, the use of market intermediaries, 
minimal complexity of government regulation and clarity of property rights.   
5.5.3.7. Contract costs 
As with emission rights, the costs of contracting are zero since the purchase 
of a permit is merely a spot transaction and no time between the promise 
and actual transfer of the entry right exists. 
5.5.3.8. Monitoring and enforcement costs 
Adequate monitoring and enforcement is vital to the success of any tradable 
permit scheme. In principle, the transport sector would not be likely to differ 
significantly from other sectors of the economy in requiring monitoring and 
enforcement to prevent cheating. There are, however, significant differences 
in the cost and difficulty of these tasks, depending on how the permit 
scheme operates. Placing permit liability upstream would be efficient, 
provided that the resulting permit market is competitive. Downstream 
monitoring, as in the case of tradable entry permits, involves more market 
players and thus higher costs. Whether permits are monitored at individual 
level, at fuel producers/wholesalers or importers level, governments need to 
have reliable measures of usage to make sure that there is no consumption 
without permits.  
 
Enforcement comprises four stages: detection of the violation, notification 
of the offender, negotiation about compliance measures and sanctions for 
non-compliance. In case of TEP, the violation will be detected when passing 
the entry gate through number plate scanning. The offenders will be notified 
and if no negotiation about compliance is possible, they will have to pay a 
fine. This fine has to be high such that the expected costs of fraud172 exceed 
the costs of sticking to the rules. Also, the environment or congestion level 
should not suffer from fraud. Therefore, in addition to a fine, actors who 
have failed to comply should be forced to acquire permits to cover there 
external costs (Koutstaal, 1996, p. 26).   
 
Furthermore, transaction costs depend on the fact if a tradable transportation 
system can fit in with existing institutions for levying taxes. These 
administrations exist in most western countries, meaning that monitoring 
and enforcement costs can be kept relatively low.  
5.5.3.9. Compliance costs 
The costs of compliance are comparable to those of road pricing because the 
same technology is used. This technology, namely smart card and electronic 
payments, guarantees a high level of compliance and will make a system of 
tradable entry rights just as feasible as road pricing as far as compliance is 
concerned.  
                                                 
172 The expected costs of fraud equal the chance that fraud is discoverd times the level of 
the sanctions.  
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5.5.3.10. Conclusions 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the transaction costs analysis 
of tradable entry permits. First of all, the amount of transaction costs is 
largely dependent on the design of the system. In general, a tradable permit 
system implemented on a small scale by a national authority that distributes 
permits for free, not based on previous use and without approval processes, 
with the use of smart-cards, electronic markets and monitored upstream will 
induce fewer transaction costs than a large European scale, where permits 
are auctioned off and monitored downstream.  
 
Secondly, there exists a trade-off between some cost categories. While a 
downstream allocation induces high planning costs, monitoring costs can be 
kept relatively low when using smart-cards for all vehicle users. It is 
therefore fair to conclude that technology plays an important role in the 
development of tradable transportation permits and thanks to recent 
development, transaction costs do not prohibit the use of tradable permits in 
the transport sector if smartly designed.   
5.5.4. Transaction cost comparison 
Only by assessing the total transaction costs, it is possible to choose one 
mechanism over the other, or a combination of both. Given that an effective 
mechanism should be implemented, our transaction cost analysis will 
answer the question which policy, road pricing or tradable entry permits, 
entails the least transaction costs.  
5.5.4.1. Information and search costs 
There are significant differences between information and search costs of 
road pricing versus tradable entry rights. For setting efficient prices in road 
pricing, the physical relationship between traffic, congestion and 
environmental costs needs to be established and these external costs need to 
be valued. Furthermore, a differential road charge needs to be levied based 
on time and place. Concluding, transaction costs are clearly a function of the 
amount of information that is to be transmitted, and the timing of these 
transfers. A trade-off between the degree of differentiation in the pricing 
scheme and the amount of information that is required to be collected and 
transmitted exists and the scale of this trade-off will depend upon the 
minimal amount of information that is needed to accurately infer the 
characteristics of individual journeys. With tradable entry permits, only the 
cap needs to be established and no further information is necessary on price 
elasticity’s and abatement costs.  
5.5.4.2. Monitoring, enforcement and compliance cost 
The monitoring, enforcement and compliance costs are dependent on the 
technology used and the following time and energy that the individuals need 
to comply with the system and the government needs to effectively monitor 
and enforce the system. Because road pricing and tradable entry permits use 
the same technology, these costs are comparable for both market-based 
approaches.  
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5.5.4.3. Negotiating and contracting cost 
Road pricing entails no contract costs and very low negotiating costs 
because the system is obligatory, and no negotiation between governments 
and citizens is possible. Tradable entry rights induce also minimal contract 
costs because a spot transaction takes place. However, negotiation costs 
depend on the market mechanism chosen. Auction or electronic markets will 
substantially lower these costs because prices are then publicly available 
which reduces the bargaining process.  
5.5.4.4. Administrative costs 
Set-up costs of road pricing and tradable entry permits are comparable 
because again, the same technology is used for both systems. In both cases, 
a new institution can be created or the function can be fulfilled by existing 
(transport) tax administrations. 
5.5.4.5. Legislative costs 
These costs are not a good decision criterion to reject or choose one 
approach because in both cases, lobbying for or con the program will take 
place.  
5.5.4.6. Conclusion 
All the previous results are summarized in table below. From this table, the 
first conclusion that can be made is that tradable entry permits can induce 
high transaction costs, but so does road pricing. Much depends on the 
design of the system and the technology used. Developments in new 
technology will ensure that transaction costs associated with implementing a 
road pricing or tradable entry permit system will be at a lower level. 
Information costs are a decisive factor in choosing between both 
instruments. While no information is needed about price elasticities and 
marginal abatement costs in case of tradable permits, road pricing is only 
efficient if there is sufficient differentiation in the road charge to induce the 
appropriate incentives.
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Table 13: Comparative transaction costs of market-based transport policy instruments  
Transaction costs F*/V° Road Pricing Tradable Entry Permits 
Information costs F Very high (physical relationship between traffic, congestion and 
environmental costs, ability to value external costs) 
Very Low (cap, free distribution, 
auctioning) 
Low (cap, grandfathering) 
Search (planning) 
costs 
F Very high (differential road charge) 
Low (flat fee) 
High (allocating permits to 
individuals) 
Low (allocating permits to firms) 
Negotiation costs F Very low (no negotiation between government and road users, 
minimal between road users) 
High (direct search market) 
Low (brokered or dealer market) 
Very low (auction, electronic 
market) 
Contract costs F Zero (spot transaction) Zero (spot transaction) 
Set-up costs F Very high (tollbooths, new back-office) 
Average (automatic vehicle identification and in-vehicle meters, 
existing tax administration) 
High (new institution) 
Low (smart cards) 
Monitoring and 
enforcement costs 
V High (camera technology, differential prices) 
Average (electronic vehicle identification) 
Average (downstream, electronic 
vehicle identification) 
Low (upstream) 
Lobbying costs F High (public transport pro, other transport industry con) 
Low (vulnerable road users groups) 
High (free distribution: interest 
groups, transport industry) 
High (auctioning: environmental 
groups, bureaucrats 
Public support costs F High (treasury) 
Average (earmarking revenues) 
Low (providing alternatives and addressing equity issues) 
High (auction) 
Low (free distribution because of 
freedom of movement) 
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Operational costs V High (personnel) Low (few requirements and no 
approval processes) 
Compliance costs V High (toll booths) Low (technology) 
Low (electronic payments) 
 
* = fixed; ° = variable
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5.5.5. Policy implications 
Comparison between tradable permits and equivalent taxes are normally 
based on standard analysis that assumes absence of transaction costs. As 
Stavins (1995) shows, the existence of transaction costs introduces 
ambiguities into the choice between permits and other policy instruments, 
‘the supposed symmetry of taxes and permits becomes questionable, and the 
need to compare these instruments on a case-by-case basis becomes more 
compelling’. Unfortunately, there is no a priori method of choosing between 
taxes and tradable permits. In case of road pricing, a flat fee will induce far 
fewer transaction costs that differentiated prices, but will also not be very 
effective. Therefore, in the following table, a comparative transaction cost 
analysis is performed of effective road pricing and tradable entry permits 
measures (inducing the appropriate price incentives). 
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Table 14: Transaction costs of effective market-based transport policy instruments  
Transaction costs F*/V° Road Pricing Tradable Entry Permits 
Information costs F Very high (internalization external costs, 
variable road charge) 
Very low (cap, free distribution, auctioning) 
Search (planning) costs F Very high (differential road charge) High (allocating permits to individuals) 
Negotiation costs F Very low (no negotiation) Very low (auction, electronic market) 
Contract costs F Zero (spot transaction) Zero (spot transaction) 
Set-up costs F Average (automatic vehicle identification) Low (smart cards) 
Monitoring and 
enforcement costs 
V Average (electronic vehicle identification) Average (downstream, technology electronic 
vehicle identification) 
Lobbying costs F High (public transport pro, other transport 
industries con) 
Low (vulnerable road users groups) 
High (free distribution, auctioning) 
Public support costs F Low (providing alternatives and addressing 
equity issues) 
Low (free distribution) 
Operational costs V High (personnel) Low (few requirements and no approval 
processes) 
Compliance costs V Low (electronic payments) Low (technology) 
Total costs High fixed costs of effective road pricing, 
average variable costs 
Average fixed costs, low variable costs  
* = fixed, ° = variable
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Table 14 reveals that, from a transaction cost perspective, the effective 
tradable entry permit system is downstream operation in which the urban 
authority distributes the permits (on a smart card) for free and ensures that 
excess permits can be sold via an electronic market. Table 14 also shows 
that effective road pricing entails higher fixed costs, namely information, 
search and set-up costs, than an effective tradable entry permit system.  
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The Delors report (1989) argued that monetary union without fiscal 
convergence might lead to monetary and economic instability. Therefore, it 
recommended binding fiscal rules limiting the size and financing of fiscal 
deficits. Subsequently, the debate on excessive deficits, the need for binding 
fiscal rules in the EC, and the coordination of fiscal policies has been wide-
ranging (Buiter, Corsetti and Roubini, 1993, p. 60). The European Union 
followed the Delors Report in adopting principles for fiscal discipline of 
EMU Members, the so-called Stability and Growth Pact. The provisions of 
this Treaty have proven to be highly controversial. Many economists have 
attacked the Treaty’s convergence criteria provisions, which limit the size of 
budget deficits to 3 % of GDP and debt-to-GDP ratios to 60 %, as being 
arbitrary and likely to impose substantial costs in terms of unemployment 
and lost economic output due to forced fiscal stringency at inappropriate 
times (Willett, 2000). In this chapter, we will elaborate further on the 
weaknesses of the current Stability Pact.  
 
With monetary union removing the option of countercyclical monetary 
policy at the national level, one can argue that greater flexibility in fiscal 
policy is needed. There is a strong parallel between this fiscal problem and 
the market for pollution permits. In a market for pollution permits (as 
discussed in chapter 4), the regulatory authority sets the overall pollution 
limit and pollution sources sell their permits if their cost of pollution 
reduction is below the permit’s price or, otherwise, buy additional permits. 
A system of tradable deficit permits among European countries, as proposed 
by Casella (1999), would allocate deficits where their value is highest, 
making it possible to implement the desired fiscal discipline at minimum 
total cost. Given the general idea of a system of tradable permits, the exact 
design can vary. For example, countries with different debt positions can be 
treated differently, mirroring the fear that deficits from economies with 
larger outstanding debts may be particularly destabilizing for the Union as a 
whole. We will reflect upon this design and consider both micro- and 
macro-economic aspects.  
 
Although permit trading is thought to be more effective and efficient, it is 
also thought that it induces higher transaction costs than command-and-
control policy. Using a comparative transaction costs analysis, we will 
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173 Part of this chapter has been published as: Crals and Vereeck (2003b).  
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demonstrate that the transaction cost advantage of regulation over permit 
trading is not as straightforward as economic theory suggests.   
 
This chapter is organized as follows. The first section defines the concept of 
tradable deficit rights and discusses the micro-economic aspects of 
introducing such a system. Then, the macro-economic aspects of tradable 
deficit permits are analyzed and the business cycles, the character of the 
budget deficit, national debt and the demographic situation are taken into 
account. The following section discusses the difficulty of Germany to 
comply with the Pact and proposes to implement a national system of 
tradable deficit permits between the federal government and the Länder. In 
the final section, the transaction costs of both policy instruments, namely the 
current Stability Pact and tradable deficit rights are analyzed and compared.  
 
6.2. Micro-economic aspects 
 
The Stabilization Pact (Treaty of Amsterdam) wanted to create a stable 
monetary order in Europe174. It did so by imposing strict fiscal and monetary 
targets upon the Member States. A worldwide economic recession175 hitting 
the Old Continent is forcing the largest economy, Germany176, to relax the 3 
% national deficit rule. The purpose of this requirement was to constrain 
crowding out effects. National governments borrowing on a unified euro-
market would put upward pressure on interest rates thus harming citizens of 
other Member States with balanced budgets. Relaxing the EMU 
requirements under German pressure is, however, sending the wrong signals 
to financial markets and has the potential of destroying the Union’s 
monetary credibility. This paragraph examines the possibility of trading 
deficit rights among countries. Under this system, the option to borrow on 
the euro-market could be sold to countries that are in a temporary need of 
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174 The EU Treaty Article 105.1 states that the primary objective of the European Central 
Bank shall be to maintain price stability. The four principal reasons for placing primacy on 
price stability are: (1) price stability improves the transparency of the relative price 
mechanism, thereby avoiding distortions and helping to ensure that the market will allocate 
real resources efficiently across use and time, (2) stable prices minimize the inflation risk 
premium in long-term interest rates, thereby lowering long-term rates and helping to 
stimulate investment and growth, (3) if the future price level is uncertain, real resources are 
diverted to hedging against inflation or deflation, rather than being put to productive use; 
and (4) maintaining price stability avoids the large and arbitrary redistribution of wealth 
and incomes that arises in inflationary as well as deflationary environments, and therefore 
helps to maintain social cohesion and stability.  
175 After achieving 4 % growth in 2000, the global economy began to slow in 2001, when 
the real GDP growth rate fell to less than 1-2 % for the first time since 1994 due to the 
economic downturn in major economies such as the U.S., Germany, Japan and Singapore. 
The conditions began to improve in Europe starting from the second half of 2002.  
176 In Germany, the deterioration of business and consumer sentiment grew more 
pronounced and real GDP growth in 2001 was only 0.7 %.  
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additional deficit spending. This system allows more fiscal flexibility 
without loosing monetary credibility since the total borrowing capacity of 
the Member States remains equal. 
6.2.1. The Stability Pact 
The Stability and Growth Pact consists of three components: the “European 
Council Resolution on the Stability and Growth Pact”, the “Council 
Regulation on the Strengthening of the Surveillance of Budgetary Positions 
and the Surveillance and Coordination of Economic Policies” and the 
“Council Regulation on Speeding Up and Clarifying the Implementation of 
the Excessive Deficit Procedure”. The Resolution commits all parties: the 
Member States, the Commission and the Council to implement the EC 
Treaty177 and the Stability and Growth Pact in a strict and timely manner. 
The Council Regulations themselves, unlike the Resolution, have legal 
force. The first Council Regulation refers to the strengthening of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies. It 
commits those Member States which join the single currency, to submit a 
stability program to the Commission. The latter Council Regulation is based 
on article 104 of the EC Treaty and includes the specification of possible 
penalties and the voting procedure in case of excessive deficit (Irlenbusch 
and Sutter, 2003). According to the Stability Pact, an ‘excessive’ deficit 
exists if the annual deficit exceeds 3 % of a country’s GDP. If so, warnings 
will be issued and, eventually, penalties levied. According to article 104c 
(2a) of the Treaty, a government deficit above 3 % of GDP is not excessive 
if that excess is “exceptional and temporary and the government deficit to 
GDP remains close to the reference value”. While the Regulation on 
excessive deficits clarifies the concepts of “exceptional” and “temporary”, it 
is silent on the notion of “close to the reference value”. The definition of the 
term “exceptional" comprises two parts, firstly, unusual events which are 
not under control of Member States and which have major impacts on 
public finance178 and, secondly, events of an economic nature179 
(Blyumental, 2004). The excess over the reference value shall be considered 
“temporary” if budgetary forecasts provided by the Commission indicate 
that the deficit will fall below the reference value following the end of the 
unusual event or the severe economic downturn. A general exemption from 
the excessive deficit procedure is provided, if a country faces a decline in 
the real GDP of at least 2 % at an annual basis. If growth rates are positive 
or if the decline in the GDP is less than a critical value (which has been 
fixed at 0,75 %), the Council will declare the deficit to be excessive and will 
start with the excessive deficit procedure.  
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177 Treaty establishing the European Community (signed in Rome on 25 March 1957). 
Provisions concerning Economic and Monetary Union have been added to the EC Treaty 
by the Treaty on European Union (signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992).  
178 These include natural disasters.  
179 Like severe economic downturn.  
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When no exemptions can be evoked, the Member State has eight months to 
take the necessary measures to reduce its excessive deficit. After those 
months, in case of non-compliance, sanctions will be levied. The first 
sanction is a non-interest deposit that the Member State has to put down 
until the excessive deficit is corrected. This deposit consists of a fixed 
amount (0,2 % of the GDP) and a variable amount (0,1 % of the GDP for 
each point excessive of the 3 % budgetary deficit). The cap is set on 0,5 % 
of the GDP. When, after two years, the situation has not been corrected, this 
deposit becomes a fine. In reality, this penalty has never been carried out. 
The political process is designed in such a way that it puts maximum 
pressure on a Member State not to exceed the maximum budgetary deficit.  
 
There are several weaknesses in the Stability Pact which are widely 
discussed in the literature180. First of all, it forces governments to tighten 
fiscal policy exactly when growth is weak and thus limits or even prevents 
the functioning of automatic fiscal stabilisers. Countries need an instrument 
to deal with a temporary economic crisis. The Stability Pact takes away this 
possibility and leaves no room for differences between countries181. This 
implies that the ability of many governments to use fiscal policy during the 
cyclical downturns will be much reduced (Lossani, Natale and Tirelli, 
2002).  
 
Secondly, the sanctions are not automatic, but can only materialise after a 
long process of negotiations among EMU members. This arbitrariness in the 
application of the penalties creates uncertainty and could lead to difficult 




                                                
Finally, the different voting weights in the EU-Council of Ministers are an 
advantage for larger countries. They have more power to stop the excessive 
deficit procedure, giving them more room for manoeuvre in their fiscal 
policy than smaller countries. Currently, if an EMU-Member State has a 
deficit above 3 % of GDP, the European Commission has to prepare a 
report, making a recommendation to the Council for a decision. The 
Economic and Financial Committee (ECOFIN) also has to give an opinion 
on the Commission’s report. When making a decision on whether an 
excessive deficit exists, the Council acts by qualified majority (which 
represents a minimum of 232 votes). All EU-countries, including the 
 
180 For example by Beetsma and Uhlig (1999). 
181 Before the EMU, governments often inflated their currency to reduce the level of public 
debt as a percentage of nominal national GDP. However, within the EMU, this option is 
effectively closed by transferring all monetary policy to the ECB. But still governments 
could increase public debt and thereby forcing the ECB to increase interest rates. Such a 
tight monetary policy would have adverse effects on other members of the EMU. 
Therefore, the Stability and Growth Pact restrict governments in their fiscal policy.  
153
country under examination (and even EMU-outsiders), are allowed to vote 
in this decision.  
 
The current distribution of voting power in the Council of Ministers is 
shown in the following table. Also the voting powers of the new Member 
States, which are currently not (yet) part of the EMU, are shown (in italic). 
 
Table 15: Distribution of voting power in the Council of Ministers  
Member State Votes  
France 29 Sweden 10 
Germany 29 Denmark 7 
Italy 29 Finland 7 
United Kingdom 29 Ireland 7 
Poland 27 Slovakia 7
Spain 27 Lithuania 7
The Netherlands 13 Luxemburg 4 
Greece 12 Estonia 4
Belgium 12 Latvia 4
Portugal 12 Slovenia 4
Czech Republic 12 Cyprus 4
Hungary 12 Malta 3
Austria 10 TOTAL EU 321 
Source: Treaty of Nice, European Commission 
 
Irlenbusch and Sutter (2003) demonstrate in an experimental setting that 
large players are, in fact, more successful in blocking their own punishment 
procedure. Currently, the five biggest Member States’ population-wise in 
the 15-strong European Union have 60 % of votes. Because it are the large 
countries which are breaching the Stability Pact (see further), it can be 
assumed that they have more power to stop their own excessive deficit 
procedure or avoid sanctions.  
 
Buiter (2003) states that fiscal rules in a monetary union should (1) be 
simple; (2) ensure the solvency of the state; (3) avoid pro-cyclical behaviour 
of the fiscal policy instruments; (4) make sense in the long run; (5) allow for 
important differences in economic structure and initial conditions; (6) 
aggregate into behaviour that makes sense at the level of the union as a 
whole; (7) be credible and (8) be enforced impartially and consistently. We 
add the condition that fiscal rules should induce low transaction costs. After 
analysing the current legislation, Buiter (2003) states that the rules of the 
Stability and Growth Pact satisfy unambiguously only the first two of the 
eight requirements. It could be argued to satisfy the third, avoiding pro-
cyclical behaviour, as a country can take steps to have a public sector 
surplus that is large enough in normal times to eliminate the risk of hitting 
the deficit ceiling in unfavourable times. Whether the Stability Pact induces 
low transaction costs will be thoroughly examined in the fifth paragraph.  
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6.2.2. Tradable deficit rights 
A rethinking of the fiscal-financial framework for the EMU is necessary and 
urgent. Muscatelli, Natale and Tirelli (2003) suggested allowing Member 
States within the EMU to exceed the reference ceiling stated by the Stability 
and Growth Pact, but only under certain conditions. For instance, countries 
willing to exceed the announced deficits targets should obtain the approval 
of the other Member States as well as the European Central Bank. Such 
approval should be accompanied by a country’s plan for future fiscal reform 
in order to attain the deficit discipline enforced through the Stability and 
Growth Pact. Additionally, the remaining Euro countries must agree to 
implement policies such that union-wide deficit does not exceed the 3% 
deficit limit. However, this seems to induce high negotiations and delay 
costs because other countries have to agree to the exception. Another 
approach, proposed by Casella (1999), introduces the principle of tradable 
deficit permits. The deficit is an external effect that weighs heavily on the 
Euro-market and affects all members of the European Union. A high deficit 
in Germany affects the other members of the EMU in a negative way by 
putting upward pressure on the interest rate in the Eurozone. Crowding out 
has thus become a transnational phenomenon in the EMU. Deficits can be 
seen as negative externalities created by one Member State and spilling over 
to all others. To deal with the problem, the European Union chose a set of 
strict norms and standards to which countries have to apply. If not, fines are 
imposed. This is a clear example of a traditional ‘command-and-control’ 
policy. For many decades, economists advocate a ‘market-based’ approach 
for the internalization of externalities. Market-based instruments have 
several advantages compared to the command-and-control policy. They give 
flexibility at agents because they allow freedom of choice and create an 
incentive to search for an efficient way of reaching the goals. They are also 
more cost-effective than the conventional policies.  
 
Learning from the tradable emission right systems, the following section 
will design a similar system of tradable deficit rights (TDR)182. Emission 
rights systems have three key features as a method of pollution control. 
Firstly, they provide the economy an upper bound on emissions. Secondly, 
since the permits can be traded, pollution abatement will be done at the 
lowest possible cost to the economy. Firms who can reduce emissions 
cheaply will end up doing the abatement: they will be able to make a profit 
by cutting their emissions and selling their extra permits. Firms who find it 
very expensive to reduce emission will buy permits instead. Thirdly, permits 
will ensure that the marginal cost of reducing emissions, is the same in all 
countries that participate in the scheme (McKibben, 1998).  
 155 
                                                
 
 
182 Along with the creation of a market for tradable deficit permits, Casella (1999) also 
advocates a system of sanctions for those countries which hold fewer permits than deficit 
units at the closing of the market.  
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The design of any permit trading system is complex, particularly because of 
the problem of the initial allocation of rights. To develop a system that 
works and limits transaction costs, several conditions need to be fulfilled 
like e.g. a good administration and monitoring & enforcement mechanism. 
Each element of the tradable permit system can improve or worsen the 
operational efficiency and smooth implementation of the system. The design 
of a TDR system will be discussed in the following paragraph.  
6.2.3. Design of TDR 
According to the Stability Pact an ‘excessive deficit’ exists if the annual 
deficit exceeds 3 % of a country’s GDP. Not all countries are able to keep 
their deficit below this norm. In the following table, the general government 
surplus of each EMU Member State is given as percentage to the GDP. 
Table 16: General Government Surplus in 2003 














Source: Eurostat 2005 
 
This table shows that Germany, France, Greece and The Netherlands were 
not meeting the requirements of the Stability Pact in 2003183. Table 17 
shows that at least six Member States could breach the 3% reference value 
for the fiscal deficit to GDP ratio in 2004184. 
Table 17: Growths and deficits 2002-2004 
GDP% Deficit/GDP  
2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004 
France 1.3 0.2 1.7 3.2 4.1 3.7 
Germany 0.2 -0.1 1.5 3.5 3.8 3.6 
Italy 0.4 0.3 1.2 2.4 2.4 3.2 
                                                 
183 In June 2005, the European Commission agreed that Italy should enter the excessive 
deficit procedure as agreed in the Stability and Growth Pact. According to the latest figures 
of Eurostat, Italy had a deficit of a least 3.1 % in 2003 and 2004. The projected deficits for 
2005 and 2006 are set to exceed 3.1 %. Furthermore, for 2003 and 2004, the debt-to-GDP 
ratio remained at around 106-107 %, well above the 60 % reference value in the Stability 
and Growth Pact.  
 
184 More recent information is currently unavailable.  
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Portugal 0.4 -1.3 0.8 2.7 2.8 3.4 
The Netherlands 0.2 -0.8 1.0 1.9 3.2 3.5 
Greece 3.9 4.2 4.0 1.4 4.6 3.2 
Source: Verde (2004, p.15) 
 
The President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, suggested that 
these requirements may be loosened or postponed (Collignon, 2004). This 
statement will certainly undermine the credibility of the European monetary 
policy and the Euro. Financial markets are in need of predictability and 
tranquillity to prosper. The introduction of tradable deficit permits might 
bring a solution to the need for additional deficit spending while 
maintaining the trust of the Stability Pact. The parallel with tradable 
emission permits is obvious. The Stability Pact puts uniform quantitative 
limits on the budgetary deficit of each Member State. Meeting this 
constraint comes with different costs for each Member State, depending on 
the country’s debt structure and stage in the business cycle. A system of 
tradable deficit permits will allocate deficits where their value is highest and 
reach the overall cap at minimum cost. Accordingly, with TDR, individual 
Member States can exceed the budgetary deficit norm of 3 % but, at the end 
of the year, the total budgetary deficit in the whole Eurozone will meet the 3 
% norm. This guarantee brings the stability that the new monetary union 
that the Euro-market needs.  
6.2.3.1. Determination of the cap 
In a TDR system, each country receives a number of deficit permits equal to 
3 % of its GDP185. One deficit permit gives the right to a deficit of 100 
million Euros. These permits are freely tradable. At the end of the year, each 
country has to present enough permits to cover the year’s deficit. 
 
Table 18: GDP at current market prices 2003 (in billion €) and TDR 








(1 permit = 100 million  
€)
Austria 226,1 6,783 68 
Belgium 269,5 8,085 81 
Finland 143,3 4,299 43 
France 1557,2 46,716 467 
Germany 2128,2 63,846 639 
Greece 153,5 4,605 46 
Ireland 134,8 4,044 40 
Italy 1300,9 39,027 390 
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185 GDP estimations are not always correct and during the year, events can occur which can 
alter significantly the GDP projections. Therefore, permits could be distributed for free 
based on an updating scheme. For example, Member States receive permits equal to 3 % of 
the GDP of the year before.  
Luxemburg 24,0 0,72 7 
The 
Netherlands 
454,3 13,629 136 
Portugal 130,5 3,915 39 
Spain 744,8 22,344 224 
Eurozone 7267,1 218,013 2180 
Source: European Commission, European Economy, Statistical Annex. 
 
This table shows that there would be 2180 permits of 100 million € in 
circulation in the Eurozone. For example, Germany, which has a deficit of 
3,8 % of the GDP186, would initially need 809 permits187 to allow it to run 
this deficit. In the TDR system, it initially only has received 639 permits. As 
a consequence, Germany has to buy 170 extra permits from other countries 
that have excess permits. 
6.2.3.2. Allocation aspects 
Because every Member State is allowed to run a 3 % deficit each year, it is 
entitled to these deficit rights for free. At the beginning of each calendar 
year, the TDR will be distributed. Member States that do not use their entire 
annual rights, can sell them partly or entirely at the current market price to 
other countries that need more. Ongoing regulated auctions will allow the 
Member States to buy or sell permits according to their expectations of 
current and future needs. 
 
Countries that are facing a deficit larger than 3 % will have to buy extra 
TDR. This means an extra cost for the Member State. But this is also the 
case in the Stability Pact because those countries, who do not meet the 3 % 
limit, face a steep fine. The important difference lies in the determination of 
the amount they have the pay in case of non-compliance with the Stability 
Pact. A TDR has a market price while the fine is arbitrarily determined. 
6.2.3.3. Inter-temporal trading 
It will not be allowed to bank permits. This means that Member States 
cannot transfer TDR to the next year. Banking could have as a consequence 
that the tradability after some time would show a cyclical pattern. 
Furthermore, banking can interfere with the liquidity of the permits at the 
end of a year because Member States can bank their permits for the 
following years. An option would be to allow banking during a business 
cycle. During a business cycle, an economy grows, reaches a peak, and then 
begins a downturn followed by a period of negative growth that ends in a 
trough before the next upturn. In this option, TDR can be banked for the 
next year in the same business cycle. However, today business cycles are 
widely known to be irregular, varying in frequency, magnitude and duration. 
                                                 
186 A deficit of 3,8 % of the GDP equals 80,872 milliard €.  
 
187 One permit = 100 million €. 
158 
This irregularity will cause uncertainty which will hamper the trading of 
permits.  
 
Borrowing permits is not allowed. It could create an enormous deficit 
because Member States will keep on borrowing from the following year and 
will not make the necessary adjustments to limit their budgetary deficit. 
6.2.3.4. Market power  
Market power occurs when there is not enough potential competition. In this 
scheme, there are only 12 countries of very different size. Hahn (1984) 
showed that the presence of a monopsonist in the permits market distorts the 
equilibrium price and leads to higher compliance costs than in a competitive 
market. In the case of the EMU, we do have 12 market players and for the 
moment at least four buyers. Nevertheless, it seems unrealistic to assume 
that the TDR market will be a competitive market without some form of 
regulation. 
 
However, ten new Member States joined the EU on May 1, 2004, but they 
did not introduce the single currency straight away. In order to be able to 
adopt the euro, a Member State must have observed the normal fluctuation 
margins provided for by the European exchange-rate mechanism (ERM-II) 
for at least two years without devaluing its currency. Furthermore, their 
deficit must be less than 3 % of GDP and government debt lower than 60 % 
of GDP. Three Member States (Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia) joined 
ERM-II on June 28, 2004 and wish to adopt the euro as soon as possible. 
However, a Member State joining ERM-II in 2004 can not meet the 
exchange-rate criterion until 2006; this means that the new Member States 
can not adopt the euro before 2007.  
 
Will transactions of TDR’s be bilateral or will the rights be pooled and sold 
by an ECB-subsidiary? The TDR-market is likely to suffer from asymmetric 
information188. Consequently, it will be hard for the seller to determine the 
marginal value of a TDR for another national government. In bilateral 
trading, some countries will end up paying different prices depending on 
which countries they bargain with, the amount and quality of information 
they possess and their bargaining power which in turn depends largely on 
their political power and weight. It is also possible that some countries will 
not sell their TDR’s, but trade them for a (geo-)political favour (e.g. 
participation in war). For all the reasons mentioned above, the market needs 
a regulator preferably the European Central Bank (ECB). 
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188 A key feature of auctions is the presence of asymmetric information. A market for TDR 
is a basic example of a private-value model where each bidder knows how much she values 
the object for sale, but her value is private information to herself (Klemperer, 1999, p. 229).  
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According to Casella (1999), a continuous double auction may be the 
appropriate trading mechanism for a market in deficit permits. A double 
auction is a market mechanism through which multiple buyers and multiple 
sellers exchange goods. Both bids and asks are permitted and exchange can 
happen at any time during the trading period. Trades therefore take place at 
different prices and net trades are the result of many bilateral transactions. 
Continuous double auctions have been the object of a large volume of 
experimental work. Friedman (1984) and Friedman and Ostroy (1995) have 
conjectured that double auctions induce competitive behaviour even in the 
presence of few large players through a form of Bertrand competition: “ 
(…) in order to realize any gains from exchange, a trader must either seize 
the market price, or accept the market price of another. This necessity both 
limits each agent’s influence on prices (via Bertrand competition189) and 
also conveys high quality information to other agents” (Friedman, 1984, p. 
71). Although this argument is intuitively convincing, the formal result 
requires that players have knowledge of the market clearing price190. In 
experiments, double auctions consistently outperform other exchange 
mechanisms when market power can exist (Smith et al., 1982), and yield 
competitive outcomes even when one side of the market, sellers for 
example, are given the opportunity to coordinate actions in pre-play 
communication. According to Casella (1999), participants will quickly 
recognize their common interest, “conspiracies” form and informal 
agreements to impose cartel prices are easily reached. However, these 
agreements unravel just as quickly during the play of the game191. 
Consequently, this mechanism seems an appropriate system for a tradable 
deficit permit market. Furthermore, the continuous double auction should be 
computerized, a feature that reduces transaction costs and can protect 
anonymity. Exchanges would take place through a two-tier system: first, 
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189 Bertrand competition is a model of competition used in economics. Specifically, it is a 
model of price competition between duopoly firms which results in each charging the price 
that would be charged under perfect competition, known as marginal cost pricing. It is also 
defined as a bidding war in which the bidders end up at a zero-profit price.  
190 In most experiments, as discussed by Casella (1999), players acquire experience with the 
rules of the game through stationary repetitions of periods of exchange, and thus can use 
the previous period final price as a good guess of the equilibrium price. The view that these 
experiments come to approximate games of complete information seems plausible, but 
raises the obvious concern that the experiments may then not be faithful to the experience 
of real world markets.  
191 The continuous double auction has two features which may be responsible for this. First, 
the continuous nature of the auction implies that the temptation defect is continuous too, as 
opposed to the single act of quoting the cartel price once in a static auction. Second, any 
access to the market requires a seller to underbid the current ask price; thus, unless the 
cartel has also agreed to a credible ex post partition of the profits, the agreement will not be 
sustainable.  
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direct bilateral negotiations between countries or negotiations via the ECB 
and second, a simultaneous electronic and anonymous double auction192.  
6.2.3.4. Price information 
For the TDR-system to be efficient, the price of one TDR should equal the 
marginal external cost it creates, i.e. the marginal loss of GDP in the 
Eurozone because of crowding-out effects. Obviously, there are also 
external benefits of increased spending by a national government, especially 
for the export-industries of neighbouring countries. The latter countries 
might, therefore, be willing to sell their TDR’s at lower prices than distant 
countries.  
 
Using the framework developed by Soberg (2002), we compare the current 
situation with the 3% cap which will show each Member States’ 
commitment for fiscal deficit spending reduction193.   
 




2003 (deficit in % of 
GDP)
Cap (deficit 
in % of 
GDP)
Fiscal deficit reduction 
commitment (in % of 
GDP)
Austria 1.1 3.0 0 (-1.9) 
Belgium -0.4 3.0 0 (-3.4) 
Finland -2.3 3.0 0 (-5.3) 
France 4.1 3.0 1.1 
Germany 3.8 3.0 0.8 
Greece 4.6 3.0 1.6 
Ireland -0.1 3.0 0 (-3.1) 
Italy 2.4 3.0 0 (-0.6) 
Luxemburg -0.8 3.0 0 (-3.8) 
The 
Netherlands 
3.2 3.0 0.2 
Portugal 2.8 3.0 0 (-0.2) 
Spain -0.4 3.0 0 (-3.4) 
Eurozone 2.7  0 (-0.3) 
Source: Eurostat 2005 and own computations 
 
                                                 
192 A similar dual structure exists in most financial markets: for example the “upstairs” and 
“downstairs” market of the New York Stock Exchange. The downstairs market is the main 
market, organized as a computerized double auction and the upstairs market is reserved for 
very large trades that could not be concluded without delay through the main market but are 
closed through the dealers’ personal negotiations. If the downstairs market is sufficiently 
liquid, it can exercise the necessary disciplinary effect on the upstairs market (Casella, 
1999). 
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193 Soberg (2002) compares a hypothetical business-as-usual scenario with the cap to 
calculate the reduction commitment. However, we will use the current situation and 
compare this with the cap to propose a calculation method for the price of a tradable deficit 
permit in 2003. 
At first sight, demand for TDR’s is weak relatively to supply as a result of 
what the price might become zero194. However, it could well be possible that 
France and Germany need all excess permits of the other Member States to 
cover their deficit.  
 
Deficit reduction commitments may be implemented as a combination of 
domestic reduction or net purchase of TDP. The marginal reduction cost of 
tradable deficit permits is the effect on GDP of more deficit spending, 
taking into account the multiplier of governmental expenditures and future 
taxes (because of the additional investments). Begg et al. (2004, p. 1027) 
state that an increase of 1 percentage point of GDP in public investment or 
purchases of goods and services adds 0.7 per cent to GDP in Germany, 
France and Italy, while it varies between 0.5 and 0.6 per cent in the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Portugal and Austria. In Finland and Greece, 
the multipliers are closer to those of the larger countries. According to 
Brunila, Buti and in ‘t Veld (2003, p. 13), the impact of a 1 per cent of GDP 
increase in government outlays varies significantly across spending 
categories and over time, but the pattern is roughly the same in all countries. 
While the multipliers are in the range of 0.5-0.7 and the short-term impact 
of government purchases of goods and services as well as government 
investment is somewhat smaller than that for employment. The 
expansionary effect of higher government purchases would fade away 
rapidly over the medium term, whereas that of government investment 
would have a more lasting impact by raising public capital stock and 
potential output. The smallest expansionary effect in all countries is 
achieved through a temporary increase in higher government transfer 
payments, most of which is saved.  
 
These multipliers can be used to calculate the effects of deficit spending on 
GDP and consequently the marginal abatement costs. Once these costs are 
known, they can be arranged and transformed into aggregate quota demand 
and supply curves. 
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194 A zero price is acceptable because, in that case, the total burden of governmental lending 
on the Euro-market is less than 3 % of European GDP.  
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Source: Based on Weber (2002, p. 285) and Soberg (2002) 
 
The equilibrium position corresponds with the point E and the trading of 
permits that occurs satisfies the equi-marginal principle, because E 
corresponds, in effect, to the intersection of the segments of the two parties’ 
respective MAC curves. This analysis only holds for the case of two 
Member States (A and B). As additional Member States participate in 
permit trading, some that initially were buyers may become sellers, and vice 
versa. However, regardless of the number of Member States involved in the 
markets of permits, a single equilibrium price for permits, ensured by the 
forces of competition, guarantees that all countries will reduce deficit 
spending to the point at which marginal reduction costs are the same for all.  
 
As indicated by Soberg (2002), the competitive trading volume and the 
market-clearing permit price will result from the intersection of permit 
demand and permit supply195 and can be obtained by the horizontal 
summation of the individual parties schedules. This general analysis is 
applicable to a broad range of problems in which the government limits the 
use of a particular commodity and allows trading in the rights to that 
commodity. The importance of calculating the expected market-price is self-
evident. Not only will this knowledge improve political and social 
acceptability196, it is also a focal point on which bids are made despite the 
                                                 
195 The equilibrium price will occur at the level at which the quantity of permits demanded 
by both (or all) polluters equals the cap, and the marginal cost of reducing emissions is the 
same for both (or all) polluters.  
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196 Regulated parties have to be convinced of the advantages that trading permits offers 
them because if not, no trading will occur.  
existence of uncertainty underlying permit demand and supply (Soberg, 
2002, p. 272).  
 
Concluding, the price of a tradable deficit permit can be calculated 
beforehand if marginal reduction costs are known. Marginal reduction costs 
can, at their turn, be calculated based on multipliers. The marginal reduction 
cost of a tradable deficit permit is the effect on GDP of more deficit 
spending, considering the multiplier of governmental expenditures and 
future taxes. However, it was not our objective to calculate a price for TDR, 
we have just tried to propose a calculation method that can be used.  
6.2.3.5. Monitoring and enforcement 
In the current version of the Stability Pact, penalties for countries violating 
their deficit ceiling are not automatic meaning that compliance with the Pact 
may or may not be enforced. In a system of TDR, the price would fall to 
zero if penalties are not enacted. However, even if penalties are imposed 
and collected, under both schemes, countries will only constrain their 
behaviour if they indeed bear the final responsibility for such penalties. The 
most direct approach, recommended in this book, is that banks are legally 
prohibited to lend (or support the issuing of bonds) to public authorities that 
do not have the required deficit permits. This is an upstream system with 
three main advantages. First, the system is self-policing and self-enforcing 
because no additional deficit spending is possible if countries do not have 
the required deficit permit to do so. Second, there is no elaborate political 
process à la Stability Pact necessary. Finally, as discussed in the case of 
environmental markets, upstream monitoring and enforcement systems will 
significantly reduce transaction costs.  
6.2.4. Summary and evaluation of a TDR system 
 
This chapter provides a proposal in which an EMU tradable deficit rights 
system may be designed to balance the need to create an alternative for the 
Stability Pact that fits well within the current legal framework. This option 
represents one practical approach that could be useful launching discussions 
between the Commission and the Member States on the design of an EMU 
deficit trading system197. 
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197 For concerns of European policy makers and a complete analysis of implementation 
issues regarding deficits and debts, the organization of the trade, the participants of a 
tradable deficit permit system and the enforcement and political economy, we refer to 
Casella (1999).  
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Table 20: Summary of TDR proposal  
Design Issues TDR Proposal Options 
Initial start The trading system can start at the beginning of each 
year, preferably after 2007 to allow the new Member 
States to participate. 
2008 
Unit of exchange Allowances are defined in millions of deficit-equivalent. 
Each allowance provides the holder with a right to 
deficit spending of 100 million Euros. 
 
Duration of allowances Allowances can be used to cover deficit spending in 
one year. They can not be banked to cover deficit 
spending in future periods. Borrowing is also not 
allowed. 
Banking could be allowed during a business cycle. If 
unused, allowances can be used to cover deficit 
spending in future years in the same business cycle. 
Ownership Allowances are owned by the current holders. Holders 
are Member States or local governments (domestic 
TDR system). Each year, when the allowances have 
been used for compliance purposes to cover deficit 
spending, they are retired and are no longer available 
for use or trade. 
 
Role of Member 
States 
Each Member State included in the trading system 
must surrender annually allowances equal to the 
amount of deficit spending of the previous year. 
 
Role of the European 
Commission/Ecofin 
These institutions must distribute allowances to 
Member States, approve trades (there is likely to be 
blanket approval of all trades), monitor compliance and 
impose penalties. 




Role of the banks Banks can lend (or support the issuing of bonds) to 





Through free allocation and continuous double auction. Updating scheme where information on GDP’s is 
updated each year en allowances are distributed based 
on last year’s GDP. 
Amount of allowances 
available for trading. 
The number of allowances distributed by the European 
Commission is set by the Stability Pact provisions, 
namely 3 % of the GDP of all Member States. 
The European Commission can choose another cap 
each year, dependent on the economic situation. 
Compulsion of the 
system. 
It is compulsory for all Member States of the EMU.  
Penalties in case of 
non-compliance 
Because banks are legally prohibited to lend to public 
authorities that do not have the required deficit rights, 
the (upstream) system is self-enforcing. In case of 
offense, banks and Member States have to pay a fine. 
The European Commission will set minimum penalties 
on banks and Member States. It is also possible to 
impose only fines on banks in case of non-compliance. 
 Market power Bilateral trading imposes the risk of more bargaining 
power of larger countries because of their political 
power and weight.  
The European Central Bank can be used as a 
regulator. A continuous double auction can be used 
which needs to be computerized. Exchanges would 
then take place via direct bilateral negotiations between 
countries or via a simultaneous electronic and 
anonymous double auction. 
Reference price  If marginal reduction costs are known (which is the 
effect on GDP of more deficit spending, considering 
the multipliers of government expenditures and future 
taxes), a price can be calculated. 
 
Inclusion of other 
sources. 
Yes, a domestic TDR system is also possible, where 




There are many reasons why the use of property rights, such as the TDR 
system, is particularly promising for regulating public deficits.  
 
First of all, the transnational external effect of a national deficit will be fully 
internalized by the TDR system. The system gives some degrees of freedom 
to countries to deal with a temporary economic crisis. Countries can choose 
to incur larger deficits by purchasing permits on the market. Member States 
that remain below the 3 % deficit of the GDP, can sell their unused permits 
and will gain from fiscal discipline. Member States that exceed the limit, 
will have to buy permits but it is expected that their price will be lower than 
the very high penalties described in the Stability Pact.   
 
Secondly, the TDR scheme promotes fiscal discipline, because every 
country has to meet the standard or buy extra deficit permits. Thus, the total 
budgetary deficit is fixed in the Eurozone while Member States are allowed 
some flexibility by trading deficit permits among each other.   
 
Thirdly, a TDR system gives freedom to individual nations and restores 
their sovereignty. This is important and may tempt Great Britain to join the 
EMU. Great Britain claims that the transfer of monetary and fiscal 
competencies from national to union level will mean that economically 
strong and stable countries have to cooperate in the field of economic policy 
with other, weaker, countries that are more tolerant to higher inflation. The 
TDR system restores some of that sovereignty to the Member States.  
 
Finally, the system destroys the arbitrary and political mechanism of 
granting exceptions to nations that cannot maintain the 3 % limit. If the 
system is well designed, it will be transparent and predictable. A tradable 
deficit rights system scores well on transparency because countries that 
exceed the 3 % ratio will have to buy extra permits at the TDR market or 
have to pay a fee for every permit that is missing. At this moment under the 
Stability Pact, penalties are rarely carried out and this undermines its 
credibility. 
 
6.3. Macro-economic aspects 
6.3.1. Business cycles 
One of the most well-known and appropriate criticisms of the Stability Pact 
is that the individual situation and performance of a national economy are 
not taken into consideration. The maximum budget deficit remains 3 % in 
every phase of the national business cycles. In addition, the excessive 
deficits during recessions are being punished while too low surpluses in 
times of economic boom are not dealt with. 
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A system of TDR however offers cyclical flexibility. Countries are now able 
to opt for excess deficits in times of recession, if they are willing to buy 
more deficit rights. Therefore, the system offers a sort of ‘fine’ for those 
countries who have to buy extra deficit rights. Countries that do maintain 
budgetary discipline are now being rewarded because they can sell their 
excess TDR. This mechanism works also and especially in times of 
economic boom. 
 
In the Stability Pact, the 3% norm can only be exceeded when a country is 
confronted with a serious recession198. This exemption is only permitted 
when the recession is diagnosed. Because of the business cycle, the allowed 
extra budgetary efforts will be pro-cyclical. TDR allow to interfere in an 
earlier phase and to conduct an anti-cyclical policy. 
 
When all countries in the Euro zone are simultaneously hit by an economic 
depression, then, the possibility exists to raise the European cap (3 %). 
Consequently, the amount of TDR can be made dependent of the European 
business cycle. At first glance, raising the cap seems just as arbitrary as 
overlooking the excessive deficits of France and Germany. However, the 
major difference lies in the fact that only the cap is changed, not the rules of 
the game. The ‘ad hoc’ character of exceptions for certain countries 
undermines the credibility of the monetary policy of the ECB. The 
announcement of the margin for the entire Euro zone, for example by Ecofin 
or ECB, is part of a general economic policy. Additionally, raising the cap 
will not create spill-over effects because the new policy is the same for all 
Member States.  
6.3.2. Character of the budget deficit 
Critics of the Stability Pact state that, for the sustainability of government 
expenditures, it matters if the budget deficit stems from consumption or 
investments. According to the classic public finance theory, consumption 
expenditure needs to be covered by tax revenues and investments by loans 
(Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989). A budgetary deficit is permissible for 
investments in public infrastructure because those investments also 
contribute to the future economic growth and form the tax base for the 
repayment of the government’s debt. The Stability Pact however does not 
discriminate between consumption and investment expenses of the 
government.  
 
In principle, the TDR system can make that distinction while loosing part of 
its simplicity. The deficit rights, that give national governments access to 
the European money market, can be earmarked. Otherwise said, the 
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198 There exists an exception on the 3 %-rule when a country is confronted with a decline of 
the real GDP of more than 0,75 %. In all other cases, Member States have 8 months to take 
counter measures. 
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financial means obtained by exercising a deficit right can be earmarked for 
investments expenses. This is, however, not really desirable because the 
system loses then one of its most important trumps. The advantage of TDR 
lies in the fact that the Ecofin council does not have to deal with which 
country has a deficit and for which reason, but only has to take into account 
the global picture. As soon as stipulations are connected with TDR, 
monitoring costs will increase. As a consequence, the Ecofin council will 
have to take disputable decisions with regard to the investment character 
and earn back effects of certain governmental expenses. Therefore, 
proponents of the system of TDR want to avoid these kinds of discussions. 
6.3.3. National debt 
Although limited national debt is a condition for entering the EMU199, the 
Stability Pact does not place a disciplinary-procedural connection between 
the budget norm and the debt ratio. Regardless of the volume of the national 
debt, all countries are allowed to have a budget deficit of 3 %. Nevertheless, 
this 3 %-rule is derived from the national debt norm. To limit the growth of 
the national debt and the resulting effect of interest payments on the public 
budget, the Pact has chosen for a stable debt ratio of 60 % with respect to 
the GDP. Since a stable debt ratio approximately equals the deficit ratio 
divided by the economic growth (Van Poeck, 1999), a debt ratio of 60 % 
with an (optimistic) growth of 5 % allows maximal a budgetary deficit of 3 
%. It follows that countries with a lower debt ratio have more space for 
temporarily budgetary deficits and that financial markets will offer them 
those incidental means because of their solvability. On the other hand, a 
similar deficit of a country with high debts will soon lead to interest 
snowball effects.  
 
Consequently, macro-financial principles shape the foundations of the 
budget norm of the Stability Pact. In principle, it is possible to determine for 
every single country the budget norm in function of the national debt. 
Consequently, the budget norm for countries with a high historical debt 
could be reduced to zero (or less). Although the system of TDR can also 
perfectly accommodate this, countries with high debts maintain the 
possibility of holding a temporarily budgetary deficit. 
 
The distribution of tradable permits can occur according to different 
scenarios: an equal or a historical distribution. Usually, an equal distribution 
has the least social-political resistance. Also the administration costs are low 
because, once the cap is set, there is no need to considerate other parameters 
such as national debt. Presumably, these are the reasons why the European 
politics will choose this distribution model.  
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199 The Treaty of Maastricht stipulates that the debt ratio should not exceed 60 % of GDP. 
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The distributive consequences of the different allocation scenarios are the 
same because of the tradability (Lyon, 1986). The rights will end up there 
where they yield the highest benefit. Therefore, the distribution scenarios 
are important mostly because of the legitimacy in the society and with 
policy makers. Because of the tradability of the deficit rights, countries with 
high debts still have some possibilities. Finally, distributing TDR based on 
national debt would enable the transition countries with a relative low debt 
ratio to have temporary higher deficits and invest in their public 
infrastructure.  
6.3.4. Demographic situation 
The Stability Pact also does not take into consideration the demographic 
situation and development of a country. However, this is important when 
setting the socio-economic and financial dependence coefficients200. The 
dependence ratio determines the ability of the government to fulfil their 
financial and social obligations. The Stability Pact only considers the 
sustainability of the actual national debt, not the future obligations. An 
example is the retirement payments of the ageing European societies. These 
retirement payments hypothecate the capability of the government to pay off 
their debts in the future. Therefore, it is argued to add the actualised value of 
the pension burdens to the national debt or to impose a lower debt ratio in 
function of the dependence coefficients. When distributing TDR, besides the 
actual national debt, it is also possible to consider the impact of the 
demographic developments on public finance. In principle, this is even 





Germany and France both exceed the deficit limit of the Maastricht Treaty 
for more than three years (2002-2004). Meanwhile, the European 
Commission challenged the refusal of the European Council to act upon the 
repeated failure to meet the deficit criterion before the European High Court 
(Bizer, Rahahleh and Sesselmeier, 2004). Moreover, Germany’s finance 
minister Hans Eichel indicated in 2003 that Germany would not be able to 
reach a balanced budget by 2006 (Fatás et al., 2003, p. 2). The main reason 
is that the local governments and states (Länder) question the constitutional 
status of the Pact, and they do not comply with the total allowed deficit 
spending. Furthermore, it was stated that the situation in Germany reflected 
a desperate attempt to redistribute the burden of transfers related to the 
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200 Socio-economic dependence coefficient = non-working population/ working population. 
Financial dependence coefficient = unemployment benefits/wages. Because of the ageing 
population in the European Union, these coefficients show an increasing trend.  
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German unification201 (Collignon, 2004). However, not only the transfers 
due to the unification have led to excessive deficits. Also the ageing of the 
population probably will lead to substantial pressures for increased public 
spending if no significant reforms are undertaken (von Hagen and Strauch, 
2001, p. 32).  
 
The implementation of a tradable deficit rights system can also be 
decentralized to lower level jurisdictions (regions, municipalities, etc.) as 
long as they have borrowing authority. National governments would then 
have to set a domestic procedure for re-allocating their national quota to 
lower level authorities (Collignon, 2004b). This solves one of the vexed 
problems of domestic stability pacts, which have been a major obstacle for 
meeting the Maastricht criteria in federalist states, such as in Germany.  
 
In the first paragraph, we will discuss the current Germany’s federal 
political structure. Then, we will analyze the fiscal relations in Germany and 
the spending and deficits of the Länder. Finally, we will design a tradable 
deficit permits system where local governments, next to the federal 
government, are allowed to borrow and trade permits.  
6.4.1. Germany’s federal political structure 
The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has a political system with a 
pronounced federalistic structure with three levels of government: federal, 
state (Länder) and local. Before German reunification, there were 11 Länder 
in the former West Germany; with German unity the number of the Länder 
increased to 16 (Seitz, 2000, p. 188). Three large German cities, namely, 
Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen, form their own states. These are the so-called 
“city-states” (Stadtstaaten) that do not have local administrative bodies. In 
contrast, the other German states are called “non-city-states” 
(Flächenländer).  
 
The Länder are not mere provinces but states endowed with their own 
powers. These powers and responsibilities are specified in the German 
constitution (Grundgesetz). The constitution also guarantees the local 
authorities the right to independently administer their own affairs. As the 
local authorities rely heavily on grants from the states, their independence is 
rather limited. There exists an important difference between the budgets of 
city-states and non-city-states. Budgets of city-states include expenditures 
and revenues that are part of the local budgets in non-city-states. Moreover, 
the expenditures of the non-city-states include grants to the local authorities 
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201 German unification implied the extension of West Germany’s social security and 
assistance institutions to East Germany and the inclusion of East Germany into the federal 
grant system. The full inclusion of the new Länder into the system led to an overall increase 
of transfers, particularly of unemployment related benefits (von Hagen and Strauch, 2001, 
p. 18-19).  
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whereas there are no such grants to local authorities in the city-states. 
Consequently, public expenditures or public debt of the two types of state 
are not directly comparable (Jochimsen and Nuscheler, 2003).  
 
The German federal fiscal system is based on budgetary autonomy of the 
different layers of government while simultaneously attaching a high 
importance to realizing broadly equal living conditions across the federation 
(Wurzel, 2003, p. 4). Because the German states manage their fiscal policy 
independently of the federal government, the promise of the German federal 
government, and especially the rigorous interpretation and sticking to the 
Maastricht rules by the German Federal Minister of Finance is rather hard to 
achieve if the states do not stay in line and follow a fiscal policy than runs 
counter to the Maastricht guidelines (Seitz, 2000, p. 185).  
6.4.2. Fiscal relations 
Although the Länder are endowed with extensive powers, an almost total 
lack of tax setting autonomy exists. According to Jochimsen and Nuscheler 
(2003), the situation in Germany therefore differs in one major aspect from 
the theoretical literature on the political economy of public expenditures. 
Namely, typically the government has two options for financing 
expenditures – taxes and debt. But, due to the lack of tax setting autonomy 
and the equalization scheme, the total revenue of every Land is more or less 
fixed. Consequently, to finance public expenditures, Länder governments 
only have one discretionary source of financing at their disposal, namely 
debt.  
 
Under the terms of the Stability and Growth Pact, Germany is obliged to 
observe a general government deficit limit and to accept sanctions including 
fines in the event of non-compliance. However, under present conditions, 
the Länder could run excessive deficits at the expense of the federal state 
which would have to bear the fines under EU regulation. Furthermore, there 
are several other reasons why the fiscal relations between the various levels 
of government are at the fore of the policy debate (Wurzel, 1999, p. 4). 
First, the integration of the new states is producing greater financial strains 
than anticipated. Secondly, the Stability and Growth pact at the European 
level has raised questions as to how the international commitments to fiscal 
consolidation can be efficiently and equitably allocated between different 
levels of government. Finally, there is the issue of whether an efficient 
public sector could be achieved through greater conformity with the 
constitutional principle of subsidiarity.  
 
In order to solve some of these issues, the German government has proposed 
to determine Maastricht deficit limits both vertically between the Bund and 
the Länder, and horizontally across the Länder. Such budget caps would 
only apply in the event of an excessive budget deficit as defined in the 
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Maastricht treaty. Other federalist countries in Europe, such as Austria, 
Spain and Switzerland, have also introduced rules to contain the deficits of 
the central and decentralized governments. However, it is an open question 
whether commitments will be held without enforcement mechanisms. In 
Austria, whose federalist structure resembles Germany’s in many respects, 
all three layers of government recently agreed on sanctions in case of a 
party’s non-compliance with negotiated budgetary targets (Wurzel, 2003, p. 
17). However, the issue of penalizing individual Länder stands in potential 
conflict to the principle of fiscal equalisations. 
6.4.3. Spending and deficits of the Länder 
The updated German Stability program of December 2003202 and the new 
fiscal planning aim, first, to reduce the deficit rate in order to meet the 
standards of the Stability Pact and, in a longer term, to achieve a close-to-
balanced budget. According to the current status of the fiscal planning, the 
deficit rates will decline in the medium term from -4% in 2003 to -1.5% in 
2007. In the following table, the deficits and GRP203 of the Länder are 
shown for 2001 to illustrate the current situation. 
 
Table 21: Deficit of the Länder (2001) 
Länder GRP Deficit 
(in % of GDP)(in million Euro)
Baden-Württemberg 301.663 0.79 
Bremen 22.448 1.66 
Bavaria 360.783 0.05 
Hamburg 73.570 1.36 
Hesse 188.055 0.71 
Lower Saxony 180.426 1.55 
Nord Rhine-Westphalia 458.078 1.42 
Rheinland-Palatine 91.042 1.36 
Schleswig-Holstein 64.505 1.02 
Saarland 24.780 0.08 
Berlin 76.189 6.43 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 29.168 2.30 
Saxony 74.241 0.17 
Thuringia 40.139 1.76 
Saxony-Anhalt 42.528 2.04 
Brandenburg 43.583 1.66 
Source: Jochimsen and Nuscheler (2003).  
                                                 
202 The federal government and the states agreed on new legislation, which specifies that all 
parties, including the communities, should aim at balanced budgets. Moreover, the inter-
governmental Financial Planning Council is attributed the tasks of making 
recommendations on how to accomplish or restore fiscal discipline and to monitor whether 
the authorities’ spending and budget balances evolve in line with the targets set and the 
requirements of the EU Stability Pact. However, violations will not be subject to sanctions 
(Wurzel, 2003, p. 17).    
 
203 Gross Regional Product. 
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The table clearly shows that in 2001, only Berlin exceeded the 3 % deficit 
rule. This is understandable, because, the deficit level of the whole 
federation in 2001 was below the 3 % level, namely -2,8 %. In 2002, 
Germany started violating the Stability Pact204. In the first appendix, we will 
illustrate the amount of deficit spending throughout the years, starting from 
1992 until 2001 for all Länder205. These results are summarized in the 
following figures. First, deficit spending in % of GDP of the West German 
Länder is illustrated for the period 1992-2001.  






























                                                 
204 However, it is very difficult to compare federal data with state level data. The federal 
debt is debt issued by the federal government and this is something completely different 
from the aggregate debt level issued by German states. Applying the 3 % deficit rule to a 
federal country like Germany is therefore not straightforward. Three governments, namely 
federal, Länder and communities, can issue debt. The data used in this analysis do not 
include debt by communities which can cause federal deficit level and aggregate Länder 
deficit level to differ. More recent data were unavailable.  
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205 For some Länder, the deficits for 1991 are unknown. Therefore, we start our analysis 






















































This figure shows that deficits of all Länder range between 0 and -2 % of 
the GDP, except for Berlin. However, deficit spending of some formerly 
West German Länder is increasing. Second, we take a look at the new 
Länder in East Germany. This figure shows that the East German Länder 
have already significantly reduced their deficit spending in the last 10 years.
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Referring to the current status of fiscal planning in Germany, it is predicted 
that the overall debt rate will temporarily rise in the medium run to 64.5% 
and will only decline towards the Maastricht reference figure of 60 % after 
2007. The following table shows the debt of the 16 Länder in % of GDP. It 
clearly demonstrates that, in 2003, only three (Western) Länder had reached 
the Maastricht criteria, namely Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg and Hesse. All 
other Länder exceeded the criteria. Moreover, Berlin has the largest debt in 
percentage of GDP.  
 
Table 22: Debt of the Länder in % of GDP (2003) 
Länder Debt in % of GDP
Baden-Württemberg 52.1 % 
Bremen 83.9 % 
Bavaria 48.2 % 
Hamburg 63.6 % 
Hesse 56.8 % 
Lower Saxony 66.5 % 
Nord Rhine-Westphalia 65.0 % 
Rheinland-Palatine 67.4 % 
Schleswig-Holstein 70.3 % 
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Saarland 69.1 % 
Berlin206 101.6 % 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 77.6 % 
Saxony 60.5 % 
Thuringia 76.8 % 
Saxony-Anhalt 83.8 % 
Brandenburg 78.6 % 
Source: Geldner, 2005 
 
Currently, the Federal and Länder governments are continuing their 
combined strategy of structural reforms and consolidation of the public-
sector budgets. They are thus taking account of both the short-term 
economic stabilization objectives and the medium-term and long-term 
targets of the Stability and Growth Pact. In the Ecofin Council 
recommendations (Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour, 2004), the 
following obligations were set out for Germany: Germany is to return below 
the 3% threshold in 2005, to undertake a structural deficit reduction of 0.6% 
in 2004 and of 0.5% in 2005, and thereafter to reduce 0.5% a year. These 
Ecofin recommendations are more difficult to attain for some Länder than 
for other. Therefore, in order to meet the different needs of the 16 Länder, a 
system of tradable deficit permits could be set up in Germany to reach the 
Council’s recommendations. The design of such a system will be discussed 
in the following paragraph.  
6.4.4. Tradable deficit permits in Germany 
6.4.4.1. Initial distribution 
Regarding the distribution of deficit rights between states and the federal 
government, some Länder may argue for a distribution in line with past 
deficits motivated by the perception that high deficits can not be turned 
around over night. However, distributing deficit allowances based on past 
deficits will not be welcomed by low deficit states, which believe that it 
implies a punishment for a policy of fiscal austerity in the past and adds to 
existing disincentives for economical usage of resources. For efficiency 
reasons, a distribution per capita is preferable because this implies that the 
deficits of the new Länder would have to fall significantly, given that the 
eastern states account for 21,5 % of the population and for 35% of the 
overall Länder deficit in 1997 (Wurzel, 1999, p. 19). However, distributing 
permits based on population can not be used for the federal government, 
which is also entitled to a certain amount of deficit spending. Alternatively, 
the allocation of deficit rights could be made based on both investment and 
population shares. To the extent that the average investment of the new 
Länder will level off with their catching up economically with the rest, the 
                                                 
 177 
206 Because of budgetary reasons as already mentioned, public debt of city-states are not 
directly comparable with those of non-city-states. 
two latter distribution methods should produce similar allocations of rights 
in the medium term.  
 
A more radical solution would be to auction deficit rights among the Länder 
and federal government. Assuming that deficit permits are acquired by those 
states which utilise above-average deficits for financing public investment, 
the auction principle should again produce deficit allocations which are 
similar to the population-based rule in the medium term. According to 
Wurzel (2003, p. 20), it is then preferable to implement the latter. However, 
a transitory period seems necessary in which past deficits are regarded. It 
remains an open question whether deficit restrictions which are auctionable 
would be perceived by the Länder to be as binding as fixed rules or whether 
the risk of overruns would increase. Also, auctions could effectively amount 
to transfers from the poor states to the rich states.   
6.4.4.2. Coordination 
With respect to public finance policy and deficit spending for the federation 
as a whole, a special institution, the Financial Planning Council207 
(Finanzplanungsrat), seeks to achieve consensus and cooperative behaviour 
between the German federal and state governments (Seitz, 2000, p. 185). 
This institution can also be used to set-up and administer a national tradable 
deficit permit system. The use of an existing institution is likely to keep 
transaction costs low. Furthermore, it will also ensure the quality, 
transparency, timeliness, and reliability of budgetary statistics. In a 
signalling system, federal government and Länder are kept up to date of the 
data used and the status of the deficit spending. Such a system would make 
sense since the federal government and Länder need to be wholly convinced 
of the quality of the analysis (and of the data used) behind the surveillance 
and coordination. In that case, the Financial Planning Council states very 
clear and transparent thresholds that allow it to flag an emerging problem of 
permit shortage and to assess its severity. Once it is established that a deficit 
is excessive, the enforcement mechanisms should commence.    
6.4.4.3. Monitoring and enforcement 
For the implementation of tradable deficit permits in Germany, the technical 
ability of the governments and the Financial Planning Council to monitor 
and control the evolution of the budgets is of high importance. As already 
mentioned, efficient and timely controlling of deficit spending of all layers 
of government requires that identical and appropriate accounting standards 
be utilised.  
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207 The Financial Planning Council, which operates since 1968, is composed of the federal 
finance minister, the federal minister for economic affairs and the finance ministers of the 
16 Länder, as well as representatives of the local governments. The Deutsche Bundesbank 
has also the right to participate at the sessions of the Financial Planning Council.  
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Non-compliance should trigger sanctions. One option is to impose fines. 
These fines should be high enough to induce compliance behaviour but 
without aggravating the problem ex-post that is to be prevented ex-ante. 
Another option, in case of non-compliance, is to suspend certain rights of 
the Länder or the federal government. For example the right to 
independently administer some affairs or the right to receive permits the 
next year. Another possibility to ensure the enforceability of the budget 
rules is to strengthen the disciplinary power of treasury ministers so they 
can sanction non-compliance with the deficit permit system. It is also 
possible to create a neutral body with the power to assess and sanction the 
budgetary and permit behaviour of Länder and federal governments.  
 
It can be expected that these proposals, notably the plan to strengthen the 
disciplinary power of treasury ministers or the creation of a technocratic 
body with the power to sanction democratically elected parliaments, will 
meet fierce political resistance. However, it is our belief that the private 
market, namely a neutral body, to play a more active role in limiting 
government borrowing and sanctioning non-compliance does have merit. 
Furthermore, enforcement measures are necessary since the EU peer-
pressure mechanism has failed in fiscal policy208. Holding governments 
accountable will limit the options for deficit spending to improve 
government finances.  
 
6.5. Transaction costs 
 
Given the objective of imposing fiscal discipline on the countries of the 
European Monetary Union, what is the most efficient way of doing so? In a 
market for deficit permits, all Member States will act to equalize their 
marginal costs of deficit reduction, achieving the 3% target at minimum 
total cost. Consequently, a system of tradable deficit permits would allocate 
deficits where their value is highest. Even so, do tradable permits not entail 
higher transaction costs than regulation? We will look into this question by 
analyzing all relevant transaction costs of the Stability Pact and tradable 
deficit permits.  
6.5.1. Determination of relevant transaction cost categories 
The following categories will be discussed in the comparative transaction 
costs analysis: 
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208 More specifically, the mechanism has collapsed since Germany and France, which both 
have exceeded the deficit limit from more than three years, are not penalized. Moreover, the 
refusal of the European Council to act upon the repeated failure is challenged by the 
European Commission before the European High Court.  
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− Legislative costs which includes lobbying, political support and legal 
barriers209 costs; 
− Costs of delay (in policy implementation or execution); 
− Information costs about fiscal deficits and the behavior of Member 
States; 
− Search (planning) costs for the appropriate design of the system; 
− Operational costs; 
− Negotiation costs between Member States or between the ECB or 
Ecofin Council and the Member States; 
− Contract costs; 
− Monitoring and enforcement costs; and 
− Compliance costs. 
6.5.2. Regulation: The Stability and Growth Pact 
The essence of the Stability and Growth Pact is to watch the fiscal deficit of 
each Member State closely and punish those countries whose deficits are 
deemed excessive. Though important, the other aspects of the Pact are not 
essential for our analysis.   
6.5.2.1. Legislative costs 
Schuknecht (2004) has identified a number of reasons why deficit and debt 
biases are likely to emanate from the democratic political process. Voters 
and economic agents in democracies are represented by politicians who 
themselves are aided by administrations. The resulting institutional setup 
differs significantly across countries but invariously gives rise to several 
problems. For example, rational (but imperfectly informed) voters can 
induce politicians to conduct expansionary policies before elections. 
Distributional conflicts across interest groups or generations can also give 
rise to deficit and debt biases. Public debt can be a means of distributing 
money from tomorrow’s rich (taxpayers) to today’s poor (benefit 
recipients). Spending biases and inefficiencies can also be reinforced by 
self-interested bureaucrats who, through various mechanisms, are able to 
secure budget allocations (expenditures) that are higher than economically 
efficient. The spillovers that could arise from these unduly expansionary 
fiscal policies in monetary union are an argument in favour of fiscal rules 
(such as the Stability and Growth Pact).  
 
As described by Kirkpatrick and Parker (2004, p. 12), regulatory regimes 
are prone to capture. ‘Regulatory capture’ involves the regulatory process of 
becoming biased in favour of particular interest groups and notably the 
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209 Legal barrier costs are the costs of embedding a certain policy in the (existing) legal 
framework. 
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regulated entities. Regulation is also subject to ‘political’ capture meaning 
that regulatory goals are distorted to pursue political ends. This is most 
likely to arise when the regulation is directly under the control of the 
government. Under political capture, regulation becomes a tool of self-
interest within government or the ruling elite.  
 
There are several vested interests in the design of regulation. Politicians 
may prefer complex rules when this opens room for interpretation and 
discretion and renders a strict implementation more difficult. The 
administrating agency (the Commission) may also not be immune to the fact 
that via complex regulation it can gain more influence on the process and 
receive higher budgetary appropriations. By contrast, financial markets and 
even more so the public will have an interest in rather simple and clear rules 
due to compliance costs without ignoring economic rationale.  
 
With regard to enforcement, the Commission will want strong provisions. In 
contrast, politicians will not want to strengthen fiscal rules unless they 
receive strong signals from the public and financial markets. The 
Commission may also have a preference as to enforcement via a centralized 
approach. If they can take this role, they will be more than simply an 
assessment agency and secretariat for fiscal contracts between European 
countries.  
 
Regulation is a frequently used mechanism with little legal barrier costs. 
More specifically, the Stability Pact (EC Treaty) needed to be ratified by the 
Member States to be legally valid. No other specifications or procedures 
were necessary. Consequently, legal barrier costs of regulation, more 
specifically the Stability Pact, are negligible.   
 
In conclusion, lobbying costs will be substantial, not only in the 
implementation phase but also in the enforcement phase. Politicians are in 
favour of complex regulation with no enforcement which increases 
transaction costs. Bureaucrats prefer regulation with centralized 
enforcement which will increase their budgets or influence. Legal barrier 
costs are negligible because regulation is a well-known and often used 
mechanism which requires no or few adjustments in national legislation.  
6.5.2.2. Delay costs 
The excessive deficit procedure of the Stability Pact creates costs to the 
citizens of the countries with an excessive deficit but also to the citizens of 
all other Euro-zone countries because of the increased interest rate. The 
relative sanctions arrive too late, if at all. Moreover, the procedure is not 
sufficiently clear since Member States do not know how they will be treated 
when they breach the 3% threshold.  
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Verde (2004, p. 17) states that the flexibility provided by the Pact is of an 
ex-post nature and as such, reduces the incentives for countries to 
implement fiscal reforms, encourages moral hazard behaviour210 and 
reduces credibility. Verde continues by stating that this ex-post nature is 
unlikely to induce simple procedures and consequently, very unlikely to 
prevent crises. However, it is not the ex-post nature that creates crises. For 
example, also traffic safety is of an ex-post nature. The accident costs are 
only distributed between parties after the accident has occurred. However, 
there is an incentive for road users to drive safely before the accident. The 
same is valid for the current Stability Pact. Countries do have an incentive 
to limit their deficit spending but the distribution of the costs of a violation 
of the Pact only occurs after the excessive deficit spending has occurred. 
The delay costs stem from the lengthy procedure as shown in the following 
timetable. 
 
Table 23: Timetable of the steps in the excessive deficit procedure 
 Year N Year N+1 and 
thereafter 
March Member states of the EU submit data211 - 
Commission prepares report 
Member States 
submit data211 
April Economic and Financial Committee 
formulates opinion – European Commission 
prepares opinion 
Ecofin decides to 
abrogate or intensify 
sanctions 
May Ecofin decides on excessive deficit and 
issues recommendations 
 
September Ecofin assesses ‘effective sanctions’ and 
may decide to punish recommendations – 
Member states submit data211 
Member States 
submit data211 
October Ecofin gives notice of specific measures  
December Ecofin decides to apply sanctions  
Source: Buti, Franco and Ongena, 1998, p. 96 
 
Speeding up this procedure and predetermining procedural rules is 
indispensable to reduce delay costs. At the moment, in order to avoid 
sanctions, the Member State concerned should bring back its deficit below 
the reference year two years after the occurrence of an excessive deficit and 
one year after its identification, unless special circumstances are given. The 
example of the excessive deficit procedure of Germany and France clearly 
demonstrates the high delay costs. Since 2002, France and Germany’s 
deficits have been above the 3% of GDP Treaty reference value. This led to 
                                                 
210 Moral hazard behaviour is encouraged because the Ecofin Council’s refusal to impose 
sanctions on Germany and France, suffering excessive deficits, encourages other countries 
to more deficit spending in the future. 
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211 According to Council Regulation (EC/3605/93), Member States must submit budgetary 
data twice a year: first until March, 1 at the latest, afterwards until September, 1 at the 
latest. 
an excessive deficit procedure under the Stability and Growth Pact for both 
countries. The commission requested Germany to reduce its structural 
deficit by 0.8% of the GDP, and France by 0.4%. However, the Ecofin 
Council voted in November 2003 against proceeding with these sanctions 
without genuine economic reasons. On January 13, 2004, the European 
Commission announced its decision to challenge in the European Court of 
Justice the legal status and validity of certain elements of the Council 
conclusions adopted by Ecofin relating to the excessive deficit procedure for 
France and Germany (HM Treasury, 2004, p. 40). In other words, the 
procedures of the Pact have never been fully applied. Concluding, delay 
costs are substantial because of the lengthy excessive deficit procedure and 
its stipulations. 
6.5.2.3. Information costs 
The problem with rules and regulation is that they often reflect the 
economic and intellectual environment of the time when they were 
designed. Furthermore, regulation is often associated with information 
asymmetries. The regulator and the regulated can be expected to have 
different levels of information about matters such as costs, revenues and 
demand. The regulated Member States hold the information that the 
regulator needs to regulate optimally and the regulator must establish rules 
and incentive mechanisms to force and coax this information from the 
Member States. Since it is highly unlikely that the regulator will receive all 
the information required, the results of regulation remain ‘second best’ to 
those of a competitive market (Kirkpatrick and Parker, 2004, p. 11). 
However, even when they have been intelligently conceived, the life 
expectancy of regulatory rules is limited meaning that they have to be 
changed from time to time. The more rigid and the more context rooted they 
are, the more frequently they will have to be redesigned and, of course, the 
less credible they will be. The Stability Pact was designed assuming that 
governments would accumulate surpluses in good times to allow the 
operation of automatic stabilizers in bad times. However, the Pact was 
signed at the end of a long phase of convergence to the Maastricht criteria, 
which involved procyclical fiscal policies during at least the years 1995-97. 
Its implementation started at a time when public deficits were rapidly 
vanishing reinforcing the belief that a situation of balanced budget would be 
easy to reach. The requirement of a balanced or surplus budget was thus 
context dependent. Since the end of the US expansion of the 1990s, the Euro 
area economy has experienced a combination of depressed growth and 
(procyclical) restrictive fiscal policy. The three largest countries, namely 
Germany, France and Italy, did not have room for automatic stabilizers to 
effect, so that fiscal policy was ineffective even facing transitory shocks. 
This situation is simply unbearable and is resulting in increasing pressure to 
revise or soften the Pact (Fitoussi, 2002).  
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The current three percent rule of the Stability and Growth Pact is not 
cyclically adjusted. Therefore, it interferes with the operation of the national 
automatic fiscal stabilizers when the three percent rule is in danger of being 
breached by a cyclically appropriate deficit increase. Buiter (2003) suggests 
that this risk can be avoided by targeting a cyclically adjusted deficit that is 
sufficiently far below three percent of GDP. Furthermore, the numerical 
constraints on deficits and debt of the Stability and Growth Pact are ‘one 
size fits all’. However, there are sizeable and persistent differences among 
the growth rates of the current EMU members. Another important source of 
heterogeneity relates to initial conditions, especially the outstanding stock of 
public infrastructure capital and debt. The current rules pay no attention to 
amount of outstanding debt in relation to the deficit rule212. The three 
percent deficit rule applies equally to Belgium, Italy and Greece as to 
Luxembourg, Finland and Sweden. Yet, at the end of 2001, gross general 
government debt as a percentage of annual GDP was 108.2 for Belgium, 
108.7 for Italy and 99.7 for Greece, while Luxembourg’s scored 5.5 %, 
Finland 43.6 % and Sweden 52.9 % (Buiter, 2003)213. A three percent rule 
for all Member States does not handle these differences. Consequently, for 
an efficient rule, which takes into account all the differences between the 
Member States, information costs will be much higher.  
 
In general, information costs are higher in an international context than at 
the domestic level. In case of efficient regulation, more market players and 
more differences between market players increase information costs. 
However, a ‘one size fits all’ rule as used in the current Pact substantially 
decreases information costs.  
6.5.2.4. Search (planning) costs 
The Maastricht Treaty has defined the sustainable debt level to be 60 % of 
GDP. The corresponding budget deficit consistent with this target debt ratio 
was put at 3 % of GDP. It is well known that the 3 % deficit norm will 
indeed ensure that the 60 % debt ratio can be kept constant provided the 
nominal growth of GDP is 5 %214. It has been noted by many economists 
that these numbers are quite arbitrary (Buiter, Corsetti and Roubini, 1993). 
The debt ratio happens to be close to its average for the EC in 1991 (61.7%), 
the deficit ratio is below the 1991 EC average of 4.3%. There is no reason to 
believe that current EU averages are optimal for the EU as a whole, let alone 
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212 Although limited national debt is a condition for entering the EMU, the Stability Pact 
does not place a disciplinary-procedural connection between the budget norm and the debt 
ratio. Regardless of the volume of the national debt, all countries are allowed to have a 
budget deficit of 3 %.  
213 Net general government debt as a percentage of GDP at the end of 2001 was as follows: 
Belgium: 98.9; Italy: 96.5; Finland: -47.9 and Sweden: 1.0 (Source: OECD).  
214 This follows from the steady state relationship between deficit and debt ratios for given 
nominal growth rate of GDP, i.e. d = b y, where d = deficit as percentage of GDP, b = the 
debt as percentage of GDP and y = nominal growth rate of GDP.  
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for each of the individual Member States which differ in economic structure 
and initial conditions. Consequently, Buiter, Corsetti and Roubini (1993) 
question the economic logic behind the choice of 3% for the deficit-GDP 
ratio. They state that the Maastricht guidelines are too tight, unless EMU 
really does achieve zero inflation and public sector investment does not rise 
above 3% of GDP (p. 63).  
 
To conclude, there exists a trade-off between search and planning costs on 
the one hand, and the efficacy of the regulation on the other. With regard to 
the Stability pact, search costs were rather low. However, the efficacy of the 
Stability Pact is also often questioned. Furthermore, the lack of 
differentiation between the Member States adds to this critique.  
6.5.2.5. Set-up costs 
With the rise of the European Union, institutions have been set up to 
administer all relevant aspects. The set-up of the Stability Pact, and more 
specifically the excess deficit procedure, was incorporated into these 
existing institutions. The European Commission has the task of monitoring 
budgetary developments and the stock of public sector debt of the Member 
States, checking in particular their compliance with two reference values for 
the ratio of the deficit to GDP and the ratio of public debt to GDP. If a 
Member State does not comply with these reference values215, the 
Commission prepares a report for the European Council. Furthermore, the 
Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) advises the Council in these 
matters. If the Commission believes that an excessive deficit exists, it sends 
its opinion to Ecofin and makes a recommendation for the Council to decide 
that a deficit is genuinely excessive. Voting on these recommendations, it is 
the Ecofin Council that decides whether or not an excessive deficit exists. 
Concluding, set-up costs will be relatively low because tasks and 
responsibilities are taken up by existing institutions.  
6.5.2.6. Operational costs 
Low set-up costs do not necessarily imply negligible operational costs. The 
costs of directly administrating the regulatory system are internalized within 
government and reflected in the budget appropriations of the regulatory 
body or bodies. The Stability Pact requires several tasks, such as monitoring 
budgetary developments and debts, checking their compliance, preparing 
reports and formulating recommendations. These costs are certainly not 
negligible because of the complexity of the procedure.  
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215 This is unless the deficit and the debt are approaching their reference values in a 
satisfactory way and unless the excess of the deficit over the limit is exceptional and 
temporary.  
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6.5.2.7. Negotiation costs 
At the origin of the Stability Pact lies a lot of negotiation efforts. The 
requirement of achieving and maintaining fiscal discipline to join the single 
currency is at the core of the Maastricht Treaty. A proposal for a ‘Stability 
Pact for Europe’ was put forward by the German Finance Minister, Theo 
Waigel, in November 1995. Negotiations on the pact were conducted during 
1996 and the first half of 1997. The politically difficult issue of the 
‘exceptional’ conditions under which a breach of the 3% threshold is 
allowed, was settled at the European Council in Dublin in December 1996. 
The final package was adopted by the European Council in Amsterdam in 
June 1997. Further specifications concerning the implementation of the Pact 
at the start of EMU were given in the formal declaration adopted by the 
Ecofin Council during the ‘EMU weekend’ in the beginning of May 1998 
(Buti, Franco and Ongena, 1998). In general, coordination between Member 
States always generates negotiation costs, incentives to cheat, and possible 
conflict in the delegation of authority (Jacquet and Pisani-Ferry, 2001, p. 6). 
In the case of the Stability Pact, these negotiation costs were substantial 
because of the lengthy deliberations that took place.  
 
Renegotiation costs should also be taken into account when regulating 
Member States. Furthermore, when a small number of players are 
contracted, strategic opportunism can be the result. This occurs when one of 
the contracting parties renegotiates the terms of the contract in their favour 
during its lifetime. During contract negotiation, either the Member State or 
the regulating authority could be the loser, depending on the results of the 
renegotiation.  
6.5.2.8. Contract costs 
No costs are incurred as a result of contracting over regulation and more 
specifically the Stability Pact.  
6.5.2.9. Monitoring and enforcement costs 
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First, ex-post monitoring of compliance is indispensable. The surveillance 
process required under EU law provides for such ex post monitoring and the 
fiscal thresholds (also called reference values) are formulated relative to ex-
post outcomes. Second, there must be a means to sanction inappropriate 
compliance/performance. The EU fiscal framework is based on EU law 
which means that fiscal rules are applied in an international law context. 
Furthermore, neither the Treaty nor the Stability and Growth Pact foresee 
that sanctions can be imposed automatically216. This has some important 
implications for enforceability (Schuknecht, 2004, p. 12): 
 
216 The Commission argued that the automatic working of sanctions is impossible because 
the Treaty provides scope for the Community institutions to exercise discretionary 
judgment, and this can not be taken away by either secondary legislation or a new 
international treaty.  
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1. The Ecofin Council, comprising the Member States’ finance ministers, 
takes all relevant decisions. This implies that the decision making 
body is not independent and impartial but partisan with all parties, 
some creating spillovers and others paying for it; 
2. Fiscal rules are not litigable so that nobody can go to court if the 
Ecofin Council does not punish a non-complier; and  
3. There is no army or policy that can force governments to comply and, 
thereby, give up their fiscal sovereignty.  
 
Schuknecht (2004, p. 13) proposes self-enforceable contracts to limit 
monitoring and enforcement costs, meaning that the incentives of 
participants are set in a manner that it pays to comply. This can be a solution 
to an international contracting problem without a proper (non-partisan) court 
or enforcer. One way to achieve self enforceable contracts is repeated games 
with sufficiently large profits from behaving cooperatively so that they 
exceed the gains from opportunism/non-cooperation in net present value 
terms (Mueller, 1997). If a contracting party does not co-operate, the other 
parties would not continue the contractual arrangement. However, the EU 
fiscal policy is more complicated than that. Governments can not simply 
enforce another country’s exit as a result of deficits that are more likely to 
rise beyond some arbitrary maximum. However, governments would be 
well aware of the potential long run costs of breaching the contract because 
it would put their own economic and financial stability, if not of the whole 
EMU, at risk.  
 
Zsolt de Sousa (2004) suggests the creation of a different sanction 
mechanism. This suggestion recognises that cooperation between Member 
States does require some form of enforcement but argues that the existence 
of financial sanctions is counter-productive, since it is not credible. 
Consequently, a softer sanction could be created, for example, the 
imposition of a progressive fine that would take the form of a percentage of 
GDP that Member States would have to pay on top of their debt service. 
Zsolt de Sousa (2004, p. 27) argues that this enforcement system will make 
sanctions more credible, as they would be more easily applied by 
comparison to the currently existent sanctions that require a non interest 
bearing deposit by the sanctioned Member State. However, softer sanctions 
might provide an incentive for misconduct as countries know the price they 
will have to pay for not respecting the rules. As described in the third 
chapter, sanctions need to be strong if they are to be effective in their 
deterrence role. By having softer sanctions, misbehaviour is not prevented 
from taking place, but, on the contrary, there is a risk of inciting it, since 
Member States would know that the fine they would incur would be 
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minimal, especially when compared to the possible gains from taking 
measures that would imply a deficit rising above the limit217.  
 
Another development is the introduction of the open method of coordination 
(OMC) as part of the Lisbon European Council218. The emphasis is on 
consensus-forming with three elements found in each process: common 
assessment of the economic situation, agreement on the appropriate 
economic policy responses and acceptance of peer pressure and, where 
necessary, adjustment of the policies being pursued (Hodson and Maher, 
2001, p. 723). The method has been applied to macro-economic policy, the 
employment chapter of the treaty, social policy and structural policy. The 
objective of the OMC is ‘not to establish a single common framework, but 
rather to share experiences and encourage the spread of best practice’ 
through the setting of guidelines, the establishment of performance 
indicators, the translation of targets from European to national and regional 
levels, and periodic monitoring, peer review and evaluation (Kassim and 
Menon, 2004, p. 13). Disadvantageous is that this soft coordination method 
of economic policies is not supported by any sanction but relies on the 
commitment of states and peer pressure.  
 
In general, monitoring costs rise when rules become more complex. 
Furthermore, complex rules reduce pressure on policy makers to comply 
because compliance becomes less clear and transparent for the public. In 
addition, complex rules are more prone to disagreement, which undermines 
enforcement and compliance in the political sphere (Schuknecht, 2004, p. 
19). The following figure illustrates in a simplified manner the optimality of 
fiscal rules in different contexts of enforceability. “Soft law”219 reduces 
monitoring and enforcement costs by resulting in secondary regulation and 
processes that facilitate transparency and create a forum to exercise 
international peer pressure. At the same time, when sovereignty costs are 
high, meaning that special interests and electorates must be pleased and hard 
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217 For example, a Member State decides to lower taxes one year before elections. The 
impact of that tax decline, without the corresponding cut in spending, would initially be a 
rise in the deficit. A government that wishes to be reelected could prefer incurring a penalty 
rather than losing the elections, especially if the penalty is soft. As described by Zsolt de 
Sousa (2004, p. 27), the political cost of not abiding by the rules is high for the government. 
However, the type of sanction is directly linked to the political cost. Politically the cost of 
not respecting a rule gets higher when the financial cost of not respecting that rule is also 
higher.  
218 The OMC draws its inspiration from earlier Council meetings at Luxembourg, Cardiff 
and Cologne, where a series of supply-sided policy initiatives were set up.  
219 Schuknecht (2004) defines “soft law” as law of which formal enforcement is limited. 
Because it is often argued that the EU fiscal rules are unenforceable, ineffective and dead, 
the term “soft law” is used in the political science and international relations literature as 
the middle between the hard law and no law enforcement. Schuknecht has also identified a 
number of advantages of soft law over “no law” especially in the international context so 
that at least some contract compliance and internalization of spillovers can be attained.  
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law is impossible to attain, soft law might imply that the rules can be bent to 
some extent to reduce political costs at home (Schuknecht, 2004, p. 14).  
Furthermore, when rules are not enforceable (‘soft law’), they must be very 
simple so that monitoring institutions with high transaction costs can put 
pressure on policy makers. At the other end of the spectrum, well-enforced 
law may require complex rules to enhance their acceptance.  
 









Source: Based on Schuknecht, 2004, p. 33. 
 
Although the 3% deficit limit is a simple and transparent indicator, the 
Stability and Growth Pact will induce high monitoring and enforcement 
costs. Firstly, sanctions are not automatic but can only be executed after a 
long process of negotiations among EMU Members. The different voting 
weights in the EU Council of Ministers are an advantage for larger countries 
because they have more power to stop an excessive deficit procedure. For 
example, in 2003, the Ecofin Council has rejected a Commission request to 
take further procedural steps against France and Germany under the 
excessive deficit procedure. Or, in other words, the rules were not 
implemented in a strict manner. It can also be assumed that the probability 
of being sanctioned depends inversely on the number of countries that 
breach the Stability Pact rules. According to Begg et al. (2004, p. 1029), it is 
hard to imagine that Member States on the verge of breaking the deficit 
criterion sometime in the not so distant future will take a tough stance with 
regard to those countries that already have an excessive deficit. Secondly, if 
an excessive deficit is decided to be sanctioned, the penalty deposit of a 
Member State will have to be calculated according to the following formula: 
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Deposit in percent of GDP = 0.2 + 0.1 * (deficit – 3% GDP)   (10) 
 
which consists of a fixed amount of 0.2 % of GDP220 and a variable 
component of 0.1 % of the difference between the actual budget deficit and 
the 3 % reference value221. This deposit will only be reimbursed if the 
Council considers that the excessive deficit has been corrected within two 
years. The pecuniary cost of such a sanction is the interest foregone. If the 
excessive deficit is not corrected after two years, the deposit is turned into a 
fine and the Council intensifies the sanctions through the requirement of a 
new non-interest-bearing deposit which only consists of the variable 
component of the above formula (Blyumental, 2004, p. 11).  
 
Concluding, monitoring and enforcement costs will be high because of the 
complicated mechanisms of sanctions, the limited enforceability and the 
non-transparent negotiation process.  
6.5.2.10. Compliance costs 
The compliance costs of regulation are external to the regulatory agency and 
fall on Member States in terms of the economic costs of conforming with 
the regulations or of avoiding and evading them. For rules to be credible and 
compliance costs to be low, one of two conditions must be met. Either the 
rules are self-enforcing, or they are enforced consistently by an external 
agent (Buiter, 2003).  
 
First, for rules to be self-enforcing, they either must be individually 
incentive-compatible because they make sense at the level of the individual 
nation state or they must take on ‘totemic’ or ‘sacral’ qualities (Buiter, 
2003). The Stability and Growth Pact three percent rule is not self-enforcing 
by being individually incentive-compatible. The number 3 is arbitrary, and 
those who propose and defend the three percent deficit ceiling readily admit 
that they would have been happy with any number, as long as it was low. As 
regards any totemic or sacral qualities for fiscal rules, there is little prospect 
of that nowadays.  
 
Second, the rules are also not consistently enforced. The arbitrariness left in 
the criteria of the Stability Pact creates uncertainty about the application of 
the penalties and generates difficult negotiations with individual countries 
which negatively affect compliance. Especially when economic conditions 
are tough, but not bad enough to qualify for exceptions automatically, the 
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220 The fixed amount demonstrates that there is a tangible difference between having and 
not having an excessive deficit position, and thus, provides an incentive to Member States 
to make additional efforts to avoid the risk of sanctions.  
221 The variable component is designed to penalise further budgetary misbehaviour in a 
continuous fashion.  
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incentive to violate the deficit limit and then negotiate will be high (Casella, 
1999). Moreover, in the current version of the Stability Pact, penalties for 
countries violating their deficit ceiling are not automatic, and it is hard to 
escape the impression that compliance with the Pact may not be enforced. In 
general, the aggregate cost of compliance is minimized when marginal costs 
are equal across sources. However, in the Stability Pact, these marginal 
costs are not equalized thus inducing high compliance costs.  
6.5.2.11. Conclusion 
From this analysis, two main conclusions can be drawn. First, an important 
characteristic of the Stability and Growth Pact is its simplicity. On the one 
hand, fiscal rules need to be sufficiently sophisticated to find political 
support. On the other hand, simplicity and clarity decrease public support 
and financial market monitoring costs. Furthermore, the scope for discretion 
and disagreement amongst policy makers undermines their enforceability 
and credibility. In case of the Stability Pact, enforcement is weak however 
inducing high enforcement costs. Sanctions are not automatic and not 
implemented in a strict manner.  
 
Secondly, although set-up costs are relatively low because responsibilities 
are taken up by existing institutions, operational costs are substantial. The 
Stability Pact requires several complex tasks, such as monitoring deficits, 
checking compliance and making reports and recommendations in case of 
excessive deficit which, in turn, are likely to induce substantial delay costs.  
6.5.3. Tradable deficit rights 
A market for tradable deficit rights can be an efficient mechanism for the 
implementation of fiscal constraints in the European Monetary Union. 
Along with well-known advantages of a market-based approach – 
flexibility, lower aggregate compliance costs and incentive for above 
minimum fiscal behavior – we will analyze whether TDR also entail lower 
transaction costs than the regulation approach of the Stability Pact.  
6.5.3.1. Legislative costs 
Tradable deficit permits must be acceptable to two types of agents, the ECB 
and the national governments. The governments will agree if they gain more 
freedom of choice regarding their fiscal policies. The ECB will agree if 
tradable deficit permits do not have expansionary effects on monetary 
targets. If these conditions are fulfilled, lobbying costs can be kept low 
(Bizer, Rahahleh and Sesselmeier, 2004).  
 
Furthermore, elections matter when choosing a certain fiscal policy. In 
essence, the predictions of the theoretical literature on fiscal behaviour in 
relation to elections can be summarized as follows (Buti and van den Noord, 
2004, p. 27):  
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1. Opportunistic behaviour implies fiscal policy manipulations before the 
elections; 
2. Uncertainty about the electoral outcome and the degree of polarisation 
induce governments to undertake short-sighted policies; 
3. Most models predict tax cuts before elections while the implications 
for spending is less clear-cut; and 
4. Electoral rules shape fiscal behaviour. 
 
The results of Buti and van den Noord (2004) can be interpreted as follows: 
in election off-years governments may want to build up a “war chest” which 
shows up as tight fiscal policy, and then go into the election year with a 
subsequent easing of fiscal policy. Furthermore, results show that deviations 
from the target (3% rule) appear larger and more systematic in election 
years. Consequently, governments are expected to be in favour of TDR 
because it offers them a larger margin in fiscal policy in election years.  
 
Controversies about the Stability Pact began as soon as it was agreed upon, 
and they have not ended (Coeuré and Pisani-Ferry, 2003, p. 4). There exists 
no disagreement on the need for fiscal discipline in a monetary union. It is 
generally recognised that the Pact has helped containing the rise of deficits 
so typical for the preceding decade. The question is thus not whether there is 
a need for a Stability Pact, but whether the design of the current Pact 
provides the appropriate incentives for national governments and achieves 
the right mix between short-term flexibility and long-term constraint. A 
growing literature is developing on how to change the Stability and Growth 
Pact. Proposals have come first from academia, but increasingly also from 
official sides (e.g. Commission and Member States). The points-of-view can 
be classified into the four following categories (Coeuré and Pisani-Ferry, 
2003, p. 7-8): 
1. Those who recognise the imperfections of the Pact but attribute the 
current problems to the lack of efforts made by Member Countries. 
Because of the transaction costs of a new system, they favour a status-
quo. These interest groups are expected to lobby in favour of the 
Stability Pact. 
2. Those with a deep scepticism towards the effectiveness of peer 
pressure want to depoliticise the Pact by moving away from the rules-
based system towards institution-based discipline. Those groups are 
likely to lobby in favour of a tradable deficit rights system.  
3. Those who want to keep the general framework of a rules-based 
arrangement but find the current surveillance based on deficits 
economically irrelevant. They favour a system more related to the 
level of debts, or, more generally, to the sustainability of public 
finances. They are expected to lobby in favour of TDR which are 
linked to public debt. 
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4. Those who want to keep the rules of the current Stability Pact but 
soften the interpretation while avoiding the transaction costs of 
changing the legal framework. These interest groups are expected to 
lobby in favour of the Stability Pact. 
 
Among the different Member States, only France, Germany, Greece and 
The Netherlands are exceeding the 3% deficit spending rule. Consequently, 
they have lobbied hard to get more flexibility into the Stability Pact and are 
expected to prefer a tradable deficit rights system above the current 
regulation. Smaller countries such as Austria and Luxemburg have been 
pushing to uphold the principles of fiscal discipline and can be expected to 
prefer the current regime. However, in the case of TDR, fiscal discipline in 
the Eurozone is also kept but more flexibility is granted at the individual 
Member States.  
 
Opponents of TDR will argue that if countries keep a balanced budget over 
the business cycle, they will have enough flexibility during a recession 
allowing them to let the budget deficit increase up to 3%. According to 
them, this should be sufficient for most countries to follow an anti-cyclical 
budgetary policy during most recessions (De Grauwe, 2003).  
Woerdman (2002, p. 97) states that legislative costs will be lowered when 
societal actors representing vested interests reduce or cease their lobbying 
efforts in defence of the dominant institution. More specifically, interest 
groups will put less time and money in lobbying if they can be convinced 
that they will loose the battle and that the adoption and implementation of 
the new instrument, namely tradable deficit permits, is inevitable. The 
extent to which this belief can be fed also depends on the presence, number, 
stake and lobbying efforts of actors representing new interests that plead for 
deficit permits.  
 
According to North (1990), institutions shape human interaction by means 
of formal constraints, such as legal rules, and informational constraints, such 
as cultural values. Woerdman (2002) has analyzed whether legal barriers, 
that are unique for permit trading, could hinder its implementation, add to 
the legislative costs of this instrument and contribute to the institutional 
lock-in situation222. He states that although all permit allocation options 
have similar efficiency consequences; permit allocation is the most 
important political barrier to implementing permit trading.  However, in 
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222 Lock-in theory originally stems from the (economic) literature on technological change. 
Whereas the traditional models in this particular field of science predict that an optimal 
design will win, lock-in theorists identify path-dependent developments and positive 
feedbacks to explain why in practice often a sub-optimal technology is implemented and 
used for some period (Woerdman, 2002, p. 62). North (1990) came up with the idea to 
apply the lock-in concept to explain (a lack of) institutional change. In general, a lock-in 
can be defined as the dominance of a sub-optimal situation in the presence of a superior 
alternative. Optimality is defined in terms of efficiency and/or effectiveness.  
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case of TDR, the legal barrier costs will be kept low. The reason is that 
tradable deficit rights will be implemented on a European scale and the 
decision will be made by the European Commission itself. Consequently, 
trading deficit rights will not be seen as state aid following EC Article 87 
because all Member States will participate and hence will not receive an 
advantage that can possibly distort competition223. Tradable deficit permits 
can thus be declared compatible with existing law224. 
 
In conclusion, lobbying costs of opponents of a balanced budget policy will 
be high. Legal barriers costs will be minimal because TDR are implemented 
for all Member States, which will neutralise the danger of violating EC 
Article 87 on state aid.  
6.5.3.2. Delay costs 
In the setting of TDR, delay costs will be minimal. Once non-compliance is 
determined, penalties will be levied with a minimal time lapse between the 
violation and the sanction. Furthermore, to the extent that governments need 
TDR to borrow money, delay costs are zero when they do not dispose of a 
sufficient amount of TDR. It is highly likely that the commitment of the 
Member States increases when the monetary system is more transparent, 
allows the cyclical flexibility of the national budgetary policy and can be 
adjusted to the demographic and financial situation of a country. The yearly 
settlement of the permit account also significantly reduces delay costs. 
Member States need to present each year their TDR to cover their deficit 
spending. Consequently, fewer conflicts are expected when implementing 
TDR in comparison with the Stability Pact which, in turn, decreases delay 
costs. 
6.5.3.3. Information costs 
Information costs comprise the costs of setting the cap and determining the 
amount of permits each Member State receives. In terms of deficit, the 
stated goal (cap) and the initial distribution are easy to quantify: 3 % of 
GDP. No other estimations than GDP’s are necessary. Since these data are 
already kept, they entail few information costs. In general, good rules are 
simple and easily verifiable while complex rules are likely to add noise and 
uncertainty to the system. The current 3% rule scores well on simplicity. 
However, when the cap is determined in terms of its effect, for example 
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223 Article 87(1) on state aid as formulated in the EC Treaty determines that ‘(…) any aid 
granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which 
distorts or threatens to distort competition by favoring certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be 
incompatible with the common market’.  
224 In practice, changing (ether the design of the deficit permit system or) the law may be a 
politically difficult or even undesirable exercise, which largely depends on the distribution 
of values and interests (Woerdman, 2002, p. 96).  
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upward pressure on interest rate, the system would be more effective but 
information costs would rise as well.  
6.5.3.4. Search (planning) costs 
A cap-and-trade program entails several planning issues such as 
geographical area, temporal flexibility and the nature of the permits. The 
geographical area is the Eurozone and currently consists of 12 countries. As 
already stated, this number is likely to be insufficient for an efficient and 
liquid market. Therefore, some form of regulation seems to be necessary. 
Temporal flexibility, namely banking and borrowing, will not be allowed 
(as described in § 6.2.3.3.). As far as the nature of the permit is concerned, 
the cap is defined as the amount of money that governments are allowed to 
borrow. Permits take the form of deficit rights.  
 
The small geographical area may thus entail some regulatory costs, but the 
ban on temporal trade and the simple nature of the permit push planning 
costs substantially downwards.  
6.5.3.5. Set-up costs 
No additional agency needs to be set up to implement a TDR system in the 
European Union. In principle, all tasks like setting the cap, distributing the 
permits, regulating the market and monitoring and enforcing the permit 
system, can be performed by existing institutions such as the European 
Central Bank, the Ecofin Council and the European Commission. Set-up 
costs will thus be relatively low.  
6.5.3.6. Operational costs 
The administration costs depend on the choice of the trading system and the 
initial allocation (free, grandfathering, auction, updating). For the TDR 
system, we favour a free distribution of permits based on the 3 % rule, 
which minimizes the administration costs and is likely to entail the least 
social-political resistance. Once the cap is set, no other parameters should be 
considered. In some cases, an approval from the regulatory agency is needed 
to complete a trade. However, simple approval processes and few 
requirements are essential to keep operational costs low. Complex rules for 
governing the trading system can have a dramatic effect on transaction 
costs. It will not only make finding an acceptable buyer or seller more 
difficult, it will also create indistinctness about possible regulatory 
interference. 
 
Concluding, as little interference as possible will keep operational costs 
down. In other words, Member States should be allowed to sell or buy 
deficit rights without approval processes or other requirements.  
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6.5.3.7. Negotiation costs 
Negotiation costs are real resource costs to anyone entering into 
negotiations. Negotiations tend to be simple and easy when information 
about the threat values and the cooperative solution are public. Bargaining 
becomes more difficult and costly when it involves three or more parties. In 
the case of TDP, individual countries can freely trade permits. It will not be 
too costly because there are not many partners entering into the 
negotiations. Negotiating costs may be significant in the set-up phase. But 
as soon as market prices are determined, they will tend to drop rapidly. The 
European Central Bank can play an important role in negotiation costs. It 
can act as a broker and facilitate cooperative negotiation results between the 
12 Euro-countries because of asymmetric information. It is recommended 
that transactions do not occur on a bilateral basis but rather pooled by the 
ECB.  
6.5.3.8. Contract costs 
The literature on transaction costs demonstrates that small numbers 
contracting is a source of opportunistic behaviour leading to higher contract 
costs (Kirkpatrick and Parker, 2004, p. 44). The result can be adverse 
selection which takes the form of suboptimal contracts at the outset, 
resulting from one of the contracting parties acting opportunistically to 
arrange especially favourable terms. However, in the case of TDR, the 
transaction costs of contracting are zero because TDR are a homogenous 
good and there is no time lapse between the agreement and actual transfer of 
the permit. In other words, transferring permits is a spot transaction of 
which contract costs are non-existing.  
6.5.3.9. Monitoring and enforcement costs 
Monitoring and enforcement are of utmost importance to realise the 
objectives. Casella (1999) stated that non-compliance not only negatively 
affects the whole Union in general, via increased interest payments, but also 
those countries in particular that do play by the rules. More specifically, 
suppose a country is in violation of the scheme. If penalties are not taken, 
the price of the permits could fall to zero225. If the trading price was 
positive, any country that has saved permits for sale, or that has emitted debt 
to finance permits purchases suffers a capital loss.  
 
If a country is non-complying, it should face a fine for every missing permit. 
Member States will only constrain their behaviour if they have to bear the 
consequences, i.e. paying penalties. The European Central Bank should 
obtain the authority to monitor the market of deficit permits. While central 
bankers, like members of the Commission, are tenured bureaucrats without 
the political legitimacy that comes with elected office, they are generally 
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225 Assuming that all countries are opportunistic and will not follow the rules anymore.   
196
perceived as less politicised in the partisan sense of that world. Besides 
fines, also explicit political sanctions at the EU level, such as losing the 
right to vote on euro matters in Ecofin, might help to enforce the system.   
 
Buiter (2003) proposes to let the National Academies of Sciences of the 
EMU members nominate (possibly by rotation) a group of experts to 
determine compliance and non-compliance of Member States. They would 
serve for a fixed term, without possibility of re-appointment to limit 
opportunistic behaviour. This could be effective if the nominees owe their 
allegiance first and foremost to the mandate they would hold and to the 
tenets of impartial scholarly judgement. However, this proposal has obvious 
weaknesses, most important by its high monitoring and enforcement costs.  
 
Another possibility is to create a banking system that is legally prohibited to 
lend (or support the issuing of bonds) to public authorities that do not have 
the required deficit permits. Sanctions are then self-policing and self-
enforcing and no elaborate political process à la Stability Pact is required 
(Collignon, 2004b). This upstream enforcing mechanism will consequently 
significantly reduce monitoring and enforcement costs.  
 
Concluding, a market for deficit permits will induce lower monitoring and 
enforcement costs because exceptions are no longer possible and the permit 
price falls to zero if penalties are not executed. Transaction costs of 
monitoring and enforcing TDR will be lower in an upstream monitoring 
system (at the level of the banks) than in a downstream monitoring system 
(at the level of the Member States).  
6.5.3.10. Compliance costs 
In the simplest setting, each Member States receives each year a number of 
deficit permits equivalent to 3% of its GDP. At the end of every year, the 
Member State must have in its account a sufficient number of permits to 
cover that year’s deficit. These used permits are withdrawn from the system. 
When a country is not complying, it faces a fine or has to give up a 
corresponding number of permits from the following year’s quota. 
Consequently, in a market for deficit permits the transaction costs of 
compliance would be lower and the circumstances meriting exceptions 
would be harder to claim.  
6.5.3.11. Conclusions 
The first conclusion that can be drawn from the previous analysis relates to 
the transparency of the system. Clear and transparent rules will significantly 
reduce delay, operational, monitoring and enforcement costs. Delay costs 
will also be reduced because of a stronger commitment of the Member 
States which results in fewer conflicts. Operational costs are reduced 
significantly if deficit rights are freely distributed which makes the system 
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easy to administer and comprehensive for all Member States. Finally, 
monitoring and enforcement costs will be reduced in case of a upstream 
monitoring system, meaning at the level of the banks.  
 
Secondly, because no additional agencies need to be created, set-up costs 
will be low. Existing institutions such as the European Central Bank can 
play an important role in minimizing transaction costs. Because of the small 
number of partners, price negotiation costs can be substantial. Using the 
ECB as an intermediate is likely to reduce asymmetric information and 
market dominance. Therefore, expanding the role of existing institutions is 
an indispensable factor in minimizing transaction costs as a whole.  
6.5.4. Transaction cost comparison 
In the first part of this chapter, we have already demonstrated that the 
Stability Pact has several disadvantages which can be overcome by using a 
tradable deficit rights system. However, a major concern is whether such a 
system does not entail prohibitively high transaction costs. The real 
question, however, is whether the transaction costs generated by a TDR 
system are significantly higher than costs induced by regulation (Stability 
Pact). To answer this question, we will compare the transaction costs 
incurred by both systems.  
6.5.4.1. Information and search costs 
The information and search costs of the Stability Pact and the efficacy of the 
instrument increase with the degree of differentiation of the rules. The 
current ‘one size fits all’ rule induces relatively low information and search 
costs. However, for a more efficient rule, which takes into account all the 
differences between the Member States, information costs will be much 
higher. With tradable deficit permits, simple rules will keep information 
costs low. As the Stability Pact, these costs will rise when the cap is 
differentiated, for example, determined in terms of upward pressure on 
interest rate. Finally, search costs of a TDR system are dependent on the 
geographical area, temporal flexibility and the nature of the permits. While 
the small geographical are may entail high search costs, these costs will be 
substantially lowered by the ban on temporal flexibility and the well-defined 
nature of the permit.  
6.5.4.2. Monitoring, enforcement, compliance and delay costs 
Monitoring, enforcement, compliance and delay costs are all dependent on 
the complexity of the rules and the transparency of the system. The 
excessive deficit procedure of the Stability Pact creates high delay costs 
because of the lengthiness of the procedure and the predetermined 
procedural rules that need to be followed. However, sanctions arrive not 
only too late; it is often the case that they do not arrive at all. Monitoring 
and enforcement costs are thus substantially high, mainly because of the 
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complicated mechanism of sanctions, the limited enforceability and the non-
transparent negotiation process. The ‘soft’ law approach also increases 
compliance costs, because rules are not consistently enforced and 
consequently provide little incentive to comply.  
 
While a lengthy and complex procedure lies at the bottom of the Stability 
Pact, thus inducing high costs, a TDR is basically self-enforcing. Delay, 
monitoring, enforcement and compliance costs are kept low in an upstream 
system, if the banks are legally prohibited to lend to public authorities that 
do not have the required deficit permits.  
6.5.4.3. Negotiation costs 
The excessive deficit procedure not only induces high delay costs, also 
negotiation costs are substantial because of the lengthy deliberations that 
can take place. Furthermore, renegotiation costs can be substantial because 
of the opportunistic behaviour. In case of TDR, the European Central Bank 
can act as a regulator to lower negotiation costs by facilitating negotiation 
processes between the Euro countries.  
6.5.4.4. Administrative costs 
TDR as well as the Stability Pact can be administered by existing 
institutions. Set-up costs are thus comparable for both instruments. Because 
of the free distribution, TDR will also entail low operational costs. These 
costs can be further reduced in case of simple and few approval processes. 
In other words, Member States should be allowed to sell or buy deficit 
rights without approval processes or other requirements. However, complex 
procedures in case of the Stability Pact will cause substantial operational 
costs. Whereas set-up costs are low because the Stability Pact was 
incorporated into existing institutions, the costs of directly administrating 
the regulatory system are certainly not negligible. Again, the complexity of 
the procedure with various tasks for different regulatory bodies, such as 
monitoring budgetary developments and debts, checking compliance, 
preparing reports and formulating recommendations, are at the basis of the 
high administrative costs.  
6.5.4.5. Legislative costs 
Lobbying costs will be substantial in both cases and is, therefore, no good 
criterion to choose between both approaches. It is expected that countries 
with a high deficit will lobby in favour of TDR while Member States who 
have kept their deficit within limits will prefer the current Stability Pact.  
6.5.4.6. Conclusion 
All results are summarized in the table 24. It can be inferred that the current 
Stability Pact gives rise to higher transaction costs, largely because of the 
complex design and procedures in case of excessive deficit. As in the case 
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of environmental taxation versus tradable emission rights, it all comes down 
to the appropriate design of the policy instrument. Whereas the current 
Stability Pact is designed in such a way that operational, negotiation, 
monitoring, enforcement and compliance costs are high, a well-designed 
permit trading system is likely to generate fewer transaction costs (see Table 
25).  
Table 24: Comparative transaction costs of regulation versus tradable 
deficit rights 
Transaction costs F*/V° Regulation: Stability 
Pact 
Tradable deficit rights 
F High (politicians: 
complex design) 
High (opponents of 
balanced budget) 
Lobbying costs 
Delay costs V High (lengthy excessive 
deficit procedure) 
Low (yearly settlement of 
the permit account) 
Information costs F High (optimal 
regulation, hard law) 
Low (second best 
regulation, soft law) 
High (cap in terms of its 
effect) 




F High (optimal 
constraint) 
Low (low efficacy) 
High (additional regulation 
because of few 
participants) 
 
F Low (existing 
institutions) 
Low (existing institutions) Set-up costs 
V High (several tasks and 
complex procedure) 
Low (free distribution) Operational costs 
F High (lengthy 
deliberations) 
Low (ECB as regulator) Negotiation costs 
Contract costs F Zero Zero 
Monitoring and 
enforcement costs 





High (arbitrariness) Low (no exceptions) Compliance costs V 
* = fixed / ° = variable 
6.5.5. Policy implications 
 The main advantages of a tradable deficit rights system are its efficacy and 
flexibility. By setting a cap, the system makes sure that the overall goal can 
be attained while allowing individual discretion. Member States can meet 
their obligation by complying with their quota or by buying additional TDR. 
Since some Member States can reduce deficit spending at lower costs than 
others, the latter will choose to buy deficit rights from the former.  
 
Because regulation is incorporated in current policy and the use of tradable 
permits is rather new, especially in fiscal issues, policy makers tend to 
believe that the implementation of regulation is less complicated and 
induces fewer transaction costs. The comparative analysis of transaction 
costs presented in this paragraph has shown the inaccuracy of this argument. 
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In the following table, we will summarize transaction costs of effective 
regulation (revised Stability Pact where an optimal constraint is put on 
Member States) and tradable deficit permits. 
 
Table 25: Transaction effective fiscal policy instruments 
Transaction 
costs 
F*/V° Regulation: Stability Pact Tradable deficit rights 
F High (politicians: 
complex design) 
High (opponents: balanced 
budget) 
Lobbying costs 
V High (lengthy excessive 
deficit procedure) 
Low (transparent system) Delay costs 
F High (“hard” law) High (cap in term of its 
effect) 
Information costs 
F High (optimal constraint) High (additional regulation) Search 
(planning) costs 
F Low (existing institutions) Low (existing institutions) Set-up costs 
V High (complex) Low (free distribution) Operational 
costs 
F High (lengthy 
deliberations) 




V High (complex) Low (self-enforcing) 
V High (arbitrariness) Low (no exceptions) Compliance 
costs 
High fixed costs (except 
for set-up costs) and 
high variable costs 
High fixed costs (except 
for set-up and negotiation 
costs) but low variable 
costs 
Total costs  
 
This table reveals that, from a transaction cost perspective, the effective 
tradable deficit permit system is an upstream self-enforcing system in which 
existing institutions are used which determine the cap in term of its effect 
and distribute permits for free. The table also shows that effective regulation 
entails higher variable costs, namely delay, operational, compliance, 
monitoring and enforcement costs, than an effective tradable deficit rights 
system. Information costs of both ‘effective’ policy instruments will be high 
because the ‘one size fits all’ can no longer be maintained and the cap needs 








In this final chapter, the main results and conclusions of the research 
conducted in this study are recapitulated. First, the scientific and policy 
relevance of the research is discussed. Next, a summary of the results and 
conclusions of the design issues and comparative transaction cost analysis 
are provided. Finally, several concluding remarks and directions for further 
research on the subject of tradable permits and transaction costs are 
described.  
 
7.2. Scientific and policy relevance 
 
Cap-and-trade permit trading refers to a policy approach in which the use of 
a resource is capped, permits are allocated and a permit trading mechanism 
is established. Neo-classical economic theory considers permit trading to be 
efficient and effective in comparison with other policy instruments. Permit 
trading is efficient: marginal abatement costs are equalized across firms and 
every unit of the capped resource will have a price, since each unit has the 
opportunity of being sold. Permit trading is also effective: when the 
economy grows, the demand for permits rises, but their supply remains 
constant as a result of the cap. The government will meet its target and the 
scarcity of the resource will be reflected in a higher price. The 
implementation of the Acid Rain Program in the United States, where SO2 
emission rights are traded between electrical utility units, and the 
international adoption of the Kyoto Mechanisms, with IET as the most 
important mechanism, has put this formerly theoretical concept into 
practice.  
 
It is clear that permit trading ranks first in what might be called the 
‘economic hierarchy’ of policy instruments. Neo-classical economic theory 
would then expect that decision-makers choose this optimal design. 
However, it is a well-known phenomenon that this has not been the case. 
Politicians have mainly favoured sub-optimal policy instruments. The 
reason is that, when governments have accepted market-based solutions and 
decide to use permit trading as an alternative, it still has to be effectively 
implemented (Woerdman, 2002, p. 14-15). Prior to the establishment of a 
tradable permits system, policymakers must set the cap, assign initial 
allowances, set the rules for transfers and monitor and enforce the activities 
that ensue.  In this book, we pay specific attention to this complex task of 
designing a system, initially distributing the permits, determining the 
transferability rules, the temporal dimension, geographical area and the 
indispensable monitoring and enforcement system by closely studying the 
already existing cap-and-trade systems in the United States. Based on these 
systems, we propose specific designs for the introduction of tradable 
transportation rights and tradable fiscal deficit rights.  
 
However, besides the design issues, various other barriers hinder the 
implementation of permit trading, including institutional problems, legal 
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constraints and cultural objections (Woerdman, 2002, p. 470). Furthermore, 
permit trading is thought to have higher transaction costs than other policy 
approaches, such as taxes and regulation. While the literature on 
environmental economics has been discussing transaction costs of tradable 
permit systems (e.g. Stavins (1995), Woerdman (2001)), a comparative 
analysis of the transaction costs incurred by policy instruments across all 
stages of the policy process is still lacking (Krutilla, 1999). This book 
carries out such research. The objective of this book is to identify and assess 
the transaction costs generated by permit trading in three case studies, 
namely emission rights, entry rights and deficit rights, and compare them 
with other policy instruments, namely environmental taxation, road pricing 
and regulation. 
 
Not only our topic and approach are relevant, but we have also taken the 
first steps to develop an innovative theoretical framework. Rather than 
focusing on terms like political ‘acceptability’ or ‘feasibility’, as most 
analysis of economic instruments for different policy areas have done in the 
past (e.g. Mullins and Baron, 1997; Koutstaal and Nentjes, 1995), we focus 
on transaction costs. The reason for this is that transaction costs may inhibit 
trade and therefore may reduce the extent to which potential savings are 
realized in practice. Although it is suggested that permit trading still has a 
long way to go before being effective in any sense because of excessive 
transaction costs (Rao, 2003), there exists no empirical evidence that 
transaction costs have prevented trade or significantly affected prices of 
permits in the United States (Michaelowa et al., 2003). Consequently, a 
comparative transaction cost analysis between tradable permits and other 
policy instruments deserves priority in research. We have taken up this 
challenge in this book by making some first moves to develop this 
comparative analysis in three different policy areas. 
 
7.3. Design issues of tradable permits  
 
Like most literature on emissions trading, we have discussed the various 
design elements that are of importance when introducing a system of 
tradable permits. Firstly, the initial distribution of the permits is one of the 
most complex issues in the design of a cap-and-trade system. The two most 
important permit allocation methods are: sources have to buy the permits 
(auctioning) or they get them for free (grandfathering). In the U.S. Acid 
Rain Program, the basic structure of the tradable permit regime is built 
around an annual distribution of tradable emissions allowances mainly on a 
grandfathered basis, together with a small auction of about 2.8% of the cap. 
In the RECLAIM program of California, allocations are solely based on 
sources’ past level of activity. In the case of tradable entry permits, we have 
proposed a free allocation to citizens primarily for reasons of fairness and 
legitimacy. Using this method, one of the major sources of social opposition 
against road pricing, namely its redistributive impacts, could to a 
considerable extent be overcome (Verhoef, Nijkamp and Rietveld, 1997, p. 
539). Also tradable deficit rights are proposed to be allocated for free 
mainly because Member States are now also entitled to run a deficit of 3 % 




Secondly, restrictions on trade reduce the efficiency of the system and 
should therefore be limited. However, one of the most important fears that is 
expressed in almost any discussion of tradable permits involves the degree 
of market power that can be facilitated by the tradability.  Tietenberg 
(2001b) supports the notion that market power on the seller side is a more 
serious problem than market power on the buyer side because transaction 
costs of forming a cartel with a large number of small sources are 
significantly greater than those of forming one with a small number of large 
sources. Although the possibility for market power is significantly small in 
case of entry permits, primarily because the large number of individual car 
users, we have demonstrated that tradable deficit rights may suffer from a 
market power problem. Currently, there are only 12 market players and it 
seems unrealistic to assume that the market will be a competitive one 
without some form of regulation. Furthermore, political power and 
asymmetric information can influence prices and bargaining processes 
between Member States. Consequently, we have proposed to use a 
regulator, preferably the European Central Bank.  
 
Thirdly, standard theory suggests that a value maximizing tradable permit 
system must have temporal exchangeability, thus implying that allowances 
can be both borrowed and banked (Tietenberg, 2001a). However, in 
practice, and more specifically in the RECLAIM program, there exists no 
possibility for inter-temporal trade through banking or borrowing. The U.S. 
Acid Rain Program does allow for permits to be banked and used in the 
subsequent year (borrowing is also not allowed). This opportunity has 
played a significant role in reducing compliance costs because it enables 
firms the flexibility to plan their investment activities. In our design of 
tradable entry permits and tradable deficit rights, banking and borrowing 
was not allowed. The primary reason is that banking can create a temporal 
clustering of road use or deficit spending. Borrowing puts the cap at risk 
because participants can keep on borrowing permits without ever reaching 
their limit.  
 
Finally, the attainment of economic, social and environmental objectives is 
mostly dependent on the monitoring and enforcement issues. A downstream 
permit trading scheme that directly includes both large and small sources is 
most efficient, but it also entails high administrative costs to monitor many 
traders. In practice, every monitoring system must identify both the 
information that is needed to monitor the operation of the tradable permit 
program and the management component that will gather, interpret, and act 
on this information. Effective monitoring systems are therefore composed of 
data, data management, and verification components. Technology plays a 
significant role in monitoring systems of tradable entry rights. Permits will 
be put on so-called smart cards that are fraud-resistant and allow easy and 
inexpensive transactions. Monitoring tradable deficit permit systems 
requires a technical ability of all governments and the European Central 
Bank to monitor and control the evolution of the budgets. Naturally, this 
requires that identical and appropriate accounting standards are utilised 
across all governments involved. With regard to a successful enforcement 
program, we have argued that a carefully constructed set of sanctions for 
non-compliance is necessary. In practice, predetermined fines will be 
imposed by the enforcing agency itself for “routine” non-compliance. We 
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have argued that the non-enforceability of the current Stability Pact is a 
serious lack. A tradable deficit permit system will also not be successful if it 
can not be enforced properly. Consequently, non-compliance should trigger 
sanctions and these sanctions can be administrative or political. For 
example, it is possible to suspend rights of the governments or create an 
upstream monitoring and enforcement mechanism at the level of the banks.   
 
7.4. Comparative transaction cost analysis 
 
The survival of sub-optimal policy instruments could not be explained by 
neo-classical economic theory, which would expect that decision-makers 
choose the superior alternative of permit trading. A direction to search for 
an explanation can be provided by transaction cost economics which was 
introduced by Coase (1937) to explain why firms exist as an alternative for 
organizing economic activity by means of exchange transactions across the 
market. Transaction cost reasoning became most widely known by 
Williamson (1979) who argued that the alternative with the lowest 
transaction costs in the market will survive. We have criticized and nuanced 
the traditional explanation of choosing sub-optimal policy instruments in 
three ways. First, we have developed a transaction cost taxonomy that will 
be helpful in improving policy design and management. Second, we have 
analyzed the transaction costs of permit trading in three policy areas and 
those of alternative policy instruments. More specifically, we have 
compared tradable emission rights with environmental taxes, tradable entry 
rights with road pricing and finally, tradable fiscal deficit rights with the 
current regulation, namely the Stability Pact. Third, we have presented an 
overview of our transaction costs analysis and expanded this theoretical 
analysis with policy recommendations. Also transaction costs of effective 
environmental and transport market-based policy instruments and of 
effective fiscal policy instruments are compared. 
Transaction cost is now a generic term referring to any costs that come from 
realizing a transaction across a market. Since different types of costs may be 
born by different players at different points in the policy process, a proper 
classification of transaction cost categories is important to assure that all 
relevant costs are accounted for. We have extended the taxonomy proposed 
by Furutbotn and Richter (1997) which is the most complete to be found in 
the literature. They distinguish market, managerial and political transaction 
costs. Market transaction costs are the costs of transferring property (of 
user) rights between parties in a market. These costs include information 
costs, search costs, signalling costs, negotiation costs, contract costs and 
insurance costs. Managerial transaction costs are the costs of exercising the 
right to give orders within the organization and include set-up costs, 
monitoring costs, enforcement costs and bonding costs. Finally, political 
costs are the costs of running and adjusting a political system and comprise 
of lobbying costs, public support costs, enacting costs, operational costs, 
compliance costs and delay costs.   
 
Tradable emission rights versus environmental taxes 
 
From an ecological and economic perspective, it is clear that tradable 
emission rights outperform environmental taxes, but the crux of the former 
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system seems the transaction costs it entails. However, corrective taxation is 
itself not costless. First of all, the transaction costs of environmental 
taxation are conditional upon the selected tax base. The more accurately the 
tax base is defined, the higher the information costs and subsequent 
monitoring, enforcement and compliance costs. Secondly, we have shown 
that there appears to be a trade-off between transaction costs and the 
efficacy of environmental taxes. Corrective taxation, though desirable in 
principle, may entail prohibitively high transaction costs that can only be 
reduced to some extent by sacrificing its original goal, namely matching 
private and social costs. Tradable emission rights are mostly introduced 
because of two main reasons: to effectively cap environmental harm and 
efficiently internalize the environmental costs by setting the right price for 
the permits. However, the latter aim can be impaired in part by the 
prevalence of high transaction costs. We have analysed whether transaction 
costs greatly reduce the benefits of an emission trading system. In this 
analysis, we have shown that, contrary to popular belief, set-up costs are 
relatively low and not a major impediment for the implementation of a 
tradable permit system. The amount of transaction costs incurred is largely 
determined by the design of the system, in particular the distribution and 
trading regime. Permit trading also creates a trade-off between some cost 
categories. While an upstream system saves monitoring costs, it may add to 
negotiation costs because the market is less atomistic.  
 
Our conclusion is that tradable emission permits can give rise to significant 
transaction costs, but so may environmental taxes. While the former 
provoke more set-up costs, the latter is burdened by information costs. 
Essentially, it all comes down to the appropriate design of the policy 
instrument. We have shown that, from a transaction cost perspective, the 
optimal tradable permit system is a large scale, upstream operation in which 
the environmental agency distributes the permits for free at the beginning of 
each year and ensures that excess permits can be sold via a brokered market 
or auction. We have also shown that user charges, indirect tax 
differentiation for environmentally friendly products and income tax 
deductibles for environmentally friendly behaviour entails the least 
transaction costs, yet more than the optimal tradable permit system. 
Moreover, these instruments are hardly as effective. When comparing 
effective environmental market-based policy instruments, tradable permit 
systems should not be rejected ex ante based on transaction costs.  
 
Tradable entry rights versus road pricing 
 
Although tradable permits are effective in regulating road use, cost-effective 
in sense that they allow citizens to choose for the least costly means of 
achieving the objective and rely on the same technology that is used in 
existing entrance zone systems, their use in transport is still non-existing. 
With road pricing, transaction costs are conditional upon the physical 
relationship between the road charge and the external costs. The more 
accurate the charges, in terms of internalization of all external effects, the 
higher the information, search and planning costs. Technology plays also an 
important role in transaction costs of road pricing. While road pricing with 
electronic vehicle identification entails relatively high set-up costs per 
vehicle, operational costs, monitoring costs, enforcement costs and 
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compliance costs will be reduced. However, if is relied on camera 
technology, set-up costs per vehicle will be much lower wile here, set-up 
costs for gantries, operational costs, monitoring, enforcement and 
compliance costs will increase. In the transport sector, the great number of 
users constitutes an obvious obstacle to introduce tradable permit systems, 
since negotiation costs are assumed to appear, a priori, prohibitive. We have 
examined this question by discussing all relevant transaction costs 
associated with tradable entry rights. We found that the amount of 
transaction costs is, again, largely dependent on the design of the system. 
Furthermore, there exists a trade-off between some cost categories. While a 
downstream allocation induces high planning costs, monitoring costs can be 
kept relatively low when using smart-cards for all vehicle users.  
 
We have shown that developments in new technology are now decreasing 
transaction costs associated with implementing a network wide, fleet wide 
road pricing or tradable entry system. Our conclusion is that information 
costs are a decisive factor in choosing between both instruments. While no 
information is needed about price elasticities and marginal abatement costs 
in case of tradable permits, road pricing is only effective if there is sufficient 
differentiation in the road charge to induce the appropriate incentives. To 
conclude, the effective tradable entry permit system is a downstream 
operation in which the urban authority distributes the permits (on a smart 
card) for free and ensures that excess permits can be sold via an electronic 
market. Effective road pricing entails higher fixed costs, namely 
information, search and set-up costs, than an effective tradable entry permit 
system.  
 
Tradable deficit rights versus regulation 
 
The deficit spending of the Member States in the European Union is 
currently regulated by the Stability Pact. However, there are several 
weaknesses in the Stability Pact which are widely discussed in the literature 
(e.g. Beetsma and Uhlig, 1999). A rethinking of the fiscal-financial 
framework for the EMU is therefore necessary and urgent. One approach 
proposed by Casella (1999) is the introduction of tradable deficit permits. 
Deficits can be seen as external effects that weigh heavily on the Euro-
market and affects all members of the European Union. We have examined 
the transaction costs of such a tradable fiscal deficit permit system and 
compared them with those of the current Stability Pact. Although the current 
Stability Pact is rather simple, enforcement costs are high because there is 
scope for discretion and disagreement amongst policy makers which 
undermines the enforceability. Furthermore, operational costs are substantial 
because the current Stability Pact requires several tasks in case of excessive 
deficit spending which are complex. In addition, delay costs are also large 
because of this complex procedure. A market for tradable deficit rights can 
be created as an efficient mechanism for the implementation of fiscal 
constraints in the European Monetary Union. Clear and transparent rules 
will induce significantly low delay costs, operational costs, monitoring costs 
and enforcement costs. Furthermore, set-up costs will be minimal because 
existing institutions such as the European Central Bank can play an 





Because regulation is incorporated in current policy and the use of tradable 
permits is rather new, especially in fiscal issues, policy makers tend to 
believe that the implementation of regulation is less complicated and 
induces fewer transaction costs. However, we have shown that the current 
Stability Pact is not only ineffective, it also gives rise to high transaction 
costs, mainly because of its complex design, unenforceability and lengthy 
procedures in case of excessive deficits of one of the Member States. In 
contrast, a well-designed permit trading system is likely to generate fewer 
transaction costs. Delay, monitoring, enforcement and compliance costs will 
be kept low in an upstream self-enforcing system where no exceptions on 
compliance are granted. We have concluded that the current Stability Pact 
has induces higher transaction costs, especially with regard to delay costs 
and enforcement costs. Effective regulation, where hard law is used and 
optimal constraints are put on Member States, will induce even higher 
transaction costs. While the current regulation and a tradable deficit rights 
system entails high fixed transaction costs, except for set-up costs of both 
instruments and negotiation costs of TDR, variable transaction costs of TDR 




In this book we have demonstrated that the historical view of preferring 
other (market-based) instruments above tradable permits because of 
excessive transaction costs is incorrect. The argument rests on an 
incomplete and inaccurate definition of transaction costs. Furthermore, we 
have shown that the current policy instruments used, such as environmental 
taxation, road pricing and the Stability Pact, induces in some cases even 
more transaction costs. If these instruments would be designed in such a 
way to be as effective and efficient as tradable permits, their transaction 
costs would prohibit their use.  
 
Permit trading ranks low in the political hierarchy of most countries, but is 
climbing up. The Kyoto Protocol has been ratified by more than 55 % of 
industrialized countries and international permit trading is one of the four 
mechanisms of the Protocol. These actual developments have made the 
instrument better known and have put the effectiveness of existing policy 
under increasing pressure. However, the choice between other policy 
instruments and permit trading can only be made when case-specific factors 
are taken into account. We have focussed on one factor, namely transaction 
costs, and have demonstrated in three specific policy areas that the argument 
that tradable rights are effective, but entail prohibitively high transaction 




The implications for tradable permit systems that follow from the 
conclusions and analysis in this study are closely related to the design issues 
employed. Tradable permits are a rather innovative instrument that is not yet 
widely used. The implication is that more research must be conducted to 
further elaborate the key concepts as well as the practical relations between 
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them. On a theoretical level, we have explicitly discussed all design 
possibilities and issues. This has led to a framework which was used to 
design permit systems outside the field of climate policy, namely in the road 
transport and public deficit area. Of course, our proposals are not the only 
design possibilities of tradable permit systems. In general, additional 
research can shed more light on the question which design of tradable 
transport permits or tradable deficit permits is the most feasible.  
 
As described by Rao (2003, p. 6), transaction costs economics is an 
approach to the study of economic systems and organizations, the 
comparative merits of alternative forms of economic organization with its 
focus on micro-analytic and behavioural assumptions governing the statics 
or dynamics of economic agents and institutions, the law and economics. 
The importance of transaction costs was already recognized by Coase 
(1988) who stated that (p. 6):  
 
“Without the concept of transaction costs, which is largely absent from current 
economic theory, it is my contention that it is impossible to understand the working 
of the economic system, to analyze many of its problems in a useful way, or the 
have a basis for determining policy”.  
 
However, transaction costs economics remains a largely unexplored area of 
economics. Despite the voluminous literature in the new institutional 
economics, a theoretical consensus on what transaction costs are is still out 
of sight (Wang, 2003, p. 2). Given this current lack, we tried to present an 
exhaustive taxonomy of transaction costs. Since a general analysis of 
transaction costs is irrelevant for comparing policy instruments that are 
aimed at regulating specific external effects, case studies are generally 
necessary to provide the relevant data by which it is possible to conduct 
such an analysis. In this respect, transaction costs of alternative policy 
instruments in three case studies were compared based on the presented 
taxonomy. These comparative studies have been pursued by way of a 
qualitative analysis. The challenge is now to use these theories in light of 
empirical research and move forward with refined transaction costs analysis 
to conduct more informed and complete studies. By further quantitative 
research, additional information can be gathered on the administrative 
requirements of permit trading systems and the changes in relevant 
institutional structures that are necessary to introduce policy instruments 
with low transaction costs. The theoretical transaction costs approach 
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